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APIE government agency in charge of renting residential
properties nationalized at independence
Administrador do Distrito (do Posto) District Administrator, the highest authority at the
district level. Maputo is divided into 8 adminis-




Neighborhood, the geographic/political division
below the district level. Each of the 8 urban districts
in Maputo has over 10 separate bairros. Each
bairro, in turn, may be subdivided into as many as
70 quarteirões or blocks.
pre-independence term for municipality
one of the now-defunct financial lending institutions
Office housing the extension agents of the Gabinete
das Zonas Verdes. There are 4 casas agrárias, one
in each of districts 4-7 of Maputo, to provide
extension services at the district level and also to sell
agricultural inputs. Casas agrárias are found outside
of Maputo as well, but these are administered by the
Ministry of Agriculture.
Political leader responsible for a single block subdi-
vision within a bairro. His or her immediate super-
visor is the grupo dinamizador.
Head of lands, or the person responsible for ensur-
ing that the occupation of land and housing at the
block level conforms with the law. The chefe cannot
grant title. S/he may be involved in resolving
residential but rarely agricultural disputes.
Portuguese farmer who was granted a land conces-
sion by the Portuguese government in the colonial
era.
associações de produtores









conservatôrio de registro predial
conto
DINAGECA
Direcção de Construção e Urbanização (Dcu)
Direcção Distrital de Agricultura




ficha de occupação de terreno
Gabinete das Zones Verdes (Gzv)
grupo dinamizador (GD)
Executive Council (EC), the political/administrative
authority at the municipal level in Maputo (officials
of the EC are all FRELIMO party members).
custodian of property registry
(informal), is equivalent to 1,000 meticais (2.2
contos=US$1 in December 1991).
Cadastral Office of the Ministry of Agriculture
The office within the Executive Council which is
responsible for land-use zoning and titling of both
residential and agricultural lands in the city of
Maputo (sometimes broadly referred to as the
Concelho Executivo).
District Office of the Ministry of Agriculture. It has
no jurisdiction within the city of Maputo.
Provincial Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, that
is, the administrative post connecting each rural
district to the Ministry of Agriculture.
Process in the early 1980s of granting a concession
for a peri-urban quinta to individual(s) presenting an
official development plan.
base organization, usually referring to the grupo
dinamizador
same as the grupo dinamizador
form requesting occupation of land
Green Zones Office, an institution created in 1980
to promote the organization and increased efficiency
of agricultural production within the green zones of
the city of Maputo.
Political/administrative institution at the bairro level
responsible to the Urban District Administration
and, through this agency, to the City Council. It is
composed of a full-time secretary who directs the
grupo dinamizador, a full-time assistant for admin-
istration called apermanente, and several voluntary
responscáveis who direct a variety of social pro-
grams, including security, women's affairs, health,
xhousing, and farm extension. There is also a Tribu-
nal Popular, or local court, which is part of the
grupo dinamizador (see Jenkins 1991, p. 128). Its
role and function have inherent contradictions; it is
supposed to be a forceful and critical representative
of popular concerns, yet, as the lowest tier of the
state structure, it may be required to represent
unpopular government initiatives (see Pinsky 1985,
p. 301).
guevas Marketing intermediaries (who in practice are pre-
dominantly female). Guevas buy agricultural pro-
duce—chiefly lettuce and kale—directly at the plot
level or farm gate. Often they cut the produce
themselves before taking it to market, where they
either deliver it to their employer or sell it them-
selves.
Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Físico National Physical Planning Institute
Lei de Terras 1979 Land Law in the amended 1975 Constitution of
Mozambique
machamba farm or agricultural plot
palhotas traditional straw or reed house or building
posto administrativo Building in which the offices of the Administrador
do Distrito are housed.
privado private farmer or operator
Demarcated plot, usually larger than 0.5 hectare, in
the peri-urban area. These estates were primarily
owned by Portuguese settlers before independence.
owners of the quintas
Traditional, pre-independence authority serving as
the link between the colonial government and the
local population. In the peri-urban areas, their
authority was greatly diminished if not replaced by
the grupo dinamizador after independence.
Individual responsible for the daily labor allocation
as well as production and marketing decisions on his
or her agricultural plot.









Tombo Geral da Propriedade
União Geral das Cooperativas Agro-Pecuárias
de Maputo
União Geral das Associações dos Produtores
zonas verdes
parcels or plots
precarious, renewable, one-year concession
provisional, renewable, five-year concession
definitive, permanent concession
Municipal Property Registry in colonial times
General Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of
Maputo
General Union of Producer Associations




1. Mozambique was beset by Political and economic turmoil as it moved toward
independence in 1975. Portuguese settlers, fearing the power of a new regime hostile to
colonial and private interests, began to abandon their lands, homes, and businesses in large
numbers. As many Portuguese fled, they destroyed what they could not take along with them.
Moreover, the Portuguese practice of hiring expatriates for nearly all skilled and semi-skilled
Positions deprived native Mozambicans of the abilities required to operate the vacated farms
and factories.
2. According to the 1979 Land Law and subsequent regulations, all land is owned by the
state. Land cannot be sold, ceded, rented, mortgaged, or in any way privately transferred;
only land improvements may be mortgaged. A concession may be held by any individual or
collective with legal identity and may be perpetual or temporary in duration (the original
statute limited the period of holding to 5-15 years, but a recent amendment permits leasing
up to 50 years). Leasehold rights are transferable only by inheritance or, on the death of the
holder, bequeathal to heirs according to terms of civil law. The holder must utilize the land
rationally and in conformity with an authorized development plan. Any family which leaves
unleased land idle for over 2 years, without justification, may have its right to the land
revoked, without compensation.
3. The 1975 Constitution and 1979 Land Law confer on the state a strong interventionist
role in the use and transmittal of land. The state has divested these powers among various
agencies which make up the state apparatus in urban areas. At the time of independence,
central control over urban land use and transfer was granted to the Ministry of Construction
and Water, National Planning Commission, and National Institute of Physical Planning
(NIPP). At the municipal level, the Executive Council (EC) was assigned principal
responsibility for land use and distribution. Some 13 other institutions also received authority
over land allocations, including, inter alia, the ministries of agriculture, education, and
interior as well as APIE. In addition, the grupo dinamizador and bairro organizations were
granted authority over land allocations at the local level. In the early 1980s, the Department
of Construction and Urbanization (Dcu) was created as the division within the EC responsible
for issuing titles throughout the city of Maputo, including the pen-urban agricultural areas.
This dispersion of responsibility among multiple institutions has resulted in complex and
diffuse institutional arrangements governing land tenure in Maputo.Maputo peri-urban green zone settlement
4. Immediately after independence in the late 1970s, demand for arable land in the Maputo
green zones came mainly from urban workers or ex-farm laborers already within the city. In
the 1980s, several factors led to a sharp increase in land pressures and contributed to new
groups of people from outside Maputo seeking land. These provocations—including (1)
closure of the South African mines to Mozambican laborers, (2) drought and a severe drop
in agricultural exports, and (3) civil war—induced massive movement to Maputo of people
needing employment, land, and security. The rapid in-migration that ensued, continuing from
about 1982 to 1987, caused an outward expansion of settlement. By the end of the period,
most of the best agricultural land in districts 4-8 had been claimed. The next phase, from
1987 to the early 1990s, has mainly involved settlement of the drier lands around the green
zones, though irrigated areas have also been shrinking with the intrusion of population.
5. Before independence, most agricultural production for market was realized by the
Portuguese settlers who had been granted small farms (quintas) in demarcated areas around
Maputo. The massive immigration into the cement city along with the haphazard occupation
of these demarcated areas following independence created a situation of unclear and
contradictory land rights that persists to the present day. Moreover, the legal framework that
vests the state with all land rights has produced a system in which land rights are limited and
uncertain, land-allocation decisions appear arbitrary, and responsibilities for administering
land are onerous, dispersed among multiple agencies while too few resources are budgeted
to effectively oversee the system proposed.
Green zone policies
6. The concept of green zones was conceived with the aim of absorbing unemployed urban
residents, increasing food security in urban areas, and preserving the ecology of low-lying
areas. The Green Zones Directorate, created in May 1980, was responsible for coordinating
farm production, investigating land use and farm infrastructure, absorbing marginalized urban
populations, and guaranteeing a supply of agricultural inputs to producers. Extension offices
(casas agrárias) were set up in each district to carry out these missions on the ground,
including redistributing inefficiently used land and participating in land concessions (along
with the grupo dinamizador, district administration, and Dcu).
7. In an attempt to curb declining food security in 1983/84, the government engaged in a
policy of "parcelization," which aimed at transferring "underutilized" former quintas to
private farmers who had demonstrated means and capacity to use the land more productively.
The spontaneous occupation of quintas which occurred after independence was declared
illegal, and many of the occupants were displaced by state functionaries, merchants, and
urban elites who possessed either capital and/or political influence. In 1985, specific areas
of Maputo were divided into three categories: (a) permanent green zones, which contained
the highest quality agricultural land (including demarcated zones corresponding to former
quintas that had been officially registered before independence as well as undemarcated zones
that were never surveyed or registered); (b) provisional green zones, which included land
xivmore suitable for urban occupation (producers are allowed to cultivate but must leave without
compensation whenever urban development begins); and (c) zones of urban expansion, which
consisted of peripheral areas of the city.
8. The Central Union of Producer Associations was officially formed in 1988, though
individual associations have operated in the peri-urban zone since independence. Following
self-government, the producer associations carried out activities that had been performed
before by labor gangs, for example, cleaning irrigation ditches. Beginning around 1985, their
emphasis shifted to providing their members with commercial inputs. Since 1989, they have
turned their attention to problems of land conflict, in particular, to the issue of outsiders with
"certificates" claiming the lands of smallholders. Now, the principal goal of the Central
Union is to become a legal entity and thereby register its members' land by way of group
registration. At this time, however, the Dcu has no administrative procedure for granting
group titles to agricultural land.
9. Only land that lies within the demarcated areas of permanent green zones is eligible for
registration with the Dcu, though individuals have recently begun hiring topographers to
conduct surveys outside of these districts. Three types of title may be issued: precarious
(one-year concession), provisional (five-year concession), and definitive (permanent
concession). Precarious concessions were intended for areas of future urban expansion or for
landholders who currently lacked the potential to develop the land. The provisional category
is supposed to result in definitive title once the holder shows capacity to better the land.
Survey methodology
10. Between September and December 1991, the LTC research team surveyed 121
households in the peri-urban green zones—51 registered and 70 unregistered; 68 in District
4 and 53 in District 6. Titled households in the sample were randomly selected from records
in the Maputo and Matola land registries. Unregistered households were randomly selected
from lists provided by the casas agrárias and producer associations. A two-tier interview
process was employed: a first-round questionnaire was administered at the site of the
landholding to the responsável of each irrigated machamba held by the household; a
second-round interview, inquiring about household-level characteristics, was administered at
the place of residence to the household head, spouse(s), and adult workers.
11. The plot-based questionnaire asked about the responsável's farm-management experience,
land rights, settlement history, mode of land acquisition, plot characteristics, improvements,
land use, land value, output, production costs, family and hired labor, and income. The
second-round interview probed household demographics, wage- and self-employment
activities, household decision-making, political status, migration and remittances, and land
histories of all plots ever held by household members. Data are disaggregated in the analysis
according to location (District 4 versus District 6), gender (male- versus female-headed
households), tenure status (households with at least one versus those with no registered plot),
and the overall sample.
xvHousehold-level analysis
12. Of the 121 households in the survey, 28 percent have at least one family member living
outside of Mozambique (though very few reported receiving remittances). Household heads
on average have resided in the Maputo area for 30 years, and in their current bairro for 21
years. Compared with the general population, which is in a high state of flux from refugee
resettlement, this sample of producers has a long history of occupancy in the study area.
13. Households tend to own multiple plots of land in rain-fed and irrigated areas.
Households on average farm 2.2 machambas, including 1.3 irrigated plots and 0.9 rain-fed
plots. Irrigated machambas average 0.41 hectare in size while rain-fed plots average 0.52
hectare. However, these data mask important variations. Registered households on average
hold 1.7 plots (versus unregistered households, 2.6 plots) due to fewer holdings of rain-fed
land; they also have larger irrigated holdings (1.01 hectare versus .21 hectare) and larger
irrigated machambas (0.75 hectare versus 0.16 hectare per plot). Although female-headed
households have fewer dependents (18 percent fewer residents), their total irrigated
landholdings are roughly one-third the size (.21 hectare versus .58 hectare) of male-headed
households.
14. On average only 7 percent of households have one or more members who belong to a
cooperative, and 65 percent have members who belong to a producer association.
Unregistered households have higher rates of membership in producer associations than
registered households (90 percent versus 29 percent) while rates of membership between
male-headed and female-headed households are nearly equal. Those families belonging to a
cooperative tended to join for reasons of gaining access to farm inputs, obtaining produce to
sell in the market, increasing access to land, or getting marketing assistance. Those families
with membership in a producer association joined to increase security of land rights and to
acquire farm inputs. Increasing security of land rights was a more important factor for
unregistered than for registered households.
15. Registered (compared with unregistered) households practice more intensive land use
whether measured by total revenue (1,012 versus 640 meticais/square meter), chemical inputs
(89 versus 60 meticais/square meter), or net revenue (747 versus 520 meticais/square meter).
Female-headed households have the lowest productivity of any stratum and, compared with
male-headed households, disclose very low revenue (437 versus 836 meticais/square meter),
chemical inputs (32 versus 76 meticais/square meter), and net revenue (358 versus 644
meticais/square meter).
16. Males have higher rates of participation in and earnings from formal wage employment
than females. Fewer adults are engaged in self-employment relative to wage employment (80
versus 133), but net monthly income from self-employment is considerably higher. Almost
20 percent of all income earners reported having compensation from multiple nonfarm
sources. The average total income of female-headed households in 1991 was 739,000 meticais
($336) versus 4,445,000 meticais ($2,020) for male-headed households. Even after adjusting
for differences in household size, the per-capita total income of female-headed households
xvi(123,000 meticais, $56) was still only 21 percent of the male-headed category (596,000
meticais, $271). Registered households have substantially greater total income than
unregistered households (7,473,000 meticais versus 1,610,000 meticais/household),
demonstrating the economic power of private (titled) farms in the economy.
17. On average, crop activities contribute 59 percent, livestock activities, 16 percent, and
nonfarm activities, 25 percent, to total household income. Unregistered households (37
percent) and female-headed households (35 percent) place greater emphasis on nonfarm
earnings, lending weak support for the hypothesis that these groups are turning to nonfarm
sources of employment because of limited land access. Conversely, registered households
place the least emphasis on nonfarm income (21 percent).
18. Overall, the analysis reveals that agricultural producers in District 6, which has the least
effective state administration, rely to a greater extent on cooperatives and producer
associations to gain access to land and production inputs. Female-headed households, usually
composed of divorced or widowed individuals or women whose husbands are abroad, are
severely disadvantaged whether measured by land access, employment opportunities, or
income levels. Registered households possess larger farms, more wealth, and higher incomes
than unregistered households due to differences in human capital, property rights, and market
access.
Plot-level analysis
19. Land acquisition in the peri-urban green zones has roots in both spontaneous settlement
and official allocation by local and central authorities. Of the 162 irrigated plots in the
sample, 29 percent were obtained through bairro authorities, 15 percent through spontaneous
occupation, 11 percent from the Dcu or Executive Council, 11 percent from producer
associations, 3 percent from the traditional village chief (regulo), 2 percent from the Green
Zones Office, and 1 percent from the Ministry of Agriculture. Lower percentages of
holdings were acquired through nonadministrative mechanisms—12 percent through
borrowing, 9 percent through purchases, 6 percent through inheritance, 1 percent through
eviction of a former tenant, and 1 percent through renting-in. No household claimed to have
rented-out land.
20. The importance of the various processes used to acquire land has changed over time.
Spontaneous occupation, which represented 35 percent of land acquisitions in the 1950-1974
period, had become one of the least important modes by 1986-1992 (8 percent). Administra-
tive allocations by bairro authorities were important not only during the post-independence
era (1975-1980), when these influential people assisted urban residents in settling vacated
lots, but also since 1980, when they helped allocate land to refugees on humanitarian
grounds. Land allocation by the Dcu has increased in importance over time, from 0 percent
in the 1950-1974 period to 21 percent in 1981-1985. Granting of concessions by producer
associations has also expanded over time, from 0 percent before independence to the
predominant source since 1986 (24 percent in 1986-1992. Land purchases, once common
before independence, virtually ceased between 1975 and 1985 due to legal restrictions.
xviiPurchases since 1986 have rebounded (18 percent), despite periodic decrees that private land
transfers are illegal. Borrowing has remained an important means of land acquisition over
time, ranging from 10 percent to 15 percent of total. Rentals have become more important
since 1986, but still represent only 3 percent of all acquisitions.
21. A total of 34 plots of land was alienated by sampled households sometime in the past.
In 65 percent of the cases, the landholders were evicted, losing land to private farmers,
government, and producer associations; less than 12 percent of landholders in these cases
received compensation. Besides holding land in the peri-urban area, 42 households (35
percent) still have parcels in outlying regions or places of origin. The majority of these
respondents know whether and by whom their lands are being farmed. Only 22 percent
indicated that the entire household would return to these lands one day, suggesting that
prospects for going back to rural areas are not likely for most of the sampled households.
22. Private transfers, land sales, and rentals are occurring despite periodic bans by the
Executive Council. Sellers and buyers often get around the prohibition by claiming that only
improvements are being exchanged. Nominal and real land prices have rapidly risen over
time, leading to a sizable gain in wealth for existing landholders but also creating a
formidable barrier to entry into farming. Respondents in 1991 were quoting prices of
$2,500-$15,000 per hectare in actual transactions. These amounts are very high, especially
when considering that the average annual income of unregistered households is around $732
($336 for female-headed households).
23. Most plot managers feel they have the right to plant vegetables and fruit trees, invest in
permanent infrastructure, and bequeath land to heirs. However, more than 55 percent feel
they do not have the prerogative to rent or sell land. Although the law does not explicitly
grant men greater transfer privileges than women, male-headed households appear to have
greater rights of rental and sale than female-headed households, again despite legal
restrictions. Growing vegetables or fruit trees can generally be done freely without involving
the authorities. However, permission is normally needed on matters relating to permanent
constructions and transfers. Registered households commonly seek approval from the Dcu
or Executive Council; unregistered households usually seek permission from producer
associations.
24. Despite some progress made in market reforms since 1985, the vast majority of
households would still use administrative mechanisms to acquire more land. Of the 38 percent
of households that would like additional land, a high percentage would turn to the grupo
dinamizador for an allocation, especially in District 6. Purchasing would be more common
in District 4 and among male-headed households. Female-headed households would rely more
heavily on producer associations and casas agrárias. Surprisingly, 11 percent would attempt
to rent-in land, reinforcing the view that the rental market is becoming more important in the
peri-urban area despite legal restrictions.
25. Over 70 percent of households are worried about losing land, and 57 percent feel that
disputes have become more serious. In District 4, the major sources of dispute, in declining
xviiiorder of importance, are "outsiders" claiming land (with concession papers issued by the
Dcu) and neighbors; only 12 percent indicated that disputes are not a problem. In District
6, the major sources of conflict are individuals from outside the bairro, neighbors, bairro
officials, and ex-landowners; 22 percent felt that disputes are not a problem. Twenty-five
households reported having had a land conflict sometime over the 1973-1991 period; over
44 percent of these disputes have arisen since 1989, and 64 percent since 1986. The principal
causes, in declining order of importance, include conflicting title claims (multiple titles issued
for the same plot or overlapping registrations), private farmers expanding their holdings,
projects claiming land, border controversies with neighbors, and ex-landholders claiming
land.
26. In general, Possession of registration is perceived to increase tenure security, investment
incentives, and credit access. Female-headed households perceive fewer benefits than the
male-headed category due to their disadvantaged access to information about land registration
and formal credit. Land registration, by increasing exposure to government scrutiny, also
appears to be multiplying the risk of engaging in sales or rental activity, thus complicating
the benefit-cost equation (that is, households seeking greater tenure security for investment
or credit must weigh the benefits against the increased probability of land being expropriated
because if they engaged in private transfers).
27. Considering the perceived positive effects of land registration, the question remains:
Why don't more households register land? Registered households (when referring to lack of
registration by unregistered households) tend to place higher weight on land not being
demarcated, on small farmers not being interested, and on the process being too long and
expensive, while unregistered landholders themselves feel more constrained by lack of
knowledge, inability to understand procedures, and a general perception that the producer
associations should take care of it. Only 4 percent of households expressed no interest in
having their land registered, suggesting a strong latent demand. Registration procedures in
practice were far from uniform. Many registered households did not complete all the
necessary steps, and many unregistered households started the process but then stopped for
reasons of time, cost, or false perception that all the necessary procedures had been
completed.
28. Registration cannot normally be granted unless the land has been demarcated. Surveying
fees for extralegal demarcations exceed the means of most smallholders. DINAGECA, which
has the surveying capacity, is mandated to carry out registration only in rural areas outside
of Maputo Province. The Green Zones Office, which has jurisdictional authority, lacks
surveying capacity and resources. The Dcu, which has an urban focus but limited budgets,
tends to allocate its scarce resources to the registration of urban properties. The Dcu and
DINAGECA, which once had adequate funding for a much lower volume of land services, are
now in effect levying user fees to make up for budgetary shortfalls. Such requirements as
submitting a bank account, salary statement, or development plan, while perhaps applicable
to capitalized farms, are ill-suited to landholdings for the family sector. Smallholders, in
addition to lacking the knowledge, resources, or influence to acquire title to land, incur the
risk of losing holdings to "outsiders" who do possess the necessary means. A situation of
xixinstitutions at all levels being involved in granting land allocations has led to multiple or
overlapping concessions (formal and informal).
29. Plot managers in the study were asked to state the price that they would be willing to
pay for a plot identical to their current holding (reservation price) as well as the price they
would be willing to accept in disposing of the same plot (offer price). The average reservation
price is 45,966,810 meticais/hectare ($20,894), and the offer price is 31,218,177
meticais/hectare ($14,190). When respondents were asked to justify the seemingly
"exorbitant" land prices being reported, they emphasized the high future demand for—and
value of—land in the green-zone areas and their intention to capitalize on this trend. The
mean price difference is 32 percent of the reservation price—a very high figure compared
with real estate costs of around 6-10 percent in Western markets.
30. Land-price determination models are developed that link plot and household characteris-
tics with land-price perceptions by plot managers. Plot size, quality, and physical
improvements (access road and buildings) are found to be significant and positive
determinants of both the reservation and offer price. Asymmetries in information and
bargaining Position among households, which one might expect to distort price signals in a
land market characterized by administrative allocations, show either inconsistent or weak
effects. Further regression models link price differences (transactions costs) with household-
level attributes. Farm size tends to have a negative effect on the price difference due to the
reluctance of smallholders to dispose of land for income-security reasons or their difficulty
in bidding for land because they lack purchasing power. A negative relationship between
income and transactions costs and a Positive relationship between income and land prices
indicate a potential for small farmers to exit agriculture and wealthier farmers to expand their
holdings, with any forthcoming improvement in employment opportunities. Land registration
tends to increase transactions costs due to greater risk of detection as well as augment losses
of land for those engaging in "illegal" transfers. Gender has no direct influence on transaction
costs per se, but gender biases are apparent through differences in tenure status and farm-size
attributes.
Conclusions
31. Eighteen years of socialism in Mozambique have left a legacy of uncertain land rights,
high transactions costs, and proliferous institutional involvement in land Policy by central and
local authorities. Although land rentals and purchases are becoming more frequent, the
government continues in its attempts to control land allocation and use. The economic costs
of land-market restrictions are difficult to enumerate, but are widely apparent in the frequent
occurrences of land disputes, land expropriation by the Dcu and local authorities,
encroachment by refugees and private farmers, absence of fair compensation, tenure
insecurity, and onerous procedures for acquiring title under the statutory system.
32. There is no doubt that property reforms are needed and wanted by smallholders and large
holders alike, and that the combination of nationalization and civil strife has seriously
undermined security of land rights in the green zones. Yet the alternative tenure arrangement
xx(registration) provided by government is a poor substitute. Land registration, for all but the
initiated and influential, comprises demanding sets of requirements and procedures that exceed
the abilities of smallholders and are inappropriate to the needs of agriculture. Smallholders
are unsuccessfully turning to producer associations for protection of land rights, a solution
not without its own problems. The de facto situation of vesting powers of land policy among
multiple bodies with inadequate staff and resources has created too many parties with a voice
in land policy, none of which has sufficiently clear responsibilities and means to perform its
tasks effectively. Individual ownership rights and unrestricted markets may not be the best
solution. Yet, it is hard to see how Mozambique's market reforms can take hold without a
land policy more geared to serving private interests.
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Polítics de terras
1. Desde que Moçambique se tornou independente em 1975, o Pals tern sofrido uma violenta
instabilidade Polítics e econômica. Colonos portuguêses, ora residentes em Moçambique,
temendo o Poder do novo regime hostil aos interesses coloniais e Privados, abandonaram as
suas terras, habitacoes e inúmeros negócios. Muitos dos Portuguêses, enquanto fugiam,
destruiam maciçamente tudo o que nao podiam levar consigo. Alem disso, a prática comum
dos portuguêses de recorrer a mão-de-obra estrangeira Para quase todas as posiçöes
qualificadas e semi-qualificadas, Privou o Pals de quadroon capazes de operar imediata e
efectivamente as propriedades agrícolas e fábricas abandonadas.
2. De acordo corn a Lei de Terras de 1979 e regulamentos subsequentes, toda terra é
ProPriedade do estado. A terra nao poderá ser vendida, cedida, alugada, hipotecada ou em
nenhuma circunstância transferida de forma Privada, embora beneficiações as terras Pudessem
ser hipotecada. Por outro lado, a concessão poderá ser cedida a qualquer indivíduo ou
colectivo corn identidade legal, e poderá ser perpétua ou temporária (limitada no estatuto
original por 5-15 anos, embora uma recente emenda Permita contratos até 50 anos). Os
direitos do titular são transferíveis somente por heranca ou na morte do mesmo aos herdeiros
de acordo corn os termos da lei civil. 0 titular deverá utilizar a terra racionalmente e em
conformidade corn urn Piano de desenvoivimento autorizado. Qualquer família que abandone
um terreno, sem contrato, e sem justificação, por mais de dois anos, poderá ter o seu direito
a terra revogado e sem comPensação .
3. A Constituição de 1975 e a Lei de Terras de 1979 conferem ao estado um forte papel
intervencionista quanto ao uso e heranca de terras. 0 estado tern cedido esses poderes a várias
entidades estatais. Esta descentralizacão do poder combinada corn o facto de estas
resPonsabilidades terem lido designadas a muitas instituiçöes, em diferentes circunstâncias,
tornou o Processo de administracão de terras bastante comPlexo e difuso. APós a indePendên-
cia, o Poder do uso de terras, a nível nacional, foi outorgado ao Ministério de Construção e
Aguas, Comissão Nacional do Plano (CNP), e ao Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Físico
(INPF). A nível do municíPio, o Conselho Executivo foi nomeado principal autoridade Para
o uso e distribuição de terras. Contudo, Para alem das entidades mencionadas, outras 13
instituiçöes autônomas também receberam alguma autoridade sobre as terras, incluindo o
Ministério de Agricultura, o Ministério de Educação, o Ministério do Interior, e o APIE .
Alem disso, autoridades locais—grupos dinamizadores e outras organizações a nível do
bairro—foram também envolvidas no Processo de distribuição de terras. Alguns anos mais
tarde, no Princípio de 1980, o Departamento de Construção e Urbanização (Dcu) foi criadodentro do Conselho Executivo. 0 Dcu o actual responsável pela emissão de títulos de terras
na cidade de Maputo, incluíndo as zonas agrícolas peri-urbanas.
Constituição das zonas verdes na zona peri-urbana de Maputo
4. Imediatamente a seguir a independência, nos finals dos anos 70, a procura de terras aráveis
nas zonas verdes provinha principalmente dos trabalhadores urbanos, ou ex-trabalhadores
agrícolas residentes na cidade. Muitos são) os factores que contribuiram para a abrupta subida
da pressão sobre as terras nos anos 80, e que fizeram com que novos grupos populacionais
oriundos de zonas distantes de Maputo procurassem terras em Maputo. Esses factores—tais
como (1) encerramento das minas sul-africanas aos trabalhadores moçambicanos, (2) seca e
severa quebra nas exportações agrícolas, e (3) guerra civil—originaram migrações maciças
para Maputo de pessoas a procura de emprego, terra e segurança . 0 fluxo migratório, que
se acentuou entre 1982 a 1987, resultou num aumento descontrolado da densidade
populacional. Até 1987, a maior parte das terras corn melhor aptidao agrícola dos distritos
4 a 8 já tinham sido consignadas. Por outro lado, essas áreas têrn também reduzido devido
à expansão das áreas residenciais, resultante do incremento da densidade populacional. Nos
anos seguintes até ao presente, a ocupação das terras ocorreu nas zonas de sequeiro.
5. Antes da independência, uma parte considerável da produção agrícola comercializada era
feita por colonos Portuguêses a quern tinham sido atribuídas quintas, na periferia de Maputo.
Após a independência, a imigração maciças para Maputo, e a ocupação desorganizada dessas
áreas agrícolas demarcadas originou uma situação indefinida e contraditória no que diz
respeito aos direitos da terra, conflito que ainda hoje persiste. Alem disso, a estrutura legal
que confere ao estado todos os direitos da terra, criou um sistema em que os direitos da terra
São limitados e duvidosos, as decisões de atribuição de terras parecem arbitrárias, as
responsabilidades na administração de terras são complexas e dispersal em várias instituiçöes
e poucos recursos são alocados para uma administração efectiva das terras Segundo o modelo
proposto.
Pol tica das zonas verdes
6. 0 conceito de zonas verdes foi oficialmente criado com o objectivo de absorver residentes
urbanos desempregados, aumentar a segurança alimentar nas áreas urbanas e preservar a
ecologia das zonas baixas. 0 Gabinete das Zonas Verdes foi criado em Maio de 1980 com
a função de coordenar a produção agrícola, investigar a utilizadão das terras e infraestruturas
das propiedades agricolas, absorver populações urbanas marginalizadas, e garantir o
fornecimento de meios de produção (insumos) aos produtores. Casas agrárias foram criadas
em cada distrito urbano para levar a cabo os objectivos definidos, incluindo redistribuição das
terras ineficientemente usadas, e participação nas concessões de terras (em coordenação corn
o grupo dinamizador, a administração do distrito e o Dcu).
7. Numa tentativa de controlar o declínio da segurança alimentar, em 1983-1984 o governo
adoptou a política de "parcelização", que consistia em transferir as antigas quintas
sub-utilizadas a agricultores privados que possuam meios e capacidade para um melhor use
xxivdas terras. A ocupação espontanea das quintas, verificada após a independência, foi declarada
Regal. Muitos dos ocupantes foram substituídos por funcionários do estado, comerciantes, e
elite urbana corn capital e/ou influência Polítics. Em 1985, algumas áreas específicas de
Maputo foram oficialmente declaradas zonas verdes, e foram divididas em três tipos: (a)
zonas verdes permanentes—áreas de melhor qualidade agrícola (inclundo zonas demarcadas,
correspondentes as antigas quintas que foram oficialmente registadas antes da independência,
e zonas não-demarcadas, onde nunca foi feito levantamento topográfico ou não registadas);
(b) zonas verdes provisórias—áreas mais apropriadas para ocupação urbana (nestas áreas os
agricultores sãe permitidos a cultivar, contudo o terreno deve ser abandonado sem
compensação em caso de necessidade para desenvolvimento urbano; e (c) zonas de expansão
urbana—áreas da periferia da cidade.
8. A União Geral das Associaçöes dos Produtores foi oficialmente formada em 1988, embora
associaçöes individuais já existissem nas zonas peri-urbanas desde a independência. A seguir
a independência, as associaçöes dos produtores conduziam actividades que eram anteriormente
realizadas Por equipes de trabalho, como Por exemplo, limpeza de canais de irrigação. A
partir de 1985, a União Geral passou a dar maior ênfase ao fornecimento de meios de
produção (insumos) aos seus membros. Desde 1989, o problema do conflito de terras tem
recebido especial atenção, em particular problemas de estranhos corn "certificados" exigindo
a terra aos pequenos proprietários. Hoje, o principal objectivo da União Geral o de se
tornar uma entidade legal capaz de Poder registar a terra dos seus membros via grupos de
registo. Contudo, o Dcu não possui nenhum procedimento administrativo pars concessão de
títulos de terras agrícolas a grupos.
9. Somente as áreas demarcadas das zonas verdes permanentes são eligíveis de registo pelo
Dcu, todavia recentemente, certos indivíduos têrn contratado topógrafos pars conduzir
levantamentos fora destas zonas. Existem tees tipos de títulos: "precário" (concessão de um
ano); "provisório" (concessão de cinco anos) e "definitive" (concessão permanente). As
concessões precárias foram designadas pars áreas planificadas para futura expansão urbana,
ou pars proprietários de terra sem Potencialidade de desenvolver a terra. A categoria
provisória poderá resultar em título definitivo uma vez demonstrada capacidade de utilizar a
terra.
Metodologia de levantamento
10. Entre Setembro e Dezembro de 1991, a equipe de investigação inquiriu 121 agregados
familiares nas zonas verdes peri-urbanas, dos quais 51 eram registados e 70 não-registados,
68 pertenciam ao distrito 4 e 53 ao distrito 6. Os agregados familiares corn títulos de terra
(os registados) foram casualmente selecionados em listas de registos de Maputo e Matola, e
os não-registados a partir de listas fornecidas pelas casas agrárias e associaçöes de produtores.
O processo de entrevista consistiu de duas fases. Na primeira ronda o inquérito foi
administrado aos responsáveis dos talhões agrícolas irrigados, e este decorreu na própria
propriedade agrícola. Na segunda fase pretendia-se obter informação sobre o agregado
familiar, tendo para tal sido administrado um inquérito ao/a chefe do agregado familiar,
xxvesposo(a), e adultos trabalhadores. Este inquérito foi realizado no local de residência do
agregado familiar.
11. 0 questionário feito ao responsável do talhão debrucou-se sobre a sua experiência de
gestão, direitos da terra, formas de adquisição da terra, características dos talhões ,
desenvolvimento, use da terra, valor da terra, produção , custos de produção, trabalhadores
familiares e contratados, e salários. Na segunda ronda do inquérito pretendia-se obter dados
demográficos da familia, salário e trabalho por conta própria , tomada de decisão no agregado
familiar, posicão política, migração e remessa de dinheiro, e história dos terrenos dos
membros do agregado familiar. Na análise, os dados foram desagregados de acordo corn o
distrito (distrito 4 versus distrito 6), sexo (chefe do agregado familiar do sexo feminino contra
o chefe do sexo masculino), posse de terra (agregados de família corn pelo menos urn talhão
registado contra os que não possuem nenhum), e a amostra total.
Análise baseada no agregado familiar
12. Dos 121 agregados de família inquiridos, 28 por cento tern pelo menos urn membro da
familia vivendo fora de Moçambique, embora muito poucos tenham revelado receber
remessas. Em média os chefes de família inquiridos residem na área de Maputo há 30 anos,
e há 21 anos nos seus actuais bairros de residência. Comparado corn a população em geral,
na sua maioria refugiados de guerra, esta amostra de produtores tern tido uma longa história
de residência na área em estudo.
13. Em geral, as famílias Possuem múltiplas parcelas de terra localizadas em áreas irrigadas
e de sequeiro. Os agregados têrn em média 2,2 propriedades agrícolas, das quais 1,3 estão
em área irrigada e 0,9 em sequeiro. A área média das machambas irrigadas é de 0,41 hectare
e as de sequeiro 0,52 hectare. Contudo, estes dados ocultam importantes variações. As
família corn parcelas registadas possuem em média menor número de talhões do que as
famílias não registadas (1,7 versus 2,6 talhões). Esta situação resulta do facto de as família
não registadas possuirem maior número de talhões de sequeiro. Todavia, os registados
possuem maior área total irrigada (1,01 versus 0,21 hectare). Por outro lado, a área da
parcela irrigada dos registados maior (0,75 versus 0,16 hectare/talhão). Embora os
agregados com chefe do sexo feminino tenham menos dependentes (18 por cento a menos),
as suas áreas irrigadas são aproximadamente um terco do tamanho das áreas corn chefe de
família do sexo masculino (0,21 versus 0,58 hectare).
14. Em média, 7 por cento dos agregados tern urn ou mais membros pertencentes a
cooperativa, e 65 Por cento a determinada associação de produtores. A proporção das família
não-registados afiliadas as associaçöes de produtores superior a das registadas (90 e 29 por
cento respectivamente), enquanto que a proporção das família afiliadas cujo chefe do sexo
feminino aproximadamente igual a das família corn o chefe do sexo masculino. As família
que se afiliaram as cooperativas fazem-no por diversas razões, denture elas o acesso aos meios
de produção agrícola, facilidades de colocacão dos produtos no mercado, aumento do acesso
a terra, e/ou assistência nas vendas. As família que se afiliam a associação dos produtores
fazem-no para aumentar a segurança dos seus direitos a terra, e obter meios de produção
xxviagrícola. 0 factor mais importante que leva as famalias não-registadas a se afiliarem a
associação de produtores o aumento da segurança dos direitos da terra.
15. 0 use da terra das familias registadas superior a das não-registadas, seja a navel do
rendimento total (1012 versus 640 meticais/metro quadrado), aplicação de tratamentos
químicos (89 versus 60 meticais/metro quadrado), ou rendimento laquido (747 versus 520
meticais/metro quadrado). A productividade das familias cujo chefe seja do sexo feminino
inferior a qualquer extracto social. Os seus rendimentos são também muito inferiores a das
familias cujo chefe seja do sexo masculino (437 versus 836 meticais/metro quadrado), assim
como os químicos empregues (32 versus 76 meticais/metro quadrado) e rendimento laquido
(358 versus 644 meticais/metro quadrado).
16. A taxa de participação e salários dos homens em empregos formais superior a das
mulheres. Poucos adultos fizeram referência ao emprego por conta propria no concernente
aos rendimentos (80 versus 133), contudo os rendimentos líquidos mensais das actividades
por conta-própria são consideravelmente altos. Aproximadamente 20 por cento dos inquiridos
referiu que os seus rendimentos são de múltiplas origens, que não são só provenientes de
actividades agrícolas. Em 1991 a média do rendimento total das famílias corn o chefe do sexo
feminino foi 739.000 meticais ($336) versus 4.445.000 meticais ($2.020) corn chefe de
família masculino. A diferença nos dois tipos de família verificou-se mesmo depois de
ajustamentos ao tamanho da família, o rendimento total per-capita das famílias corn chefe
feminino (123.000 meticais, $56) foi sómente 21 por cento do relatado no segundo tipo de
família (596.000 meticais, $271). As famílias registadas têrn substancialmente maior
rendimento total comparado ao dos não-registadas (7.473.000 meticais versus 1.610.000
meticais/agregado familiar), o que ilustra o poder econômico das entituladas propriedades
agrícolas privadas na economia.
17. Em média, o rendimento total da familia provém de actividades agrícolas (59 por cento),
pecuárias (16 por cento) e as não-agrárias (25 por cento). As famalias não-registadas (37 por
cento) e familias com chefe do sexo feminino (35 por cento) dão maior ênfase a empregos
não-agrários. Esta informação evidencia moderadamente a hipótese de estes grupos se
dedicarem mais a empregos não agrários, pressupostamente devido ao acesso limitado a terra.
Contrariamente, as familias registadas dáo menos ênfase ao rendimento não-agrário (21 por
cento).
18. No global, a análise demonstrou que os agricultores do distrito 6, o menos efectivo
administrativamente, confiam nas cooperativas e associaçöes de produtores devido as
facilidades de acesso a terra e aos meios de produção (insumos). Os agregados corn o chefe
do sexo feminino, geralmente divorciadas, viúvas ou esposo no estrangeiro, estão altamente
em desvantagem, seja em relação ao acesso a terra, oportunidades de emprego, ou níveis de
rendimento. As famalias registadas possuem maiores áreas de cultivo e rendimentos do que
os não-registadas, devido a diferenças no capital humano, direitos de propriedade, e acesso
ao mercado.
xxviiAnálise baseada na parcela
19. A adquisição de terra nas zonas verdes peri-urbanas tern sido feita sob duas formal
principais: ocupação espontanea, e alocação official por autoridades locais e centrais. Dos 162
talhões da amostra 29 Por cento foram obtidos via autoridades do bairro, 15 por cento de
ocupação espontanea, 11 por cento do Dcu ou Conselho Executivo, 15 por cento das
associaçöes de produção, 3 por cento do regulado, 2 por cento do Gabinete das Zonas
Verdes, e 1 por cento do Ministério de Agricultura. Uma pequena porcentagem foi obtida a
partir de mecanismos não-administrativos, dos quais 6 por cento por herança, 9 por cento
compra, 12 por cento empréstimos, 1 por cento oferta do antigo proprietários e 1 por cento
explora terreno arrendado. Nenhuma família declarou ter alugado o seu terreno a outros.
20. A importância dos vários processos usados na adquisição da terra tern sofrido mudanças
corn o tempo. A ocupação espontânea que representava 35 por cento das adquisiçöes de terras
no periodo 1950-1974, tornou-se a forma menos importante no período 1986-1992 (8 por
cento). As atribuições administrativas das terras abandonadas por autoridades de bairro foram
importantes durante o periodo pós-independência (1975-1980), e desde 1980 predominaram
as alocações de terras a refugiados de guerra. As alocações de terras pelo Dcu foram-se
tornando importantes ao longo do tempo, tendo variado de 0 Por cento no periodo 1950-1974
a 21 por cento em 1981-1985. As concessões atribuídas pelas associaçöes de produtores têrn
aumentado ao longo dos anos. Desde a sua criação, nos meados de 1986, esta tern sido a
forma predominante de concessão de terras (24 por cento). As compras de terra, que eram
comuns antes da independência cessaram completamente entre 1975-1985. Uma subida
notória de compras verificou-se por volta de 1986 (18 por cento), apesar dos decretos
periódicos de notificação ao público da ilegalidade do acto de venda de terras. Os
empréstimos têrn sido uma forma importante de adquisição de terras, oscilando entre 10 a 15
por cento das adquisiçöes. Os arrendamentos tornaram-se importantes a partir de 1986, mas
representam somente 3 por cento das adquisiçöes.
21. Vinte e oito famílias revelaram ter tido pelo menos uma das suas parcelas alienada. Os
resultados do estudo demonstraram que um total de 34 parcelas de terra foram alienadas. Em
65 Por cento dos casos, os proprietários dos terrenos foram retirados das suas terras, e
substituídos por agricultores privados, governo ou associaçoes de produtores. Nesses casos,
menos de 12 por cento dos originais donos dos terrenos recebeu compensação. 0 inquérito
também demonstrou que 42 proprietários (o correspondente a 35 por cento da amostra) apesar
de possuirem terrenos na área peri-urbana também possuem outros terrenos nas áreas
demarcadas ou nos seus locais de origem. A maioria dos inquiridos conhece a situação actual
dos terrenos, se estão a ser cultivados e quern os explora. Alguns dos inquiridos (somente 22
por cento da amostra) acham que os originais donos dos terrenos poderão urn dia regressar
e apoderar-se dos mesmos. Este dado indica que a maioria das famílias não tern intenção de
regressar as suas áreas rurais de origem.
22. Apesar dos decretos periódicos emitidos pelo Conselho Executivo banindo transferências
privadas de terras, frequente a compra e arrendamento das mesmas. Frequentemente, os
compradores e vendedores para contornarem o problema argumentam que só se está atransacionar as beneficiações. Os preços nominais e reais têrn estado a aumentar drastica-
mente corn o tempo, o que torna o "negócio" bastante lucrativo para os actuais proprietários
de terras, e por outro lado cria uma barreira para se entrar no sistema. De acordo com o
inquérito realizado em 1991 os actuais preços das transaçoes variam entre $2.500 a $15.000
(USA) por hectare. Estas quantias são bastante elevadas, em particular se se considerar que
o rendimento medio anual das família não-registadas aproximadamente $732, e o das
familias corn o chefe do sexo feminino $336.
23. Muitos dos gestores acham que têrn o direito de cultivar hortícolas e árvores de fruta,
investir em infraestruturas permanentes e legar a terra em testamento a seus herdeiros.
Contudo, mais de 55 por cento dos inquiridos acha que não tern o direito de arrendar ou
vender a terra. Embora, explicitamente, a lei não outorgue direitos particulares aos homens,
aparentemente homens chefes de família Possuem mais direitos de arrendar ou vender a terra
do que as mulheres chefes de família, apesar de todas as restrições legais. Em geral, o cultivo
de hortícolas e árvores de fruta pode ser feito sem o envolvimento das autoridades, contudo,
construções permanentes e transferências normalmente requerem autorização. As autorização
as família registadas são normalmente cedidas pelo Dcu ou pelo Conselho Executivo, e para
as não-registadas pelas associaçöes de produtores.
24. Apesar de alguns progressos nas reformas de mercado iniciados em 1985, a maioria das
família usa mecanismos administrativos para adquisição de mais terra. A maioria dos 38 por
cento das família inquiridas, especialmente no distrito 6, gostaria de ter mais terra, e para
tal, acha que dirigiria o pedido de concessão ao grupo dinamizador. A compra seria mais
comum no distrito 4, e em família com o chefe do sexo masculino. As mulheres chefes de
família têrn a tendência de confiar mais nas associaçöes dos produtores e casas agrárias.
Curiosamente, 11 Por cento tentaria arrendar a sua terra. Este dado reforça a opinião sobre
o aumento da importância do mercado de rendas nas áreas peri-urbanas, apesar de todas as
restrições legais.
25. Acima de 70 Por cento das família receia perder a terra, e 57 por cento acha que o
conflito de terras se está a agravar. As principais causas de disputa no distrito 4, em ordem
decrescente são: estranhos reivindicando terrenos corn contratos emitidos pelo Dcu , e
problemas corn os vizinhos. No distrito 4, 12 por cento das família acha que as disputas não
constituem problema. No distrito 6, as principais causas são: indivíduos que não pertencem
ao bairro, vizinhos, oficiais do bairro, e ex-proprietários das terras. Neste ultimo distrito, 22
por cento de opinião que as disputas não são problema. Vinte e cinco família revelaram
ter tido conflitos de terras durante o período 1973-1991. Acima de 44 por cento dos conflitos
surgiram em 1989 e 63 por cento em 1986. As principais causas incluem, em ordem
decrescente de importância, conflitos de títulos (títulos multiplos emitidos para o mesmo
talhão, ou sobreposição de registos), expansão das propriedades dos agricultores privados,
projectos exigindo terras, disputa entre vizinhos e ex-proprietários exigindo terras.
26. Em geral, o registo destina-se a aumentar o seguro de posse da terra, incentivar
investimentos e facilitar o acesso aos créditos. As famílias com o chefe do sexo feminino
gozam de menos benefícios, devido ao limitado acesso a informação sobre o sistema deregisto de terras e ao credito formal. Apesar de o registo de terras melhorar o controle do
governo sob as terras, aparentemente o mesmo aumenta o risco de engajamento em
actividades de venda ou arrendamentos. Esta situação complica a equacão benefício-custo, ou
seja famílias procurando maior segurança de investimentos ou créditos devem avaliar o peso
dos benefícios contra a probabilidade de a terra lhes ser expropriada.
27. Considerando os efeitos positivos resultantes do registo de terras, a questao do porquê
da fraca aderência das famílias ao processo de registo permanece. As principais preocupações
das famílias registadas são: os terrenos não demarcados, os pequenos agricultores não
interessados, e o elevado custo e morosidade do processo. Por outro lado, as famílias
não-registadas sentem-se mais constrangidas pela falta de conhecimentos, incapacidade de
compreender os procedimentos, e uma percepção generalizada de que a associação dos
produtores deve cuidar do assunto. Somente 4 por cento dos inquiridos demonstrou falta de
interesse em registar as suas terras. Esta informacão sugere uma forte procura latente do
registo de terras. Na prática, os procedimentos de registo são bastante variados. Muitas
famílias registadas não completam todos as etapas necessárias e muitas não-registadas
corneçaram o processo mas não continuaram por falta de tempo ou falsas percepções de terem
concluído.
28. 0 registo normalmente feito a terras demarcadas. As taxas dos levantamentos
topográficos das demarcações extra-legais excedem os meios financeiros da maioria das
famílias. A DINAGECA, instituicão com capacidade tecnica de conduzir levantamentos
topográficos, só pode executar registos em áreas fora da província de Maputo. 0 Gabinete
das Zonas Verdes apesar de ter autoridade jurídica de fazer registos de terras agrícolas, não
possui nem recursos nem capacidade tecnica. 0 Dcu, vocacionado em assuntos urbanos e
limitado financiamento, tende a disponibilizar os escassos recursos ao processo de registo de
propriedades urbanas. Embora já tenham tido fundos adequados para o volume de servicos
então prestados, neste momento a situação financeira do Dcu e da DINAGECA precária. Para
proprietários de terras do sector familiar certos requisitos não são aplicáveis, tais como
submeter uma conta bancária, folha de salários ou piano de desenvolvimento. 0 envolvimento
de muitas instituiçöes na alocação de terras conduziu a concessões múltiplas ou sobrepostas
(formal e informal). Proprietários de pequenas áreas, agravado pela insufíciência de
conhecimentos, recursos ou influência para adquisição de títulos, poderão estar em risco de
perder as suas terras, em vantagem daqueles que possuem meios adequados.
29. Os responsáveis pelos talhões em estudo foram questionados acerca do preço de reserva
(o disposto a ser pago pelo responsável para urn talhão idêntico ao que possua actualmente),
e do pre-ço de oferta (o aceitável em caso de oferta do seu talhão). 0 preço medio de reserva
45.966.810 meticais/hectare ($20.894), e o de oferta 31.218.177 meticais/hectare
($14.190). Os inquiridos ao justificarem os preços dos terrenos, aparentemente "exorbitan-
tes", tendem a dar ênfase ao alto valor e procura de terras que existirá nas áreas das zonas
verdes num futuro próximo; e a sua intencão de capitalizarem neste facto. A diferenca entre
o preço de reserva e o de oferta 32 per cento do preço de reserva, valor bastante elevado
comparado a diferenca de preços para terrenos nos mercados ocidentais (6-10 por cento).
xxx30. Os modelos desenvolvidos de determinação dos preços de terras relacionam o talhão e
as características da familia, com percepções do preço das terras pelo gestor do talhão.
Observou-se que o tamanho do talhão, qualidade, e melhoramentos físicos (acessos a estrada
e construções) são determinantes significativos e positivos nos preços de reserva e de oferta.
Informações contraditórias e ofertas desiguais entre as familias, que em princípio Poderiam
deturpar os sinais dos preços no mercado da terra, caracterizado por alocações administra-
tivas, mostram efeitos inconsistentes ou fracos. Por outro lado, modelos de regressão
relacionam diferenças de preços (custos de transação) com as características das familias. 0
tamanho da propriedade agrícola demonstrou ter urn efeito negativo na diferenca de preço ,
devido a relutância dos proprietários de pequenas áreas de alienar os seus terrenos por razoes
de segurança alimentar ou dificuldade em propor ofertas. Uma relação negativa entre o
rendimento, e custos de transação, e uma relação positiva entre o rendimento e os preços de
terras são Potenciais indicadores de êxito para os pequenos agricultores, para expansão dos
seus títulos, e melhorias nas oportunidades de emprego. 0 registo de terras tende a aumentar
os custos de transação devido ao aumento do risco de ser detectado, o que pode induzir a
perda do terreno. 0 factor sexo não tem uma influência directa nos custos de transação , mas
os preconceitos ligados ao sexo são aparentes através das diferenças na posse de terra e
tamanho das propriedades agrícolas.
Conclusoes
31. Os dezoito anos de socialismo em Moçambique criaram um estado de conflito em relação
aos direitos da terra, altos custos de transação e proliferacão do envolvimento institucional
Por autoridades centrais e locais na política de terras. Embora os arrendamentos e compras
de terra estejam a tornar-se mais frequentes, o governo continua as suas tentativas pars
controlar o use e a alocação de terras. Os custos econômicos resultantes das restrições do
mercado de terras são difíceis de serem quantificados, mas são aparentes nas frequentes
disputas de terra, expropriação da terra pelo Dcu e autoridades locais, invasão pelos
refugiados e agricultores privados, ausência duma compensacão honesta, inseguranca na posse
da terra e procedimentos complicados de adquisição de títulos sob o sistema estatutário.
32. Não há dúvidas de que as reformas de propriedade são necessárias, e importantes tanto
pars pequenos como pars grandes proprietários de terras. A combinação de nacionalizaçöes
e conflito civil tem influenciado negativamente a segurança dos direitos da terra nas zonas
verdes. A actual alternativa do sistema de registo de terras implementado pelo governo tern
provado não ser a mais adequada. 0 registo de terras bastante complicado, corn requisitos
e procedimentos que excedem as capacidades dos pequenos proprietários, e são também
inadequados para as actuais necessidades da agricultura. Os pequenos proprietérios procuram
pelas associaçöes de produtores para protecção dos seus direitos a terra, solução que tern
também os seus problemas. De facto, a distribuição dos poderes da política de terras entre
múltiplas instituiçöes com pessoal e recursos inadequados tem criado uma situação bastante
turbulenta sem clareza nas responsabilidades e recursos pars uma realização efectiva das
actividades. Os direitos individuais de propriedade e o mercado livre aparentemente não são
a melhor solução. Todavia, difícil visualizar como as reformas do mercado moçambicano
podem ter lugar sem uma política de terras mais dirigida aos interesses privados.LAND MARKETS, EMPLOYMENT, AND RESOURCE USE
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1. INTRODUCTION
The peri-urban areas of Maputo have experienced dramatic changes over the past two
decades. Beyond the old cement city, low-lying regions that were once occupied by
Portuguese plantations and wetlands prior to independence are now fully settled by family and
private farms engaged in intensive vegetable and other horticultural production. The green
zones underwent rapid settlement following independence, first, by un- and underemployed
urban residents and former farmworkers occupying abandoned Portuguese farms and, later,
after 1980, by refugees fleeing drought and war.
The civil war had a tumultuous effect on people's welfare, settlement, and employment
as well as government's ability to regulate. Rural families have been uprooted from their
traditional lands, experiencing devastating losses of property and life. While fear, drought,
and economic deprivation pushed rural populations off the land, urban residents have seen
their city overrun by refugees and squatters. Massive immigration from the countryside and
lack of employment opportunities within the secure zone of Maputo have resulted in a rapidly
expanding belt of squatter housing and mass of poverty at the city's fringe. Petty trade and
low-wage occupations have burgeoned as formal sector employment declined, but the informal
sector, far from exhibiting dynamic growth, is providing little more than subsistence
livelihoods (Little and Baptista 1992). The population explosion of greater Maputo is
exceeding the state's meager means to regulate land use or even adequately to monitor the
demographic and economic changes that are occurring.
Maputo today is a dual city. The tree-lined avenues and southern-cape architecture on
the hilltops overlooking the sea still retain some beauty of old. Yet the skeletal remains of
skyscrapers continue to mark the city skyline eighteen years after independence. Beyond the
old cement city and pushing into the agricultural green zones is a now vast area of temporary
housing and squatter settlement which has limited or no access to water, electricity, or sewage
(DeGroot 1989). Poverty is pervasive. Long-term residents show a sense of "pain" when2
talking about the city's decline. While Maputo has rebounded somewhat in recent years, the
deterioration is clearly seen and felt throughout the metropolis. As noted by José Forjas of
the faculty of architecture and planning (personal communications), one has in effect
witnessed the ruralization of Maputo.
Since 1985, the economy of Mozambique has slowly been undergoing a transformation
from central planning under the guidance of socialist principles to less state control with a
greater reliance on private market forces. Considerable headway has been made in price
liberalization, as indicated by the widespread presence of vegetables in street markets and
articles in stores that were absent only a few years ago. Yet institutional rigidities continue
to impose a drag on the economy. Land still cannot legally be sold, rented, leased, or
transferred without the consent of an ever-changing set of authorities. A dynamic, informal
land market is emerging, but transactions costs remain high due to insecure property rights
and the onerous time involved in negotiating transfers. Economic hardships have left most
Mozambican ministries and departments dealing in land Policy with only meager resources
for day-to-day operation, effectively constraining government's capacity to provide the
essential surveying and registration services.
Clearly defined and certain property rights are necessary underpinnings for any
economy. In this regard, four questions are pertinent to the operation of the land market in
the Maputo peri-urban area: Do people have sufficient rights to ensure adequate incentives
to invest and improve the land resource? Are the rights of sufficient duration? Are they
secure? Can they be transferred at "reasonably" low cost? Negative responses to these
questions imply high costs for economic activity, with the consequence of dampening the
response of aggregate output to pricing reforms.
1.1 Research project
Beginning in January 1991, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activated
funding for a series of studies on land, employment, and financial markets in the peri-urban
areas of Maputo. Three institutions, acting under the rubric of the Peri-Urban Economic
Growth in Africa project, agreed with the Science and Technology Bureau of USAID to
cooperate in research: the Land Tenure Center (LTC) of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, the Ohio State University (Osu), and the Institute of Development Anthropology
(IDA). Funding for the research was provided by UsAID s Bureau of Science and Technology,
Africa Bureau, and Mozambique Mission. Work under the project has encompassed various
dimensions including a baseline survey of economic activity, migration patterns, food
security, financial market activity, land access and use (Graham et al. 1991); the relationship
between the legal framework, land disputes, and processes of land-dispute resolution (Boucher
et al. 1995); the dynamics of petty trade and household survival strategies (Little and Baptista
1992); and formal and informal financial market linkages (Graham and Francisco 1993), all
in the same peri-urban zone as this study of land markets.3
Beginning in September 1991, a land-market survey involving 121 households and 162
plots of land was administered in two peri-urban green zones of Maputo—districts 4 and 6.
Households were queried about their land-settlement histories, mode of land acquisition,
terms and conditions of transfer, land rights, size of holdings, perceptions of tenure security,
land-use practices, commercial input use, hired labor, agricultural sales and revenues,
nonfarm employment and earnings, and general demographic characteristics. The survey was
first administered in District 4 in October and November 1991 and later extended to District
6 in November and December of the same year. While the surveys went according to plan
for the most part, research activity in District 6 was shortened by 2 weeks due to escalated
violence in November.
1.2 OUTLINE OF PAPER
The present study reports findings from the land-market survey along with numerous other
interviews with producers, buyers and sellers of land, local authorities, and district and
national officials in Maputo and its surrounding peri-urban green zones. Section 1 is
introductory while section 2 covers the legal foundation of land tenure and describes the
various authorities and agencies responsible for setting and enforcing land policy in the
peri-urban zone. Section 3 explains the research design and sampling frame used to select
households and landholdings for the study, choice of strata, survey instruments, research
questions, and data limitations. Section 4 provides a statistical profile of the household
economy while section 5 examines processes of land settlement, land acquisition, types and
sources of land dispute, and registration benefits. In section 6, economic and political factors
are linked with land prices to explain the determination of "reservation" and "offer" prices
of land and to evaluate the influence of market factors and Possible asymmetries in
information and bargaining position on land-price perceptions.5
2. LAND LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND SETTLEMENT
A complex legal history emphasizing concession agriculture and favoring European (mainly
Portuguese) colonial interests dates back to the mid-eighteenth century. This full history is
both difficult to trace and transcends in scope a pertinence to the present study. This section
focuses, nevertheless, on the legal framework and processes of land administration that define
land policy in Mozambique and the peri-urban area of Maputo. After independence, from
1975 to around 1987, a combination of forces, initially political and economic and later civil
war, led to rapid settlement in the peri-urban green zones. This section describes these
tensions in detail and characterizes the failures in land policy that are presently undermining
security of land rights and income from farming.
2.1 LAND POLICY AND LAND LEGISLATION IN MOZAMBIQUE
2.1.1 PRE-INDEPENDENCE LAND POLICY
 
Land legislation enacted in 1918 (Decree of 16 March) subdivided the country's land base
into three land-tenure categories, the third being "reserves" for native Africans.' Outside of
the reserves, land classified as "vacant" was available for acquisition through public sale. In
principle, "progressive" African farmers could obtain up to 2 hectares of land contingent
upon demonstrating financial capability and surveying the appropriate plot. As is still the case
in Mozambique, the process of demarcation (section 5) was prohibitively complicated and
expensive. The combination of land partitioning and high demarcation costs together with
privileges and economic advantages already set aside for the colonial immigrants in land
acquisition led to the displacement of native Mozambicans from large areas of the country's
best lands.
International pressure on Portugal to redress these problems of inequitable land access
resulted in the enactment of the Statute of Native Agriculture (Decree no. 43897) of 6
September 1961. This decree partitioned Mozambique's land base into three tenure categories:
(1) land for towns and settlements, including peripheral areas; (2) land reserved for common
ownership by Africans, to be utilized in accordance with customary practices; and (3) all
other vacant lands not covered under classes (1) and (2). The decree contained no formal
recognition of land rights for indigenous individuals or families, but allowed Africans to
access land under statutory tenure in certain limited cases:
1. This and the following subsection draw heavily on Bruce (1990).
2. As used during the colonial era, "Africans" shall be used here to designate indigenous (that is,
non-European) Mozambicans for lack of a more precise and inoffensive alternative. This is in no way intended
to imply that Mozambicans of European ancestry may not be considered "African" as well.6
► under ARTICLE 226 of the 1961 Decree, the local administration could grant
concessions for permanent farms from class 2 (reserve) land to residents in its
administrative jurisdiction subject to the authorization of the district governor and to the
consent of the local administrator s advisors; and
► under ART. 229 and ART. 231, local residents could enter into rental or tenancy
contracts with the local administration for available class 2 lands (but not for areas in
excess of 50 hectares, unless resources and expertise justifying a larger hectarage could
be proved).
Land rights acquired through these channels could be transferred only with the
governor's authorization, though land rights were safe from government appropriation and
holdings could be used to secure loans. Ultimately, a native Mozambican could acquire land
rights comparable to those of a Portuguese settler only by irrevocably abandoning his or her
African status and becoming assimilated into the Portuguese political structure.
2.1.2 POST-INDEPENDENCE LAND POLICY
Mozambique was beset by political and economic turmoil as it moved toward independence
in 1975. Portuguese settlers, fearing the power of a new regime hostile to colonial and private
interests, began to abandon their lands, homes, and businesses in large numbers. As many
Portuguese fled, they destroyed much of what they could not take along with them (Hanlon
1990; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983). Moreover, the Portuguese practice of hiring expatriates
for nearly all skilled and semi-skilled positions deprived Mozambicans of the skills needed
to immediately and effectively manage and operate the vacated farms and factories.
The post-independence land Policy had to strike a balance between a rising tide of
socialism which was fueled by the need to avoid or redress past inequities in political and
economic design, a modernist ideology by those coming to power who thought that future
growth would require massive state and corporate structures, and practical concerns which
focused on maintaining and improving the farm and business infrastructure left behind by the
departing Portuguese. A land Policy built on "socialist" principles and state ownership is
firmly rooted in the 1975 Independence Constitution (ART. 8), which states (English
translation), "All land and natural resources in the soil and subsoil belong to all people
through the state," and land may be either "state or cooperative property." A debate on
property rights ensued within the ruling party of Mozambique, the National Defense and
Security Forces (FRELIMO), set against a background of ideology hardening along Marxist-
Leninist lines. The reality of properties being abandoned in the wake of the Portuguese
exodus precipitated the two-pronged strategy enunciated at the Third Congress of FRELIMO
in February 1977: reorganization and operation of "intervened" medium and large plantations
and other commercial production schemes such as state farms; and development of communal
villages involving cooperative production modeled on Tanzania's ujamaa villages.'
3. It is curious that the settlement of former Portuguese estates in the peri-urban green zones of Maputo took
neither path, as will be seen shortly, despite being close to closely located central government.7
While the legal framework was decided by 1977, the new Land Law (Lei de Terras)
(Law No. 6/79 of 3 July), one described in the presentation speech to the People's
Assemblies as "a weapon in the struggle to build socialism," was not enacted until 1979. The
law, and subsequent Land Regulations enacted in 1987, reconfirmed the principle that all land
is owned by the state, but is held by four classes of right holders—the state, cooperatives,
"private [title] holders," and "families." Although little space is devoted to state enterprises
(which are a concern of administrative law) or cooperatives (which are governed by separate
legislation, Law No. 9/80), the Land Law focuses on private titleholders and families. (The
following legal provisions refer to the 1979 Land Law unless indicated as part of the 1987
Land Regulations.)
According to the law, land cannot be sold, ceded, rented, mortgaged, pawned, or in any
way privately transferred (ART. 1), though a subsequent provision permits land improvements
to be mortgaged (ART. 2). Title or "license," which in effect is a lease of use rights from the
state, can be held by all single individuals or collectives (of persons) with legal identity (ART.
4).
4 The state promises to defend that title (ART. 5), although title does not unconditionally
grant use rights. The holder must utilize the land rationally and in conformity with an
authorized plan of exploitation or development (ART. 6). No fees are to be paid for land use
by the state itself, state agencies, or families, but fees are to be paid by private titleholders
(ART. 9).
The distinction between private holdings and family farms follows the conventional
Marxist distinction: family farms employ no wage labor while private farms do hire workers
(ART. 15).
5 The land rights of family producers are guaranteed by their occupation of the
land (ART. 8). Integration of such farms into cooperative structures is also encouraged (ART.
16). Compensation is to be paid when agricultural development causes damage to family
holdings (ART. 13), which, as Boucher et al. (1995) have documented, has rarely been
implemented or enforced (see also section 5, "Alienated land").
6
4. According to Bruce (i990), the term "license" used in the law is a more limited interest than implied by
this schedule; thus the more conventional term "lease" is used from this point forward.
5. As Myers and West (1993, p. 5) observe, this artificial dichotomy is neither realistic nor sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the continuum of farming enterprises in Mozambique: "By government definition, the
private sector is made up of farmers who employ wage labor, have access to credit, and produce for the market.
By extension they are seen as having `greater capacity' to exploit resources (that is, land, capital, labor) than
the family sector. The family sector, by definition, is made up of farmers who do not employ wage labor (but
rather exploit family labor), have little capital, and do not produce for the market. [In fact, m]any private sector
farmers . . . have little capital, do not employ wage labor, and consume much of what they produce. [While
alt the same time, most family sector farmers produce for the market and many hire limited wage labor to
augment the family work force."
6. Unlike land in residential or commercial uses, where improvements may have considerable value, it is
most difficult to apply this provision to agricultural holdings. Thus, officials can legally intervene and
expropriate without compensation in instances where the landholder has not made apparent or documented land
improvements.8
While any individual or group may apply for a title concession under the Regulations
(ART. 55), only private producers are required by law to file for title. Under the law their
rights must originate in a lease from the state (ART. 8) and fees are payable (ART. 9). A lease
may be perpetual or temporary. In the original statute, "temporary" was limited to between
five and fifteen years, but a recent amendment (Law no. 1/86) allows a lease to be given for
as long as fifty years. While titles for individuals and private entities are subject to this
limitation, the restriction does not apply to mixed private/state enterprises, in which case use
is guaranteed for the life of the enterprise (ART. 10). Should use be interrupted for reasons
beyond the control of the operator, the terms of the lease cease to apply for that period (ART.
21 of the Regulations). Leasehold rights are transferable only by inheritance, on the death of
the holder, to his or her spouse and heirs according to the terms of civil law (ART. 32). The
land in such cases may be subdivided but only if productivity is not impaired (ART. 16,
Regulations). Heirs cannot transfer the land but can transfer improvements with prior
authorization of the leasing authority; the state retains a preferred right to purchase such
improvements should it choose to do so (ART. 33).
Leases may be terminated by either expiration of term, renunciation by the holder, or
revocation by the state (ART. 34). However, the Regulations (ART. 20) permit a lease to be
automatically renewed for the same or shorter periods; a lease no longer simply expires but
must be renounced or revoked to terminate. In the event of termination, all improvements
revert to the state (ART. 35). Revocation may be caused by nonfulfillment of the development
plan, except when prompted by force majeur or by the state's need to use the land for other
purposes, in which case (the latter) just compensation is required (ART. 36). ARTICLE 19 of
the Regulations stipulates a six-month notice for revocation, except in cases of urgency. The
person or entity to whom the land is assigned is responsible for paying the value of those
improvements which cannot be removed and for all losses suffered. Rights to land and details
of their use and capability must appear in the National Land Register (ARTS. 37, 38); it is
obligatory to register the creation, termination, and transmission of such rights (ART. 39).
The Regulations further define the process for cadastral survey, titling of land, and
responsibilities for issuance. A provincial government may grant rights to use land for
agricultural production, livestock, or forestry in areas smaller than 250, 500, and 1,000
hectares, respectively. Leases for larger areas must be approved by the Minister of
Agriculture. The Council of Ministers must approve the setting aside of land as a protected
zone. Within municipalities, the municipal Executive Council has the responsibility of
approving leases.
The Regulations also seek to monitor family production. Although a family farm need
not have a lease, it may apply for one (ART. 55). As defined, a family is composed of the
extended family rather than the nuclear unit; the key criterion is "a community of material
and affective life" (formal marriage is not required). Land occupied by families is not subject
to taxation (ART. 47). The area for occupation is limited, however; a family's holding cannot
legally exceed 0.25 hectare of irrigated land and 0.5 hectare of rain-fed land (per family
member). If shifting cultivation is practiced, the family may hold additional land not to
exceed 10 hectares. Each family is entitled to common pasture for its livestock. If these
dictated allocations cannot be supported because of land scarcity, they can be reduced by local9
authorities when taking account of social, economic, and cultural realities of the region. In
the event that a family must vacate the land it occupies, a declaration of explanation is
required (ART. 50). In such cases, compensation for improvements on the land must be paid
in advance of the move and new land of similar value must be provided; those being moved
should be able to view the new holding before they relocate (ART. 52), implying a right of
refusal. If, of its own volition, a family leaves the land idle for over two years without
justification, its right to the land terminates and all improvements on the land revert to the
state without compensation. Even in the event of cancellation, the family may reoccupy the
land if no one else has begun to use it (ART. 60).
2.1.3 URBAN LAND TENURE
The Constitution and Land Law confer a strong interventionist role to the state for the
management, use, and transmittance of land. The state, in turn, has divested these powers
among the various departments, agencies, and ministries which make up the state apparatus
in urban areas (García 1989).
The Ministry of Construction and Waters (Mcw) has broad responsibilities for—as well
as a strong history of intervention in—granting licenses for construction works (General
Urban Construction Regulations), authorizing the alienation of land for buildings and rights
of occupation (ART. 12 of Decree Law no. 5/76 of 5 February 1976), and developing and
approving construction plans (ART. 5 of Ministerial Diploma no. 25/87 of 21 January 1987).
The National Planning Commission (NPc) (ART. 5 of the 1987 Land Regulation and ART.
11 of P.D. No. 34/86 of 24 April 1986) is responsible for developing and elaborating urban
plans, implementing the regulations governing physical space, developing regional and local
plans for residential use, and supporting local authorities in producing partial and detailed
urban plans. However, in practice, it is the National Institute of Physical Planning (Instituto
Nacional de Planeamento Físico , NiPP), an institute subordinate to the NPc, that is in effect
in charge of elaborating and promoting urban plans (ART. 2 of Ministerial Diploma No.
61/88 of 11 May 1988) and regulating the occupation of municipal land.
At the local level, it is incumbent on the provincial government to issue lease
concessions (ART. 8, Regulations), on the Executive Council to issue leases for areas within
the urban plan, and on the Executive Council and respective people's assemblies to
collaborate with the NiPP and superior agencies in elaborating local urban plans.' Local
offices of the Mcw, NPc, and NiPP are also responsible for coordinating and executing urban
development plans in accordance with general designs devised at the central agency level,
protecting and maintaining immovable state property, and developing housing policy.
Although the Land Law assigns the responsibility for governing land use in residential areas
to the Executive Council, the Department of Construction and Urbanization (Direcção de
Construção e Urbanização, Dcu), which issues concessions in Maputo, is actually in charge
of issuing titles for urban property in the periphery of the city, including agricultural land.
7. Summary of first meeting of the city and communal residential areas of February/March i979.10
A complex web of overlapping responsibilities is the outcome, one that defies easy
description or interpretation. In addition to the above-mentioned central and local authorities
—the Mcw, the NPC, the NiPP, the EC, and the People's Assemblies—land grants were made
to at least thirteen different agencies at the time of independence, including, inter alia, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Interior, and APIE (the parastatal
responsible for vacated apartments and housing). As noted by García (1989, pp. 7, 8), this
dispersion and overlap of responsibilities combined with constantly changing legal rules and
accountability have created an environment of arbitrary and uncertain land rights, lack of
certainty over who is liable for leases, proliferation of urban technicians, dilution of scarce
resources, and fundamental disrespect for rules and regulations by administrative officers and
citizens alike.
2.2 MAPUTO PERI-URBAN GREEN-ZONE SETTLEMENT
2.2.1 PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
Before independence, most agricultural production for market was turned out by Portuguese
settlers who had been granted small farms (quintas) in the areas around Maputo. These farms,
ranging in size from 1 to 100 hectares, produced for home consumption and supplied an
important segment of urban demand, especially fruits and vegetables. Most farms also had
infrastructure for raising small animals (chickens, ducks, and pigs). The quintas were located
in the lower, naturally irrigated areas, which were well-suited for intensive vegetable
production. The higher, rain-fed stretches, which had sandy soils and no irrigation, were used
by urban families as well as wage laborers and sharecroppers of the quintas to produce
subsistence crops (peanuts, manioc, and maize). Thus, until independence, the best land and
the most productive infrastructure were held almost exclusively by the Portuguese.
2.2.2 POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1975–1979)
The withdrawal of the Portuguese at independence resulted in the partial collapse of
agricultural production for the market as well as a breakdown of urban industrial activity. The
ensuing economic recession caused large and abrupt increases in unemployment and deflation
of real wages, accompanied by the spontaneous and unorganized occupation of the agricultural
lands abandoned by the Portuguese. During this period there was no official policy regarding
either agricultural production or land possession in the green zones. The occupation that took
place mainly involved ex-wage laborers and sharecroppers of the colonial quintas and urban
workers who sought alternative employment in response to their falling incomes and living
standards. The previous demarcations were largely ignored; in most cases, multiple families
occupied a single, demarcated plot of land.1i
2.2.3 NEw CRISES (1980-1987)
The 1980s brought new pressures on the city of Maputo and, consequently, on its green
zones. First, the Republic of South Africa (RsA) restricted access to jobs in South African
mines, causing a monetary crisis for Mozambique and unemployment distress for many rural
workers. These jobs were crucial both to foreign exchange earnings of the state and to
maintenance of large numbers of households in southern Mozambique. Moreover, the
restriction came at a time when there were record numbers of Mozambicans in the
mines—over 115,000 workers, according to Francisco (1987). Second, a series of severe
droughts plagued southern Mozambique in the early 1980s, forcing a dislocation of many
rural households. Third, armed attacks by former Rhodesian- and South African-backed
forces intensified. This accelerated economic deterioration in the countryside, disrupted food
supply lines to urban areas, and marked the beginning of a massive influx of refugees into
Maputo, which continued into the early 1990s.
These factors collectively led to an acceleration of the spontaneous occupation of
abandoned land that had begun at independence. The source of many current land conflicts
in the peri-urban area, in fact, stem from the unorderly occupancy of previously demarcated
land during this period.
2.2.4 GREEN-ZONE SETTLEMENT
The settlement of lands in the peri-urban green zones following independence was thus the
culmination of several factors (personal interviews; see also Graham et al. 1991; Pinsky
1985; and Boucher et al. 1995). First, the exodus of the Portuguese at independence sharply
reduced the supply of skilled and semi-skilled personnel in the workforce. The severe
economic depression that ensued resulted in the movement of people from the city's center
to its outlying areas in search of farmland and jobs. (See figure 2.1 for the administrative
boundaries of districts and bairros, and figure 2.2 for a land-use map demarcating the
peri-urban green zones of Maputo and Matola cities.) Second, after independence the
government adopted an "open-arms" policy, inviting rural people to occupy the apartments,
houses, and shops that had been abandoned by the Portuguese. While purposed primarily to
attract individuals into the urban areas, the proclamation no doubt led to settlement in the
peri-urban regions as well, particularly as the supply of vacant property lessened. Third,
while Mozambicans working in the mines of the RsA had been a common and important
source of employment going back to the latter half of the nineteenth century, the closing of
the mines to Mozambicans, the repatriation of earnings that followed, and the departure of
the Portuguese provided Mozambicans with the rationale, opportunity, and means to acquire
land (which they had heretofore faced restrictions in acquiring). Fourth, the impact of drought
(and the severe drop in agricultural exports and incomes in the countryside) combined with
civil war, particularly from 1980 onward, helped to encourage rural-urban migration—people
seeking employment, land, and security—on a massive scale. Finally, the elimination of price
controls on fruits and vegetables in 1985-1986 along with the structural adjustment program
(Programa de Reabilitação Econômica , PRE), which relaxed restrictions on other types of12
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trade in 1987, effectively increased incomes from horticultural production and improved the
profitability of private vegetable trade by 1989 (Little and Baptista 1992).
A baseline survey of 330 households in 1991 contributed the following settlement
characteristics of households in the peri-urban areas of Maputo (Graham et al. 1991): 32
percent of the total sample population were migrants, having moved to districts 1-8 of
Maputo Province sometime in the past; 66 percent of household heads were migrants, but
many had children who were born in Maputo and were therefore counted as nonmigrants
(thus the reason for the lower percentage reported for the total sample population); and 3
percent (household average) had resided in the area for less than 5 years, 11 percent between
5 and 9.9 years, 28 percent between 10 and 14.9 years, and 58 percent for 15 years and
more. Thus, while 67 percent of household heads were migrants, only 42 percent appeared
to have moved to the peri-urban area since independence. Between 1971 and 1980, the
primary motives (over 80 percent of valid responses) given for migration to the pen -urban
area include, in declining order of importance: "economic motives," "other family reasons"
(wife joining husband), and "came as a dependent." However, beginning in 1981, war
became the single most important motive for migration, a trend that continued through 1990.
In summary, from 1975 to 1982, most of the occupation of land in the green zones was
undertaken by former urban dwellers and farmworkers. Although the peri-urban zone today
is densely settled, in early 1980, the boundaries were still mostly limited to the old cement
city. In the course of interviews, some smallholders vividly recalled the humid lands as being
mostly unutilized and available for the taking in 1975. However, the rapid in-migration of
people uprooted by war caused a rapid outward expansion of residential settlements in the
period from about 1982 through 1987.
8 By 1987, most of the best agricultural land in
districts 4-8 had been claimed and was being intensively farmed in vegetables. The period
from 1987 to the early 1990s has involved mainly the subdivision and reallocation of irrigated
lands and the settlement of rain-fed lands in surrounding areas. Due to the political transition
at independence and war-related migration, population data are understandably scarce and
unreliable. Nevertheless, the rate of growth in Maputo's inhabitants has by most crude
estimates been extremely rapid, growing from around 250,000 in 1975, to around 800,000
by 1980 (Pinsky 1985), and to around 1.7-2.0 million by 1990. Although the most intense
demand is for residential use on drylands, the green zones have also been shrinking with the
intrusion of population settlement.
The massive scale of immigration into Maputo and the haphazard occupation of
previously demarcated land that followed created a situation of unclear, overlapping, and
contradictory land rights (see box 2.1). This situation partially stems from the environment
of political and economic turbulence within which the land policy was implemented.
However, the legal framework that vested all land rights to the state—and thence land
administration to state agencies—produced a system ripe for corruption, where land rights are
too limited or uncertain, land allocation decisions appear arbitrary, responsibilities for
administering land are onerous and too broadly dispersed among multiple agencies, and too
8. Except the lowlands which were unsuited for residential construction.16
few resources are spread too thinly to effectively administer the legal and land-administration
systems proposed.
2.3 GREEN-ZONE POLICIES
In response to declining agricultural production and an increasingly unstable economic
situation following independence, the government officially created green zones in the
peri-urban areas in 1980. The green-zone policy was aimed at absorbing the rising pool of
un- and underemployed urban residents, increasing agricultural production to meet the
growing food needs of Maputo, and preserving an ecological balance.
To meet these goals, the Green Zones Directorate (Gabinete das Zones Verdes, Gzv)
was established in May 1980 to coordinate production activities of all producers in the green
zones, investigate the common situation of land occupation, conduct an inventory of existing
agricultural infrastructure, construct and maintain recreational areas, absorb as much of the
marginal urban population as possible, and guarantee a supply of both input and output
markets for green-zone producers. Administratively, the Green Zones Directorate follows the
notion of "double subordination"; it is subordinated vertically to the Ministry of Agriculture
and horizontally to the Executive Council of Maputo.
Initially the Green Zones Directorate was assigned responsibility for the outlying
districts of Marracuene, Manhica, Matutuine, and Boane as well as for abandoned quintas
within districts 1-8 of Maputo. However, lack of resources and increased security problems
in the outlying areas forced the Directorate to scale back its activities to districts 1-8,
Catembe, and Matola. Districts 3-8 have remained the principal zones of concentration, since
Catembe and Matola continued to suffer security problems until 1992.
To carry out these goals, extension offices (casas agrarias) were organized in each
district within the green zones to work with family, private, and cooperative farms. Casas
agrárias are responsible for extending and teaching basic production techniques (an important
function since many farmers had little or no experience in farming or vegetable production
prior to settlement), selling farm inputs, monitoring land utilization, evicting and redistribut-
ing land that is not being used efficiently, and participating in the issuance and reallocation
of land concessions [along with local administrative structure (grupo dinamizador, GD) at the
bairrolevel, the district administration, and the Dcu within the Executive Council of Maputo].
9
9. Grupos dinamizadores were initially used by FRELIMO forces to mobilize the peasantry for rural
reconstruction activities. As noted by Pinsky (1985, p. 288), "As a guerrilla movement ... FRELIMO relied on
the active support of the rural population during the struggle for independence. In the liberated rural areas,
committees ofFRELIMO militants organized collective agricultural production as well as people s stores, schools,
and health posts.... Numerous meetings helped people become involved in solving their everyday problems, and
the practice of `people s power  gradually developed.... A similar strategy was attempted in the urban areas.
FRELIMO members and FPLM forces moved quickly into the cities and towns after September i974, helping to
organize the selection of grupos dinamizadores ( dynamizing groups  or GDS) in neighborhoods, factories,
institutions, and sections of the bureaucracy. GD members were sometimes militants known to FRELIMO from15
Box 2.1 Pressures of urbanization: An environment conducive to land
disputes
The four largest cities (Maputo, Beira, Nampula, and Quelimane) have
modern core areas of office buildings, hotels, and apartment blocks, along
with expansive residential areas that were once reserved for the settler
population. The rapid growth of these so-called cement cities in the 1960 s
and early 1970 s produced enormous speculative profits for the landown-
ers (or their corporate heirs), the largest of whom had acquired their
holdings when the land around the cities was ceded for agricultural
purposes. The owners cashed in as the city expanded and the land was
converted to urban use; some even sold it back to the municipal govern-
ment, as when land was acquired for the airport and a second railway
station in Lourenco Marques. Despite laws to the contrary, city officials
were often financially involved in these deals and the direction of growth
was undoubtedly determined in part by personal interest.
Expanding urban development added to the misery of the 75 to 80
percent of the population that lived precariously in the shanty-towns
surrounding the cement cities. Since Mozambicans were not permitted to
own land, many families were forced to occupy illegally land unsuitable for
building or public and private land slated for future development. Some
rented tiny plots from the land-owners, and many were subject to periodic
flooding or were bull-dozed out of their homes at the whim of speculators
and government bureaucrats.
At independence most of the shantytown areas lacked water.,
sanitation, and community services, despite the start in the early 1970 s
of a "psychosocial" program, a last-gap attempt to culturally integrate the
urban population, and not so coincidentally to develop a more skilled and
loyal workforce....
The enormous problem of improving living conditions in the growing
shantytowns was made even more difficult by the collapse of local
government as the professional and administrative staff abandoned the
country. Originally created to serve only the cement city, the "camaras
municipais" (city councils) combined inefficiency and corruption with an
inability to finance the enormous infrastructural works that were needed
to match the level of building activity. The colonial division of local
government responsibility further confused the situation. Not considered
part of the city, most shantytown areas were under a separate administra
-
tion, usually the rural district administration....
Pinsky, Barry. 1985. "Territorial Dilemmas: Changing Urban Life.
" In
A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique, edited
by John S. Saul, pp. 286-287. New York: Monthly Review Press.i7
When the redistribution ofquintas began in 1983/84, the ultimate authority for granting
and registering agricultural concessions was transferred from the Green Zones Directorate to
the Dcu. This marked the beginning of a decline of the powers of the Green Zones
Directorate. Currently the Gzv plays at most a token role in the granting of land concessions.
Its principal function is agricultural extension and supplying agricultural inputs.
The process of assigning land concessions had become very controversial by 1984/85.
Due to the worsening economic situation within the city, the government decided to
emphasize private-sector farming to increase food production. The previously demarcated
quintas were surveyed to assess land-use efficiency and exploitation and to assess the level
of infrastructural development. The process of granting concessions (entregas das quintas)
began with the objective of reallocating the "unutilized" or "underutilized" quintas to those
individuals who demonstrated means (and capacity) to better use the land. This redistribution
created many new conflicts. The spontaneous occupation of many quintas after independence
was declared "illegal." In many instances the occupants were displaced by state functionaries,
merchants, and urban dwellers from the cement city or by green-zone residents with capital
or political influence. The redistribution might have been innocuous had demand for land
been weak. But strong demand was coming from refugees and itinerants, and migrants
returning from South Africa with foreign exchange.
TABLE 2.1 Area of green zones, Maputo, 1985
PERMANENT GREEN ZONES PROVISIONAL






District 3 - 140 - 1 40
District 4 598 1,650 300 2,548
District 5 8 1,000 1 10 1,1 18
District 6 164 500 185 849
District 7 120 750 1,800 2,670
District 8 300 - 180 480
Total 1,190 4,040 2,575 7,805
Source: Maputo, Plano de Estrutura !dal Cidade de Maputo ( Maputo: Instituto Nacional
de Planeamento Físico e Concelho Executivo da Cidade de Maputo, 1985).
under-ground activities, but more often they were active individuals with some sense of organization and
engagement; all were then confirmed in their posts at public meetings. Paralleling the committees in the liberated
areas, the GDs undertook the massive task of mobilizing and organizing the transition to independence in
hundreds of urban areas...."i8
It was not until 1985 that specific areas of Maputo were formally declared green zones.
The official designation came within the 1985 Structural Plan (Plano de Estrutura) elaborated
by the NIPP and the Executive Council of Maputo. In this plan, three categories of green
zones were defined—permanent, provisional, and areas of urban expansion (see table 2.1).
2.3.1 PERMANENT GREEN-ZONE AREAS
Permanent green-zone areas, totaling 5,230 hectares (Mozambique 1985), contain the best
quality agricultural land for intensive vegetable production based on soil quality and access
to irrigation. These were further subdivided into two types of land—demarcated and
undemarcated—based on cadastral status from the colonial period.
The demarcated permanent green zones (1,190 hectares) include areas which were
officially designated and registered with the municipality before independence. They
correspond to the former Portuguese quintas. Most have a residence on the plot as well as
productive infrastructure (pig sties, warehouses, or cement wells). Most were already partially
or fully occupied by 1985, though their grounds rarely correspond with their formerly
demarcated boundaries. They are mainly located in the Infulene Valley and District 4. Only
in the demarcated areas does a semi-formal and legal registration process exist. These areas
have been characterized by intense land disputes caused by the land redistribution described
above and higher demand for land in these zones stemming from their superior land quality
and formal tenure security.
The undemarcated permanent green zones (4,040 hectares) contain similar quality land
but were never surveyed or formally registered during colonial times. In these areas, all
occupation after independence was spontaneous and disordered. After 1985, attempts were
made to organize families working in these regions into producer associations (associapoes
de produtores).
2.3.2 PROVISIONAL GREEN ZONES
According to the five-year plan, these areas, amounting to 2,575 hectares, are less suitable
for intensive agriculture and more appropriate for urban use, including residential expansion,
industrial parks, and schools. Rain-fed agriculture is permitted on the condition that producers
leave without compensation when development of urban projects begins.
2.3.3 ZONES OF URBAN EXPANSION
These are peripheral areas of the city where no formal occupation is planned within the
horizon of the 1985 plan. Rain-fed agriculture and sparse residential occupation now exist in
these outlying regions.
Land quality is not uniform within the permanent areas. One study estimates that only
about 2,000 hectares—of the almost 8,000 hectares defined as green zones—have "significant
development potential" (DAN1DA 1987, p. 48); it excludes most of the land area because of19
poor soil quality and lack of consistent irrigation. The zones identified as having high
potential include about 680 hectares in the Infulene Valley and 1,270 hectares in District 4.
2.4 PRODUCER TYPOLOGY
No state farms exist within the peri-urban area of Maputo. However, three categories of
producers—cooperatives, family farms, and private farms—are present, the latter two of
which are included in the survey sampling frame discussed in section 3. A fourth category,
producer associations, is beginning to obtain an important political force in the peri-urban
green zones and comprises members primarily from the first two classifications of producers.
2.4.1 COOPERATIVES
Following the Third FRELIMO Congress, the government emphasized forming agricultural
cooperatives to facilitate the "modernization" of Mozambican agriculture and as a means to
assist the Poor and disadvantaged in gaining access to land.
10 The Mozambican Women's
Organization strongly embraced and supported the movement, as reflected by the large
number of female managers and female members who currently work on cooperative farms.
Approximately 200 cooperatives covering roughly 1,000 hectares operate within the
peri-urban zone. They are organized and managed under the General Union of Cooperatives
(Unto Geral das Cooperativas Agro-Pecuárias de Maputo). The cooperatives' "peasant"
orientation and philosophy stress collective participation and self-help work in agricultural
enterprises, arts, and crafts. Historically, these organizations have provided an important
means for poor families, unwed mothers, widows, and divorced wives with children to
become engaged in farming." While the cooperatives within the Maputo green zones have
experienced more success than elsewhere in the country, the sector's performance has come
under increasing scrutiny as land pressures have tightened. Since 1985, a number of factors
have forced changes in their orientation and structure.
First, the General Union of Cooperatives has begun in recent years to aggressively
register the land of its members as a precaution against government expropriation. Of the 200
cooperatives in the peri-urban area, about 86 had been registered by 1991.
12 According to
officials in the union, small families (which are not in cooperatives) have been losing land
to government employees, who use donor funds intended for development projects.
10. For a more complete discussion of cooperatives in the Maputo green zones, see Tibana (1986); Gzv
(1986); and Francisco (1987).
11. Many household heads in the cooperatives are women, a fact explained by several considerations. Some
women who have husbands working in the mines of South Africa support themselves through remittances and
employment on cooperative farms. Also, a large number of co-op members were wives of men who were drafted
into the military. Finally, a clear subdivision of labor has emerged in Maputo, whereby women produce the food
and undertake petty trade in the informal sector while men seek formal wage employment (Little and Baptista
1992).
12. Communications with Prosperino Gallipoli, advisor, General Union of Cooperatives.20
Smallholders, who lack the influence or means to defend themselves, are either told to leave
or are moved by force. The cooperatives, recognizing the inevitability of residential
occupation of the green zones and fearing similar land expropriation, have been using their
political might to register the land of their members.
13
Second, while the cooperatives have historically provided the disadvantaged and poor
with access to land, recent rumblings of discontent within government about the low
productivity of cooperatives have forced the General Union to "rethink" its orientation and
structure. Until recently, all land-use decisions were managed centrally by an elected body
of members of the cooperative, the land was operated collectively, and profits were divided
among members. By late 1991, however, the cooperatives were considering individualizing
the landholdings of their members to minimize "free-rider" problems and to increase
productivity. As indicated in figure 2.3, individual cooperative members (indicated by A...Z,
a...p) who made decisions collectively prior to 1992 are, under the new model, allocated
individual plots to farm on their own.
14 Profits are individually retained while a fee is paid
to the cooperative for general services (input procurement, marketing, and land registration).
Figure 2.3 Proposed restructuring, cooperatives in the Maputo peri-
urban zone
New problems are emerging as a result of attempts to instill greater incentives for
private initiative within the cooperative model. First, individual members are now facing
illiquidity and cash-flow problems as they are being more frequently asked to bear production
13. Note that the General Union of Producer Associations of Maputo has adopted a similar strategy, though
with less success since it does not yet have official legal status.
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costs (the cooperative still provides assistance with input purchasing, but price and ability to
pay are supposed to play a greater role in allocation among co-op members). Second,
members who once never had to work are now being asked to "pay their own way," thus
creating internal dissension. Third, in attempting to resolve the "free rider" problem,
vulnerable groups—the disadvantaged, elderly, and ill—risk experiencing greater economic
hardship, which poses a moral dilemma for managers who continue to see the cooperatives'
role of assisting the economically disadvantaged as their most important raison d'être. Too
little time has passed to determine the degree of success of these experiments, but the
cooperatives clearly conceive their future structure as shifting toward a general services
approach with greater emphasis on economic initiative and performance.
2.4.2 FAMILY SECTOR
The family sector in the pen-urban area of Maputo differs from the family sector in rural
areas in two principal ways: (1) it employs a greater number of wage laborers; and (2) it
provides more marketed surplus. Whereas most family farms in the countryside produce
primarily for home consumption or barter, many of the family machambas in the peri-urban
zone are dedicated chiefly to output for sale.
15 Several points help explain the more frequent
use of both permanent and temporary wage laborers and the higher degree of market
orientation by family farms in the green zones:
► Surplus of cheap labor. The influx of war refugees (deslocados de guerra) and
economic migrants has increased the supply of farm labor and driven monthly wages
far below the official minimum wage rate. Typical monthly wages for migrants range
from 10,000 to 20,000 meticais
16 while the official minimum wage is approximately
35,000 meticais.
► Proximity of producers to urban job opportunities. With greater off-farm sources of
employment, the opportunity cost of on-farm labor is higher for peri-urban family
producers than for their rural counterparts. Farming usually represents only one
income-earning activity (albeit an important one) within a highly diversified income
strategy.
► High degree of monetization. Compared to rural regions, monetary transactions in
peri-urban areas are much more frequent. Family-sector households have greater access
to urban wage opportunities and cash sales, thus providing greater liquidity for hiring
wage labor.
15. Those family farmers who produce mainly for sale usually have access to irrigated plots; those families
having access only to rain-fed land produce primarily for home consumption. Since this study focused on the
irrigated areas, the empirical data presented in later sections pertain to a fairly specific segment of family
producers.
16. In i99i, 2,i00 meticais=US$1.00.22
► Higher urban demand for vegetables. The principal marketed output of peri-urban
family farms is lettuce and kale. These are not traditional foods nationwide; rather, they
are unique to the consumption patterns of large urban centers. Since they are perishable
and ill-suited to transportation over long distances, peri-urban producers have a
comparative geographic advantage in their production (Little and Baptista 1992).
► Price liberalization. The higher prices received for vegetables (as a result of the
economic liberalization program begun in 1985) have provided a strong incentive for
all producers in the peri-urban area to increase marketed surplus.
2.4.3 PRIVATE SECTOR
The private sector in the peri-urban zone conforms more closely to the general definitions
given in the Land Law. However, the dividing line between private and family producers in
this region is more diffuse than in rural areas. Private sector farms are distinguishable from
their rural counterparts in three principal ways: labor relations, market production, and land
registration.
Private farmers in the peri-urban zone use a combination of family and wage labor,
ranging from principally family workers to almost exclusively wage laborers with family
members filling managerial roles.
Production is primarily, if not exclusively, for the market. A distinction must be made
between the quinta owners (quintaleiros) and the other private producers (privados). The
former occupy the farms abandoned by Portuguese colonists (colonos). Their unique feature
is that the family resides on the farm. The quinta is a self-contained unit, typically having
very diversified production including vegetables for market, subsistence crops, and fruit trees
as well as small animals. In contrast, private producers not occupying a quinta do not reside
on their farms. Their production is more specialized, almost exclusively for market sale; they
rarely produce subsistence crops. Their labor is almost exclusively hired, and they normally
use more capital-intensive production techniques (for example, mechanized irrigation and
tillage) than the quintaleiros. Further, many privados own their own trucks, which allows
them to directly market their produce. Conversely, like family farmers, many quintaleiros
depend on intermediaries to buy their crops at the farm gate.
In theory, private farmers are required to register their land. In peri-urban Maputo,
however, this is problematic. As explained in greater detail below, there is only a limited
geographic area within the peri-urban zone where land can be officially registered, that is,
the quintas which were occupied and demarcated by the Portuguese before independence.
There is no administrative mechanism for registration outside these areas. Consequently, the
majority of producers in the private and family sectors are unable to obtain title.23
2.4.4 PRODUCER ASSOCIATIONS
The Central Union of Producer Associations (União Geral das Associacoes dos Productores)
was officially formed in 1988, though individual producer associations (PAS) have operated
in the Maputo peri-urban zone since independence. With the support of the Green Zones
Directorate, the PAS have organized themselves with a structure parallel to that of the
cooperative movement; they have a centralized body that is responsible for coordinating
efforts among the different associations operating at the bairro level. Some 74 PAS operate
in districts 4 through 8 (table 2.2). According to PA officials, three factors influenced the
decision to seek approved standing: (1) the spontaneous emergence of PAS to do work
requiring collective action (see below); (2) the success of cooperatives in providing technical
support as well as procuring inputs and other services for their members; and (3) the
influence of the Green Zones Directorate in organizing producers."
TABLE 2.2 Number of producer associations in Maputo by
district
Source: Archives of the General Union of Producer Associations.
In the early days after independence, the producer associations organized themselves
around activities previously carried out on a collective basis by labor gangs, for example,
cleaning irrigation ditches. Beginning around 1984/85, however, and extending through 1989,
their emphasis shifted toward providing members with commercial inputs. At the time inputs
were—and continue to be—sold by the casas agrárias and could not be purchased in "small"
amounts (part of a bag of fertilizer or part of a can of pesticide) by individual producers. The
casas agrárias, for budgetary reasons, could only purchase inputs once or twice during the
year. Small producers who wanted fertilizer usually lacked the financial resources to acquire
sufficient quantities in advance for the three or more vegetable seasons each year, while
private producers, who had better knowledge of input arrivals and better capital endowments,
i7. There is a widespread feeling among smallholders in Maputo that, without the assistance of a larger
organization with political influence (that is, a cooperative or a producer association), there is little chance of
gaining access to inputs, getting credit, or protecting land rights.













could purchase their entire stock.
18 Producer associations began to help members purchase
inputs in bulk from the casas agrárias, construct small warehouse facilities for storage, and
develop and maintain accounting procedures to record purchases and payments. They are also
trying to import inputs directly without state intermediation.
Since 1989, the PAS have turned their attention to problems of land dispute and conflicts
stemming from government Policy—in particular, the emergence of outsiders holding official
documents to claim landownership.
19 The principal goal of the Uniao Geral currently is,
first, to gain status as a legal entity and, then, to register land for its members (a process
similar to what the cooperatives are now doing). Without such status, the PAS can have no
formal relationship to the state nor can they hope to obtain formal land registration.
2.5 LAND REGISTRATION
2.5.1 COLONIAL TIMES
Before independence, registration of a concession was more expedient than at present, in part
because of lower demand for services. A letter from the producer, which contained a
cadastral map (formally requested from the municipality), had to be written to the
municipality (câmara municipal) indicating the location of the desired plot. A representative
of the municipality (seção do foral) then visited the plot to determine whether or not it was
occupied. After having his/her land rights verified, the applicant was required to pay a small
fee to the municipality for stamps, title, and administrative costs, after which the occupation
was provisionally authorized and published in the official gazette. Occupation became
permanent if no objections were filed within thirty days, after which an annual fee was
assessed, on a square footage basis, payable to the municipality.
20 Copies of the title were
then delivered to the landholder and the municipal property registry (Tombo Geral da
Propriedade).
18. The casas agrarias cannot replenish stocks on a regular basis because they lack priority within the
government budget. At the time of this study, the scarce foreign exchange needed to import inputs was rationed
to the highest priority sectors, which excluded the Gzv.
19. In District 5, for example, there are reportedly many cases of individuals bringing papers showing
claims to land. In most cases, with the backing of the Pas, producers have refused to leave. The dispute, rather
than ending, becomes stuck in limbo. Landholders still retain their title certificates while Pas enforce the rights
of smallholders. According to the Pas, land disputes are not declining; rather, people with certificates have
momentarily halted their pursuit of claims for fear of confronting the producer associations.
20. For example, a concession granted in i972 in Matola carried an annual fee of 12.5 escudos (data
collected from Dcu archives of Maputo and Matola).25
2.5.2 AGRICULTURAL OR RURAL LAND
Bruce (1990) outlines the steps currently required to register a concession of land in rural
areas of Mozambique. An application must be made to the provincial cadastral office
(Direção Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro) (DINAGECA) of the Ministry of Agriculture if
the plot is less than 250 hectares, or to the central office in Maputo, if greater than 250
hectares. The provincial office is then responsible for investigating the suitability of the plot
for the land use specified in the development plan submitted by the applicant and the
availability of the plot for concession. Once suitability and availability are ascertained,
provisional occupation is granted, the plot is surveyed by DINAGECA, and occupation is
authorized. The lease is then sent to DINAGECA
 S central office, where the title is issued and
sent for filing to the custodian of the property registry (conservatôrio de registro predial).
The entire process should take approximately four months, though a year or more is
commonly necessary.
2.5.3 PERI-URBAN ZONE, MAPUTO
The design of the current process of registration in the green zones, initiated around
1983/1984, coincides with two events: the redistribution of quintas, described earlier, and the
creation of the Dcu within the Executive Council of Maputo. The redistribution of quintas
by the government sought to delineate land rights through demarcation within the former
quintas, ostensibly to stimulate aggregate production. The Dcu was created to implement the
municipality's urban plans, including such responsibilities as land-use zoning, provision of
topographical and cadastral services, and registration. Dcu also houses the land registry of
Maputo, including residential, industrial, commercial, and agricultural concessions.
Until recently, only land within the boundaries of the permanent green zones (that is,
those areas demarcated and registered in colonial times) were effectively eligible for
registration.
21 However, in recent years, extralegal exceptions have arisen. Individuals with
money and connections hire topographers from the Dcu or DINAGECA to survey areas outside
the demarcated permanent green zones. Although no formal administrative or legal framework
exists, interviews with members of the Green Zones Directorate, district administration
offices, GDs, and the Dcu all confirmed that this process is becoming more frequent.
The current registration process involves a series of steps whereby applicants can
officially obtain one of three types of concessions:
► precarious (precãrio) title, a renewable, one-year concession;
► provisional (provisôrio) title, a renewable, five-year concession; and
► definitive (definitivo) title, a permanent concession.
Precarious and provisional concessions were originally envisioned as subdivisions of
temporary titles. Precarious concessions were intended for landholdings in areas planned for
2i. No formal process of registration existed between i975 and the time this study was undertaken.26
urban-expansion projects or for landholders lacking clear and strong potential to develop the
land. Rather than leading to definitive title, precarious titles were meant instead to
temporarily provide land rights until such time that the landholder was asked to vacate the
property. The provisional category was intended to lead to definitive title once the individual
demonstrated a capacity and willingness to develop the land.
Much confusion among both municipal officials and farmers has been caused by the
terminology used. All three categories are referred to simply as "title" in the application
forms, only the latter of which is considered a permanent concession. A title is actually
granted only after the concession has been filed with the property registry (conservatôrio do
registro predial). However, green-zone producers often believe that they hold title even
though only precarious or provisional registration has been approved. In some cases, a
definitive concession has been granted, but the landholder fails to obtain the title certificate.
In the course of interviews, several producers with provisional or definitive concessions
expressed their interest in obtaining the title certificate from the custodian of the property
registry, but said they lacked a clear understanding of the procedures for doing so.
The following steps theoretically are to be followed regardless of type of concession:
► The applicant acquires an occupation request form (ficha de occupacao de terreno) from
the Dcu, which requests demographic information on the individual, plot location, and
occupation.
► The applicant must obtain a written declaration from the GD of the individual's bairro
of residence, confirming that s/he lives in that bairro.
► The applicant must obtain a written declaration from the GD of the bairro in which the
plot is located confirming that the plot being registered indeed exists and is not already
occupied.
► The applicant must obtain a written declaration from his/her employer confirming
his/her employment and salary level, or the applicant must obtain a written declaration
from the bank documenting his/her savings balance (not both).
► With the application, the petitioner must submit a written plan describing how s/he
plans to develop the plot.
► The applicant must obtain a written declaration from the casa agrária of the district in
which the plot is located confirming the appropriateness of the plot for the activities
specified in the development plan.
► The applicant must furnish a topographical map of the plot requested.27
► After the above documents are assembled, the file is forwarded to the district
administrator (administrador do distrito), who, after giving his or her consent, must
forward written approval along with the other documents to the Dcu.
► The land-registry archival section (foral) of the Dcu checks the topographical map to
ensure that it coincides with their own cadastral maps. A member of the field brigade
of the Dcu (that is, employees responsible for confirming land occupations and seeing
that development plans are executed) then visits the plot again to confirm that the land
is not occupied.
► Assuming approval of all previous steps, a concession is granted and fees are assigned
for registration services rendered.
► Upon payment of fees, the concession is registered in the archives (foral) of the Dcu,
at which point a written document certifying the registration may or may not be given
to the landholder.
► An announcement must be made in the official gazette allowing thirty days for filing
objections to the concession.
After these steps are completed, the applicant is given six months to prepare a detailed
project plan. If the plan is approved, the applicant can have an additional two years to
complete the investments specified. In cases where the landholder fails to complete improve-
ments in the two-year time period, the concession may be terminated, a serious problem for
projects requiring long investment horizons (buildings, for example). Assuming that the stated
land-use conditions have been met, the applicant may petition for title with the custodian of
the property registry, which issues the definitive title certificate, a step rarely followed by
green-zone producers.
2.5.4 REGISTRATION PROBLEMS, PRIVATE LANDHOLDERS
As currently designed the registration process imposes significant limitations on landholders,
in general, and smallholders, in particular. First, the terms and conditions associated with
each type of concession—precarious, provisional, and definitive—are commonly unknown or
ambiguous to applicants and concession holders alike. Second, the application process,
especially the conditions stipulating bank accounts and salaries, is heavily biased toward
capital-intensive residential or business investments, not farming endeavors (excluding
livestock sheds or mechanical processing facilities) that are primarily labor intensive. Third,
the registration process is far from transparent. The above steps were compiled after long
interviews with Dcu personnel; booklets or pamphlets, which could describe the registration
process in full, do not exist. Rumors and speculation of registration procedures and terms
thus abound, leading to misinformation and uncertainty.
In addition to constraints in the registration process, a number of problems are inherent
in the procedures for implementation:28
► Limitation on plots eligible for registration. According to the Land Law, private
producers are required to register their land; family-sector producers, though not
required, may register if they choose to do so. Outside the demarcated areas, there are
many private producers who cannot register concessions without first surveying and
delimiting the land through extralegal means. Family-sector producers have no way of
acquiring an official concession since they are located outside the demarcated areas and
lack both financial resources and political status necessary to obtain a certificate
extralegally.
► Lack of uniformity in registration process. While the above-mentioned steps are
formally required for registration, certain points are bypassed. The GD is the local
authority most aware of land occupation in individual bairros. One major source of
conflict reported by applicants is the failure of the Dcu to check with bairro authorities
to determine whether a requested plot is vacant, with the result that concessions are
sometimes granted to land already occupied. This problem is exacerbated by
understaffing and lack of resources within the Dcu, causing the infrequent monitoring
of land use or occupation.
► Lack of clarity of terms of concession. Even in demarcated areas, producers with
concessions are unsure of their registration status. They seldom know whether their
concessions are automatically renewable or whether the registration process must be
extended upon expiration. Many do not know the duration of the lease associated with
their concession. This uncertainty is compounded by the variable terms issued by the
Dcu. Based on a sample of concessions drawn from records in the Dcu, some
producers were granted definitive concessions with a five-year term, others, with a
ten-year term, while still others, with no term specified.
► Lack of uniformity in fees. In practice, application fees are not uniformly assessed.
Many producers are charged either nothing or nominal fees for topographical services
since this effort usually involves only crosschecking to verify that the plot coincides
with the demarcations already made. However, other landholders are less fortunate.
One landholder in the study was charged 315,000 meticais (US$155) for topographical
services which, while never performed, nonetheless had to be paid to obtain the
concession. Local authorities report that such fees, virtually unheard of in the early
1980s, are becoming more common as the Dcu staff become more overextended and
underpaid and as operating budgets have tightened. Having been granted a concession,
most producers are unsure of their tax obligations. Producers complained that taxes
were arbitrarily applied by members of the Dcu, despite the fact that that organization
has no responsibility for tax collection.
► Administrative split of districts 6, 7, and 8. In 1989, districts 6, 7, and 8 were
administratively transferred from Maputo to the city of Matola. The files containing all
registration documents were loaded onto a truck and transported to Matola's new
Executive Council building, where they were placed in a corner of one of the back
offices. Employees were told not to touch them without authorization from Maputo. For29
producers in the green zones of the affected districts, any Portion of the registration
process not finished by 1989 became effectively frozen. Requests by applicants for
access to the documents for inheritance or conflict-resolution purposes were denied. The
Dcu of Matola has re-initiated registration in the green zones only within the past year
(1991). Whereas over 500 concessions had been granted in District 5 prior to the move,
less than 15 were given between 1989 and December 1991 under the Matola
administration.
► Multiple institutions granting concessions. Since independence, institutions at all
levels have been involved in granting concessions for agricultural and residential land.
Besides the Dcu and various government ministries (for example, Ministry of Agricul-
ture), the neighborhood (quarteirão) authorities have been especially conspicuous in
granting land for residential purposes (and sometimes selling plots for housing) while
bairro-level authorities (GDS in particular) are granting concessions to agricultural land.
Although some local authorities act out of greed, others feel compelled to assist the
landless, especially refugees who arrive destitute (Boucher et al. 1995). Under the latter
situation, local authorities can ill afford to wait for solutions from the Dcu. Conflicts
sometimes arise, however, when concessions are granted by the local authorities and
are later issued to other parties by the Dcu, which has failed to verify claims at the
local level.
2.5.5 GROUP REGISTRATION
Leaders of the producer associations are taking a different strategy to register the land of their
members, that is, through "group" titles. On several occasions the PAS have visited the Dcu
to acquire a group title on behalf of their members. They were informed, first, that the PA
must be a legal entity and told, second, that it had to complete the following steps to register
the land:
22 (1) the entire area encompassing all members of the PA must be surveyed and
measured; (2) the area of private farms and cooperatives must be subtracted (which requires
further surveying); (3) the remaining area would belong to the PA, effectively shifting legal
rights in property from the individuals to the PA; and (4) any landholders not wanting to have
their land registered in the PA must separately register their land to be excluded.
Two obstacles have impeded the process of group registration as outlined. First, the PAs
have not yet achieved official legal status. Currently, the major efforts of the Uniao Geral
are focused on developing a charter and set of statutes for the movement. At the time of
study, leadership from the Uniao Geral was systematically holding debates in each PA on the
proposed statutes, a process expected to last through the end of 1992. Second, there is no
legal or administrative procedure defined for the Dcu to grant block titles for green-zone
land. An ongoing effort is being made by the Maputo Executive Council to define an official
procedure for granting block titles for residential areas. As of September 1992, no procedure
had yet been defined (personal communications, Paul Jenkins).
22. This sequence was reported by representatives of the PAs.30
Even if the PAS are able to gain legal status, there are a number of problems with the
above registration process. First, not all farmers belong, or care to belong, to a producer
association. While a single producer may visit the Dcu to register his or her land to be
excluded from the group title, this leaves the onus on the individual to seek title and to bear
the survey and registration costs. Second, the PA must bear the cost of resurveying private
farms and cooperatives. Third, the question remains of the suitability of group title. When
some respondents were presented with the hypothetical issue of preference (individual versus
group registration), a strong inclination for individual rights was expressed—along with a
willingness to pay for it. But if this were not possible for reasons of cost and procedure,
group registration was considered a second-best option.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
At the time of independence in 1975, much of the area now known as the Maputo peri-urban
green zones was either demarcated into Portuguese estates or covered by bush, woods, or
grasses. The 1975-1982 period witnessed some settlement of the former quintas by urban
dwellers and farmworkers along with some expansion into lowland and upland areas
previously not in use. However, the immigration of refugees in the 1980-1987 period led to
a rapid expansion of residential settlement and the claims to agricultural land that one
observes in Maputo today. By 1987, most of the best agricultural land in districts 4-8 had
been claimed and is now being farmed in vegetables. Although the most intense demand for
land at the beginning of the 1990s was for residences in upland areas, the green zones have
also been shrinking with the intrusion of population.
The massive scale and rapid rate of immigration into Maputo—and the haphazard
occupation of previously demarcated land that ensued—created a fertile environment for
contradictory land claims. Rather than creating a secure legal framework for ascertaining and
defending land rights, the existing land policy created a system ripe for corruption: land
rights are limited or uncertain, the allocation process tends to favor those with wealth and
influence, the onerous task of administering land is broadly dispersed among multiple
agencies with overlapping responsibilities, too few resources are spread too thinly to
effectively administer the legal and land administration system proposed, and the high costs
of demarcation (a key impediment to expansion of registration) constrain private demand to
register land.
The causes of land disputes in the green zones point to the Dcu in one way or another.
While the Dcu was given jurisdictional authority only for the cement city, its responsibilities
and powers have been expanded over time to include the now much larger area of greater
Maputo. Furthermore, at the time of independence, land was allocated to at least thirteen
different, autonomous agencies while local authorities have also become involved in land
allocations. Institutional arrangements governing land access have thus become diffuse to such
an extent that even the Dcu expresses dismay at their complexity. Because the Dcu has an
urban mandate, it understandably lacks interest in registering agricultural lands and, further,
already lacks the resources to effectively fulfill its responsibilities in all areas assigned.3i
DINAGECA, which has the surveying capacity and a mandate to carry out registration activities
in rural lands, is free to operate only in rural areas beyond districts 1-8, which make up the
urban and peri-urban zones. Compounding this problem, the turnover of office staff is
considerable; the Dcu had three different directors between March and September 1991.
From the perspective of landholders, particularly the cooperatives and smallholders,
staff from the Dcu are often accused of being corrupt and abusing their power, particularly
in situations where registration fees and land expropriations are involved. While these
assertions contain some element of validity, tight budgets have also forced many government
departments to levy fees to augment revenues; DINAGECA is hiring out survey teams, and the
Dcu is enhancing revenues through concession fees. The combination of low salaries, land
market restrictions, and administrative land allocations acts to concentrate power in the hands
of a few technocrats, thus producing an environment conducive to rent-seeking behavior.
While a companion study by Boucher et al. (1995) describes, in considerable detail, the
effects of the current land policy on land disputes and tenure insecurity, the remainder of this
paper analyzes its impact on land markets, land access, and productivity indicators.33
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
After eighteen years of independence and nearly as many years of civil war, Mozambique
appears to have finally reached the threshold of a peaceful settlement. Issues of postwar rural
restructuring, resettlement, land rights, agrarian reform, food security, and market access
have taken on a new sense of urgency as policy options are considered and debated. The war
brought a devastating toll of people's lives as well as institutions that once provided public
services. Recordkeeping systems once dutifully kept have slipped into dysfunction. Collection
and reporting systems for most types of data came to a halt for lack of resources, security,
and political stability in both urban and rural areas. Only a few years ago, a dearth of hard
data existed at all levels, including the most basic facts on the dynamics of household
production and consumption, technology growth, operation of factor and product markets,
property systems, and market access. This land-tenure study, within a larger project of
collaborative research on the operation of factor markets, was one study among others funded
by the U.S. Agency for International Development to reduce the information gap between
data availability and Policy needs. This section describes research objectives, methods,
procedures, and limitations. Subsequent sections present empirical data generated by the
research design.
3.1 PERI-URBAN ECONOMIES IN AFRICA PROJECT
The "Economic Growth in Peri-Urban Areas of Africa" project is a collaborative effort
among the Land Tenure Center (LTC) of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Institute
for Development Anthropology (IDA), and the rural-savings cooperative agreement of the
Ohio State University (Osu). The project seeks insight into the processes of, and constraints
to, growth in the dynamic areas surrounding principal and secondary African cities. It further
pursues more detailed information on the operation of land, labor, and capital markets and
their intermarket linkages in transitional settings. Peri-urban economies provide a better
setting for studying the impacts of policy reform, official and informal market interactions,
factor market constraints, and policy failures than rural areas, which are characterized by
relatively abundant factor endowments, "thin" or "disconnected" markets, and more limited
employment opportunities. Research under the project encompasses various sectors and/or
dimensions, including a baseline survey of economic activity, migration patterns, food
security, financial market activity, land access and use (Graham et al. 1991); the relationship
between legal framework, land disputes, and processes of land-dispute resolution (Boucher
et al. 1995); the dynamics of petty trade and household survival strategies (Little and Baptista
1992); and formal and informal financial market linkages (Graham and Francisco 1993)—all
taking place in the same peri-urban zone as this land-markets study.
The collaborative project was originally intended to be administered in two phases. In
phase 1, a survey was to be administered to a sample of households in the peri-urban area
of Maputo (Graham et at. 1991), defined as the area between the cement city (and urban34
neighborhoods beyond) and the end of the security zone, roughly 20-25 kilometers from
downtown Maputo (figures 2.1 and 2.2, pp. 12-13). In phase 2, follow-up case studies and
topical surveys were to be undertaken using subsets of households from the baseline survey,
identified on the basis of predetermined socioeconomic criteria (for example, in the study by
Boucher et al. 1995, on land disputes). However, in the course of realizing the research
design, insurgency problems in the peri-urban area forced the implementing institution to
scale-back on the sample size and to undersample households in the outer reaches of the
security zone (annex A). This combination—smaller baseline sample and undersampling of
green-zone population—effectively resulted in the identification of too few households of
green-zone producers for further statistical surveys. Thus a new sample frame was designed,
one that for all intents and purposes is not connected to the original, phase 1 research
methodology. Since the two sampling frames are structurally different (land-markets sampling
frame based on access to agricultural holding versus baseline survey based on Population),
statistical results are not generally comparable.
3.2 PRE-RESEARCH VISITS
A preliminary reconnaissance trip was made to Maputo in March 1990, comprising
discussions with green-zone producers and members of two agricultural cooperatives,
"Primeiro de Maio" and "16 de Junho." Interviews were also held with officials of the Bank
of Mozambique, Green Zones Directorate, Centre of African Studies, Faculty of Agronomy
and Faculty of Architecture and Planning at Eduardo Mondlane University, Ministry of
Construction and Water, National Agency for Geography and Cadastre, World Bank, UNICEF,
USAID, and World Vision. These visits provided preliminary information on key land-market
issues in the urban and peri-urban environment of Maputo city (Graham and Roth 1990a).
A second planning visit was made in August 1990 to develop the sampling frame for
the phase 1 baseline survey and to collect further information, inter alia, on legal statutes,
property institutions, customary land rights, land use, land conflicts, and the operation of land
markets in the green zones. Meetings were held with the Bank of Mozambique, Banco
Popular de Desenvolvimento, Centre for African Studies, DINAGECA, Europa Agencias,
Faculty of Letters and Faculty of Architecture and Planning at Eduardo Mondlane University,
Remote Sensing and Mapping Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Standard
Totta Bank, Ministry of Construction and Water, Ministry of Labor, National Department of
Statistics, and World Vision. A tour of the peri-urban residential zones was arranged by the
Urban Development and Housing Programs Office of the Ministry of Construction and Water.
Reconnaissance to the green zones was again made to visit with producers and select future
research sites for the second phase of land-markets work (Graham and Roth 1990b).
In August and September 1991, a third visit laid the groundwork for the final design
of the land-markets research activity. Informal interviews were held with producers in
districts 4 and 6. Meetings were also held with local officials, including representatives of
the casas agrárias (extension offices) in districts 4 and 6, DINAGECA, the Farmers' Training
Center within the Ministry of Agriculture, the Provincial Agricultural Office for Maputo35
Province, selected producer associations in District 4, Department of Construction and Urban
Affairs, the legal advisor and general counsel to the Minister of Agriculture, Green Zones
Directorate, and the Union of Cooperatives. The following sections on land issues, research
objectives, and survey design were developed based on these reconnaissance visits.
3.3 RESEARCH ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES
3.3.1 LAND MARKET EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Although landownership is vested in the state, both formal and informal land markets operate
in the Maputo peri-urban area. Legal restrictions on land markets combined with inconsistent
enforcement by the state appear to be generating widespread tenure insecurity while the layers
of bureaucracy created by multiple agencies with powers and responsibilities over land
allocations induce high transactions costs and conflicts. Land purchasers experience lingering
concerns over their ability to retain land rights while potential lessors are reluctant to rent-out
land lest it not be returned. Leaving land uncultivated or unused risks de facto settlement by
refugees or reallocation by officials. Although land cannot legally be transferred without
government authorization, private land markets are robust, involve considerable administrative
involvement and oversight, and exhibit complex contractual underpinnings. The agricultural
restructuring now under way raises a number of land-market questions:
► Land-resource allocation. Are legal provisions and administrative allocations resulting
in an inefficient allocation of land resources, where land access is restricted to the
highest valued use and user? Are legal provisions, administrative transfers, and onerous
regulations resulting in "unreasonably" high transactions costs, distorted prices, or land
rationing that constrain land transfers?
► Distributional consequences. How are the land market and administrative allocations
affecting agrarian structure? Who are the buyers and who are the sellers? To what
extent are private and administrative transactions increasing land concentration, land
grabbing, or landlessness? Was the sale of land voluntary on the part of the landholder?
Was compensation received? Did the transfer result in welfare improvement for
"buyer" and "seller" or did the person disposing of land lose wealth and employment?
► Land value. To what extent are prices determined by economic factors of space,
location, and productivity rather than by socio-political factors which reflect asymmetric
information and bargaining position among buyers and sellers? Are land prices
sufficiently determinate and transactions costs sufficiently low to provide secure
collateral value? To what extent does the land market either facilitate or impede access
to credit through formal intermediaries and how is this credit being used?36
3.3.2 REGISTRATION COSTS AND BENEFITS
Land registration in districts 1-8 is handled by the municipality. Registration in rural areas,
starting with the outer limits of districts 1-8, is handled by DINAGECA. Cooperatives and
producer associations, foreseeing urban expansion, have aggressively sought to register their
land to guard against squatting and state expropriation. The titling process appears to be
benefiting political, administrative, and economic elites at the expense of others. Although
the rights of families with long-term, demonstrated use rights are legally guaranteed, little has
been documented about the effects of registration on the family sector in practice. Data on
the total number and area of registrations in Maputo and surrounding areas are unavailable.
Based on discussions with officials at the districts' casas agrárias, definitive titles for
agricultural use are rarely issued. Most farmers who have title hold either a precarious (one-
year) or a provisional (five-year) concession.
23 A provisional concession would offer superior
benefits if, for no other reason, transactions costs for renewal are lower. A precarious
concession would seem to confer little security; yet the fact that farmers appear to be
renewing their concessions annually suggests that it is conferring tangible benefits. The
existence of both titled and untitled producers and plots in the Maputo peri-urban area raises
a number of important research questions:
► Characteristics of concession holders(ings). What are the characteristics of household
members acquiring concessions (titles) and plots being registered? Does access depend
on farm scale and political status? Are landholders commercial entrepreneurs demanding
greater security of land rights than is possible under the indigenous system? What forces
are increasing purposeful demand for title and what factors are constraining access to
registration in practice?
► Distributional consequences. To what extent has registration been sought to increase
security of land rights versus a means to gain access to land through official channels?
To what extent has land registration created landlessness or redistributed land rights
within the household and community? Who are the beneficiaries and who are the losers?
How has the registration process affected land-market transactions and the structure of
landholdings in the peri-urban area?
► Costs and benefits of title. What benefits accrue to land registration in the long run?
Does land registration increase tenure security, and for whom? Does title reduce the
uncertainty of land sales and rentals?
24 Does it increase incentives for fixed-place
investment? Does it increase landholders' demand for credit and formal lenders'
security of repayment?
23. Since the current process of registration in the green zones has been in place only since 1983/84, very
few producers who were granted a five-year provisional concession have had sufficient time to fulfill the
development plan and thereafter request definitive title. It is also possible that the Dcu is reluctant to issue
definitive title to agricultural land for fear of curtailing future urban expansion.
24. Theoretically, this would not be expected due to legal restrictions on transfers in the Land Law.37
3.3.3 MIGRATION AND LAND SHARING
In interviews, landholders voiced reluctance to rent-out land to persons other than close
neighbors or family. The Land Law contains prohibitions on renting and stipulates that land
not cultivated for two consecutive years is subject to expropriation by the state. Lessees have
used both provisions to occupy rented land permanently. Local authorities may arbitrarily side
with the lessee, reasoning that land rented-out is not needed by the lessor's family. While
reluctant to give or rent land to outsiders, families appear willing to award land to migrant
kin. Nonetheless, the massive influx of refugees has seriously strained family and social
relations, eroded quality of life through expansion of squatter settlements, and placed heavy
demands on limited state resources. The city is uncertain whether to invest in urban
infrastructure lest migrants return to their home districts in the postwar era. As Boucher et
al. (1995) note, most land disputes are, rightfully or wrongfully, attributed to the refugee
problem and most long-term residents look forward to the time when migrants return home.
Whether refugees have put down permanent roots in the peri-urban areas or remain only
loosely attached has important implications for urban planning and development. Important
questions emerge:
► Rental markets and land sharing. How common are land rentals and what is the
impact of the current legal and administrative land-allocation framework on land rental
markets? To what extent are land-sharing arrangements (land temporarily allocated to
close family) used as a substitute for rental transactions? Land sharing serves what
primary purpose(s)—provides livelihood to the refugee population; demonstrates land
use to prevent expropriation; or increases labor supply, productivity, and income of the
lessor household? How permanent or transitory is land sharing? To what extent does
land sharing help the migrant family acquire a foothold in the area, from which families
can move on to other lands or sources of employment?
► Postwar intentions. To what extent do migrants maintain claims to land in rural areas?
How are these landholdings managed and land rights protected in the family's absence?
How mobile are migrant families or family members in monitoring land claims in rural
areas? To what extent do migrant families or family members plan to stay in Maputo
following the war? What will happen to the land upon which they are currently
operating?
3.3.4 REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
The green zones in District 4 are ostensibly less vulnerable to residential encroachment due
to the limited availability of land appropriate for housing. Land in District 6 is more suitable
for housing; the city apparently plans to convert its land use from agriculture to residence,
though this information could not be verified. Government support services (registration and
input supply) are also better organized in District 4. Conflicts between residential and
agricultural use are most severe on drylands surrounding the green zones and on outlying
areas of dispersed settlement at the fringe of the city. District 5 (mainly rain-fed upland areas
separating the irrigated green zones of districts 4 and 6) is reportedly experiencing rapid38
population settlement and severe land conflicts between residential and farm use. Refugee
populations settling on outlying lands are the most vulnerable. Refugees face less resistance
when settling the rain-fed areas, though these same places will eventually come under more
pressure from housing expansion. Lacking long-term customary rights to the land and
financial resources to strengthen their claim through investment, refugees also face a higher
risk of having land expropriated through administrative reallocation. These differences—
potential threat of residential settlement and extent of government services—raise two
fundamental questions:
► Quality of local administration. How have differences in local-level administration and
land-use pressures affected land allocations, land disputes, and tenure security in
districts 4 and 6? Is commercial input use higher in District 4, suggesting that
commercial firms (in District 6) have troubles with market access in the absence of
government assistance?
► Residential demand for land. How is urban expansion affecting perceptions of tenure
security among titled and nontitled groups? Does registration reduce fears of losing
land? Does it increase fears of non-titleholders who lack the means to register yet see
the registration process being used by elites to acquire land?
3.4 SURVEY DESIGN
As indicated earlier, the baseline survey in phase 1 yielded insufficient observations on
peri-urban land transactions and registration of agricultural holdings in the areas of dispersed
settlement (annex A). Thus a distinct and separate sampling frame was designed to include
households operating in the two principal green zones of Maputo—District 4 and District 6.
(The theoretical survey design is illustrated in figure 3.1.) To be included in the survey, a
household had to possess at least one plot of irrigated land. Regarding tenure categories
(columns in figure 3.1), a target number of households (20-30) possessing the following
characteristics were to be interviewed: holding at least one plot with definitive title (A,G),
five-year provisional title (B,H), one-year provisional title (C,I), or no title (D,J); having sold
at least one plot (E,K); and having bought at least one plot (F,L). Viewed regionally, the
sampling frame was to include households equally divided between District 4 (ABCDEF) and
District 6 (GHIJKL). A priori, one would expect tenure security to decrease from left to right
(AG > BH> CI > EK > DJ =FL), and from top down (ABCDEF > GHIJKL), all else constant.
Several problems were encountered that forced researchers to reconfigure the research design.
First, the plan to identify and randomly select households with different forms of title
possession proved to be impractical. Registry records generally failed to distinguish the type
of registration granted (that is, definitive, provisional, or precarious). Only after reviewing
the registration documents (not certificates, since these often were never acquired) of the
respondent in the course of administering questionnaires could the type of registration be
ascertained.39
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A: Households with primary machamba in District 4 with at least one machamba
held under definitive title.
B: Households with primary machamba in District 4 with at least one machamba
held under five-year provisional title.
C: Households with primary machamba in District 4 with at least one machamba
held under one-year precarious title.
D: Households with primary machamba in District 4, no machambas titled.
E: Households with primary machamba in District 4 having ever sold at least
one machamba.
F: Households with primary machamba in District 4 having ever bought at least
one machamba.
G: Households with primary machamba in District 6 with at least one machamba
held under definitive title.
H: Households with primary machamba in District 6 with at least one machamba
held under five-year provisional title.
I: Households with primary machamba in District 6 with at least one machamba
held under one-year precarious title.
J: Households with primary machamba in District 6, no machambas titled.
K: Households with primary machamba in District 6 having ever sold at least
one machamba. -
machamba in District 6 having ever bought at least L: Households with primary
one machamba.
Second, both land "sellers" and land "buyers" were extremely reluctant to report details
of transactions or even to admit that a transaction had taken place. Due to government statutes
which ban transfers without official approval, land sellers risked having the proceeds heavily
taxed or the sales receipts appropriated if the sale were discovered. The buyer risked having
the land expropriated or reallocated by the state. Therefore, researchers adopted a case-study
approach based on intensive interviews with the limited number of households (15) reporting
a purchase or sale transaction in the baseline (Graham et al. 1991) or land-market survey
(figures 3.2 and 3.3).40






















A: Households in District 4 with no machambas registered.
B: Households in District 4 with at least one machamba registered.
C: Households in District 4 regardless of registration status.
D: Households in District 6 with no machambas registered.
E: Households in District 6 with at least one machamba registered.
F: Households in District 6 regardless of registration status.
G: Households in districts 4 and 6 with no machambas registered.
H: Households in districts 4 and 6 with at least one machamba registered.
I: Total number of households in the survey.
Third, violence caused by insurgents, with random shootings and thefts, escalated in
November and December 1991, particularly in District 6. While the survey had been initiated
in District 4 in October and November 1991, it was extended to District 6 in those same two
months of increased violence. While research operations went smoothly at first, activity in
the area had to be postponed for two weeks shortly after inception due to the intensified
conflict. The survey was finally terminated in December 1991 because of financial and
security concerns, resulting in fewer households being sampled in District 6 than District 4.
To circumvent these problems, the research team settled on the simpler research design
depicted in figures 3.2 and 3.3. A total of 121 households (excluding defective or incomplete
questionnaires) were surveyed in the peri-urban zone, 68 in District 4 and 53 in District 6.
Of the 121 households, 51 have at least one registered plot while 70 are unregistered. Of the
unregistered households, 40 (57 percent of unregistered total) are located in District 4 and 30
(43 percent) in District 6. Of the registered households, 28 (55 percent of registered total)
are located in District 4 and 23 (45 percent) in District 6. The 121 households in the survey
controlled a total of 162 irrigated plots of land, 92 located in District 4 and 70 in District 6.
Of the total plots held, 19 (12 percent) had definitive title, 32 (20 percent) had provisional
title, 7 (4 percent) had precarious title, and 104 (64 percent) had not been registered.41













































A: Number of plots registered with definitive title in District 4.
B: Number of plots registered with provisional title in District 4.
C: Number of plots registered with precarious title in District 4.
D: Number of plots not registered in District 4.
E: Total number of plots surveyed in District 4.
F: Number of plots registered with definitive title in District 6.
G: Number of plots registered with provisional title in District 6.
H: Number of plots registered with precarious title in District 6.
I: Number of plots not registered in District 6.
J: Total number of plots surveyed in District 6.
K: Number of plots registered with definitive title regardless of district.
L: Number of plots registered with provisional title regardless of district.
M: Number of plots registered with precarious title regardless of district.
N: Number of plots not registered regardless of district.
0: Total number of plots surveyed regardless of district.
3.5 SAMPLE DESIGN
The government distinguishes two types of farm operation—private sector and family
sector—based on definitions that are only partially useful in peri-urban settings in practice.
Private-sector farms generally Possess title and operate on lands demarcated in colonial times.
The family or peasant sector generally operate smaller holdings and hold land under
indigenous tenure arrangements. Different sampling procedures were used in both districts
to select samples of registered (private sector) versus unregistered (family sector) households.
3.5.1 DISTRICT 4
The green zones of District 4 consist of four bairros—Costa do Sol, Laulane, Mahotas, and
Albazine, listed sequentially from nearest to city to farthest out (figures 2.1 and 2.2,42
pp. 12-13). The casa agrária (extension office) responsible for Laulane and Costa do Sol was
able to provide a current list of 1,500 irrigated machambas and respective managers in the
two bairros. The other two bairros are situated farther out in the peri-urban area, with
Albazine bordering the outer limits of the security zone. The casa agrária responsible for
Mahotas and Albazine was unable to produce comparable population lists.
Under the Dcu's registration procedures, each approved concession is issued an index
card which is filed in the office archives. The index cards are stacked by bairros and by land-
use category—agricultural or residential. Based on a review of these records, 336 agricultural
registrations were identified in all 4 bairros of District 4.
Each of the four bairros has multiple producer associations to which most producers
belong. The associations in Laulane and Costa do Sol provided membership lists containing
921 names.' The associations in Mahotas and Albazine contributed membership lists
containing 779 names. The lists together yield a reasonably representative population of
nonregistered farmers operating in District 4, Maputo peri-urban green zone.
26
Unregistered households in District 4 were randomly selected from the membership lists
provided by the casa agrária and producer associations; the registered households were
chosen from the Dcu's index of registrations. Names on both lists were assigned a unique
identification number. A random-number generator was then used to select households. In the
event that a given name was chosen twice or that the same name existed on both lists, the
selection was dropped and another name drawn. More households were picked by this
procedure than were actually interviewed in case some families proved difficult to locate.
However, only five of the first thirty households chosen no longer resided in the area or
could not be found, suggesting that the lists were fairly current and/or the population was
tolerably stable.
3.5.2 DISTRICT 6
The green zones of District 6 also contain four bairros (listed sequentially from nearest to city
to farthest out)—Vale do Infulene, T-3, Zona Verde, and Kongolote. Compared with District
4, the casa agrária in District 6 was poorly organized. While it could provide a partial list
of registered farms, it simply had no record of unregistered farmers. The nine producer
associations that operate in the four bairros supplied membership lists totaling 2,155 names.
Although researchers felt that the lists were less comprehensive than those of District 4, they
25. While neither list is complete, these data suggest that 6i percent (921/1,500) of agriculturalists in the
green zones belong to producer associations.
26. Very few members of the producer associations held registered title to their land. The difference between
the lists from Laulane and Costa do Sol—576 (i,500—921) persons—included those households with title and
nontitled land. Also, based on personal observations, most of the registered plots (that is, 336) were located in
Laulane and Costa do Sol, indicating that the vast majority of unregistered households belong to a producer
association.43
nonetheless were furnished with a fairly current inventory of producers working in the
peri-urban zone.
However, identifying registered landholders proved to be especially difficult. In 1989,
at the time the index-card system was being instituted in Maputo city, all the files of
registered owners (about 226) in District 6 were transferred to the government offices of
Matola city. Lacking proper facilities, the files were stacked in a storage room of the
municipality authority. Since 1989, only 12 registrations had been initiated and completed in
Matola. Researchers had a great deal of difficulty gaining access to the storage room; once
admittance had been approved, organizing files took a long time. Piles were first arranged
according to land-use category (agricultural and residential); then supplies were created
according to registration status (approved and nonapproved). Finally, names associated with
approved agricultural concessions were assembled, and a random-number generator was used
to select households.
3.5.3 IMPLICATIONS
As a result of these methods, (1) names of titled households were obtained from records in
the land registry; (2) names of unregistered households were secured from producer
association lists (and the records provided by the casa agrária in District 4); and (3) all
households included in the sample have access to at least one irrigated plot in the green zones
(though some of the families also produce on rain-fed land located in other peri-urban areas).
Regarding registered households, since the location of the plot was known from registry
files, researchers could visit the plot, find the operator, and inquire about other landholdings.
Unregistered households proved more difficult to locate, however, because neither the address
of the user nor the location of the plot was known to the research team. Both survey
instruments and interview processes were specifically designed to address this constraint.
3.6 SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND METHODS
3.6.1 INTERVIEW PROCESS
Extension agents (monitores/tecnicos) of the casas agrárias in both District 4 and District 6
were employed to find the machamba managers chosen from the population lists, for these
extensionists work closely with producer associations, are well acquainted with individual
producers in their district, and have good knowledge of plot locations. If the agent did not
know either the location of the plot or the responsável selected, the producer association was
then asked to determine the whereabouts of the person in question. Once the responsável was
located, a date for the interview (usually the following day) was scheduled at the site of the
respondent's principal irrigated machamba. The monitores were also very aware of other
irrigated plots held by the responsável and by other members of the family. In the case of two44
or more responsáveis per household, both were asked to be present for the interview on the
scheduled date.27.'
Since agricultural activities on the machambas normally take place between early
morning and early afternoon, investigators used a two-tier interview process. The research
team and extension agents would visit the sampled machamba in the morning to obtain
plot-specific data. Once that interview was complete, enumerators would visit the second plot
of the responsável or the irrigated plots of other responsáveis in the family. To verify data,
enumerators tried to visit as many irrigated plots as possible; for those irrigated plots not
examined, they had to rely on respondent recall. Surveyors asked a smaller set of questions
about rain-fed plots, which were generally not inspected because of security risks.
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At the first visit to the household's machambas, information were obtained on the
location of family's residence. Another interview, usually scheduled for the next day, was
arranged for the second-stage household-level survey of family members. Each evening
following the plot-level interviews, cost and revenues were calculated for each plot. In case
of any discrepancies or inconsistencies, the points in question were raised with the respondent
the following day.
3.6.2 SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
A two-round questionnaire, written in Portuguese, was administered to each household.
Round one involved plot-level questions asked of the responsáveis at the site of the irrigated
machamba. When the responsável was not the proprietor (for example, a male who works
in the city while his wife cultivates the machamba), the owner was asked also to attend the
interview, if possible. For each irrigated machamba held by the household, a round-one
questionnaire was administered to the appropriate responsável, inquiring about his or her
farm-management experience, land rights held, settlement history, and mode of land
acquisition. Also, the respondent was queried about physical characteristics of his or her
plot(s), fixed-place investments, current land use, and land value (offer price if the
responsável were to buy, and reservation price if s/he were to sell the same plot). For the
preceding agricultural year, too, detailed questions were asked on production mix, output,
marketed surplus, production costs, family labor time spent on the machamba, wage labor
costs for both permanent and temporary workers, and income.
The second-round interview explored household demographics; language proficiency;
type and earnings of all nonfarm wage employment; nonmonetary benefits received in
association with salaried employment; type, revenue, and costs of all nonfarm self-employ-
27. In the event that a second or third responsável of the same family could not attend the interview (which
was rare), plot-level questions for the absent member
's tract(s) were addressed to those who did attend. Since
plot managers frequently work on the parcels of all family members, the absence of one responsável did not
seriously undermine data quality.
28. Rain-fed plots were generally located far away from the irrigated perimeters, in many cases in
"insecure" zones.45
ment activities; household decision-making; participation in associations and political
structures; household assets; credit use; migration and remittances; and land histories of all
plots ever alienated by the household, tracts still held outside the security zone, and plots
currently held by household members. The questionnaire was administered to the household
head and principal spouse(s). Any household members with nonfarm activities were asked to
attend the interview as well.
29
3.6.3 DATA ENTRY
Questionnaires were duplicated in Maputo; one copy was deposited with the Department of
Economics, Eduardo Mondlane University (the names and addresses of respondents having
been deleted) while the original set was taken to the United States with the LTC field
researcher in December 1991. Data entry and editing took place in Madison, Wisconsin, from
March through August 1992; a preliminary report was distributed in November 1992. Further




The research team comprised one researcher from the Land Tenure Center and one research
supervisor and nine students (as enumerators) from the departments of anthropology and
economics, Eduardo Mondlane University. Working sessions were held to thoroughly review
and discuss the questionnaire; pretesting with students helped standardize interview techniques
as well as indicated questions or areas where respondents might have difficulty.
3.7 IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This section describes the research issues, objectives, and methods associated with a land-
markets survey of 121 producers in the pen-urban green zones of districts 4 and 6 of Maputo.
Despite the lack of accessible, up-to-date population lists (unregistered sample) and
registration records (District 6) and the risk of insurgency in the study area, a reasonably
comprehensive and randomized sampling frame was developed and implemented, albeit with
considerable effort. The data generated by the questionnaires administered within this
sampling frame form the basis of the empirical analysis that follows.
Despite having generated extensive data of high quality, the survey encountered a
number of problems in the course of execution, with important implications for data analysis
and reporting. First, language presented little problem. Nearly all operators of registered plots
could speak Portuguese. The student enumerators spoke the mother tongue of the respondent
29. Letters were prepared and signed by the Director of the National Directorate of Statistics to authorize
the absence from work of any household member for interview sessions.
30. This study, containing corrected data and new land-price regressions, supersedes the 1992 report.46
in about three-quarters of the interviews; the extension agent could speak the required
language in the remaining cases. There is, nonetheless, some risk of information loss in the
communication of information from respondent to extension agent to enumerator to
researcher.
Second, respondents in general had trouble recalling data on revenue and costs, amount
of vegetables sold, prices received, and other price-related information. As many as eight
cycles of lettuce or kale might be produced during the year, and the machamba manager may
grow as many as twelve types of vegetables; prices vary considerably from month to month.
Rather than trying to calculate month-by-month sales, the respondent was asked instead for
the average income from a bed of produce, minimum and maximum incomes, the average
size of bed, and the number of beds cultivated throughout the year. This procedure, though
greatly facilitating recall, is not as precise as monthly level data collection, which was
infeasible due to time and resource constraints. Nevertheless, the approach proved
substantially superior to the more aggregated approaches (such as the baseline) used in other
studies.
Third, respondents had difficulty disaggregating input use by plot. In cases where
chemical inputs and labor wages had been paid, records were kept independently of any given
plot. If detailed applications of farm chemicals and seeds by plot could not be remembered,
the enumerators were instructed to ask whether or not the input had been applied to the
machamba. For those plots receiving inputs, use per hectare was prorated by plot size.
However, the significance of this problem was greatly minimized in practice since
commercial input use proved low and most households held only one or two plots.47
4. GENERAL HOUSEHOLD AND PLOT CHARACTERISTICS
Selected data are presented and analyzed in this section on political and socioeconomic
characteristics of green-zone producers including household demographics, landholdings,
language skills, political status, household decision-making, physical assets, nonfarm
employment, and farm and nonfarm income. Data are disaggregated according to seven
categories of households to reflect different degrees of political and institutional status: quality
of state administrative structures (District 4 versus District 6), gender (male- versus
female-headed households), tenure status (registered versus nonregistered), and the overall
sample. The analysis reveals that agricultural producers in District 6, which had the least
effective state administration, rely to a greater degree on cooperatives and producer
associations to gain access to land and production inputs as well as to secure land rights.
Female-headed households—usually directed by women who have been divorced or widowed
or have husbands living abroad—are severely disadvantaged, whether measured by resource
access, employment opportunities, or income levels. Registered holdings have larger farm
sizes, more family wealth, and higher total income than nonregistered households due to
differences in human capital, property rights, market access, and nonfarm employment among
households.
4.1 HOUSEHOLD STRATA
Data by household level are reported in this and subsequent sections by seven primary
groupings:
A. households whose primary irrigated machamba is located in District 4 (most but not all
plots are located in the same district) (n=67);
B. households whose primary irrigated machamba is located in District 6 (most but not all
plots are located in the same district) (n=54);
C. households headed by a male adult (n=109);
D. households headed by a female adult (n=12 or 13);
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E. households with at least one plot registered (n=51);
F. households with no plots registered (n =70); and
G. aggregate sample of households (n=121).
Of the 68 households in the survey with the primary machamba located in District 4,
only 67.6 percent (46=68) reside in the same district (table 4.1).
32 The percentage of
31. Only partial information is available for one female-headed household.
32. Plot managers were asked to identify the "primary" machamba, that is, the plot generating the largest
share of the household's total farm income.48
households in District 6 with the primary machamba and place of residence in the same
district is higher, or 84.9 percent (45=53). This indicates a fair degree of commuting
between place of residence and site of agricultural work, particularly for District 4
landholdings.
TABLE 4.1 Number of sample households by district of primary
residence, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
DISTRICT 4 DISTRICT 6 OVERALL SAMPLE
DISTRICT Non- Non-
OF registered Registered registered Registered Total Percent
RESIDENCE households households households households households
1 1 3 1 1 6 4.9
2 1 - - - 1 0.8
3 1 0 6 - - 1 6 13.1
4 27 19 - - 46 37.7
5 1 - 4 2 7 5.7
6 - - 25 20 45 36.9
7 - - - - - -
8 - - - - - 0.8
Total 40 28 30 23 121 100.0
Strata C and D distinguish between the presence or absence of a male or female adult
as the primary decision-maker and provider for the household. Questions at the household
level were addressed to the family's elders, usually the oldest male adult or his first son along
with the first and second principal woman residents. Other household members with nonfarm
activities were asked to be present during the employment section of the survey. The random
sample indicates a preponderance of male-headed (90.1 percent) as opposed to female-headed
(9.9 percent) households. As will be seen shortly, these data underestimate the importance
of females in household decision-making, for women had a tendency to defer to a male adult
as the household head, even when the husband may be gone for most months of the year
because of military obligations or work abroad. Strata D, then, includes primarily women
who are divorced, unmarried, or widowed.
Registration status is indicated by strata E and F. Of the 121 households in the survey,
51 (42.1 percent) possess at least one plot confirmed to have been registered as a precarious,
provisional, or definitive concession, and 70 (57.9 percent) have no registered land.49
4.2 HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION
Selected household indicators of family size, residency, age, and education are reported in
table 4.2. As expected, female-headed households, for which the husband (male adult) is
normally absent, have the smallest average family size (8.0 residents). Households also tend
to be smaller in District 4 (8.9 residents) than in District 6 (10.7 residents). Registered
households have the largest average household size (10.8 persons) relative to the overall mean
(9.7 persons). Female-headed households have a comparable number of female adults to
male-headed households (2.5 versus 2.6 women), but have fewer children (3.8 versus 4.7
youngsters) and fewer male adults (1.7 versus 2.6 men).
A small but important number of households have close family members living abroad.
For the sample as a whole, 28.1 percent of households have at least one member living
outside Mozambique. The figure is higher in District 6 than District 4 (37.0 percent versus
20.9 percent) and is highest for female-headed households (46.2 percent). However, very few
households, including female-headed, reported receiving remittances from abroad, suggesting
that nonresident family members are usually children, cousins, or dependents living with close
kin rather than husbands working in the Republic of South Africa.
33 The lower income
earnings of female-headed households also limit the number of dependents they are able to
support.
With the exception of the lower age of male adults in female-headed households (26.8
versus 33.7 years for the sample average), there is very little difference among strata in age
of adult family members. Male adults tend to be slightly older than female adults on average,
but the age of both female and male adults tends to be remarkably uniform among groupings.
Male adults (those above 15 years of age), on average, tend to be better educated than
female adults, though adults in general hold less than a primary level of education. On
average, male adults had 4.8 years of public education versus 3.4 years for female adults.
The one noticeable difference—the higher education of males in female-headed households
relative to other strata—mainly reflects the absence of an older adult male, who tends to be
more poorly educated than sons or younger siblings.
Despite the high rates of immigration experienced by the population at large, households
in the green zones have resided in their current places of residence for a relatively long
period of time. As measured by years of residence of the household head, households on
average have been settled in the Maputo area for 30.1 years, and for 20.8 years in their
present bairro.
34 Female-headed households have been in residence in greater Maputo longer
than male-headed households (36.2 years versus 29.4 years), though time of occupancy in
current bairro is nearly the same (19.8 years versus 20.8 years). Aside from sex of household
head, little variance in means of length of residency is observed among strata.
33. Of the i2i households in the survey, only i1 (9.0 percent) received remittances in 1991, and of these
i1, only 4 collected cash payments (1 for 5 rand, 1 for 54 rand, 1 for 200 rand, and 1 for 500 rand). The
remaining remittances were in-kind.
34. One or more moves may have taken place in the interim.TABLE 4.2 Mean household-level demographic characteristics by sample strata, 1991 peri-urban survey,
Maputo
# of households (hh) 67 54 109 13 51 70 121
Family size and migration
Total # of hh members 8.9 1 0.7 9.9 8.0 10.8 8.9 9.7
# of children (  15 years) 4.3 5.1 4.7 3.8 5.4 4.1 4.6
# female adults (> 15 years) 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.6
# male adults (>15 years) 2.4 2.7 2.6 1.7 2.6 2.4 2.5
# family members abroad 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
% hh with z 1 members abroad 20.9 37.0 26.6 46.2 29.4 27.1 28.1
Age (years)
Female adults (>15 years) 32.7 33.7 33.2 32.6 32.6 33.7 33.2
Male adults (>15 years) 33.5 33.9 34.2 26.8 33.2 34.1 33.7
Public education (years)
Female adults (>15 years) 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.4
Male adults (>15 years) 4.7 4.9 4.7 5.5 4.8 4.8 4.8
Household head
Age (years) 48.3 51.4 49.9 46.2 48.2 50.7 49.6
Public education (years) 3.3 3.6 3.7 1.6 3.8 3.2 3.5
Resided in Maputo (years) 29.3 31.2 29.4 36.2 29.9 30.4 30.1
Resided in current bairro (years) 21.1 20.4 20.8 19.8 20.9 20.7 20.8
% hh with nonfarm job 60.0 56.0 61.0 23.0 47.0 66.0 58.0
Land
# of machambas 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.2
Irrigated 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3
Rain-fed 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.4 1.2 0.9
Farm size (ha)
Irrigated and rain-fed .65 .96 .84 .29 1.24 .46 .79
Irrigated .50 .60 .58 .21 1.01 .21 .55
Rain-fed
b .15 .36 .26 .07 .23 .25 .24
Mean plot size
Irrigated (ha)" .28 .57 .44 .13 .75 .16 .41
Rain-fed (ha)
c .44 .59 .56 .10 .89 .38 .52
a. Mean plot size is calculated on a smaller number of machambas than referred to in the number of irrigated machambas because
certain machambas were not visited for measurement.
b. Mean rain-fed land including nonmeasured plots counted as having zero area.
c. Most rain-fed plots could not be visited (hence measured) due to security risk. Estimates of mean size include only those plots
whose area measurements were taken at the time of the site visit.
MALE FEMALE NON-
DISTRICT 4 DISTRICT 6 HOUSEHOLD HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED REGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
CHARACTERISTICS51
4.3 LANDHOLDINGS
Households tend to own multiple plots of land in rain-fed and irrigated areas for residential
and agricultural use. Households on average farmed 2.2 machambas, 1.3 in irrigated and 0.9
in rain-fed zones. Irrigated machambas averaged 0.41 hectares in size (entire sample) while
rain-fed plots averaged 0.52 hectares.
35 However, these data mask three important
variations.
First, the number of holdings varies according to registration status. The registered
stratum on average holds 1.7 plots (versus 2.6 for unregistered households). However, as the
number of irrigated machambas is relatively similar between the two groups (1.3 plots versus
1.4), the difference is mainly due to the greater number of holdings of rain-fed plots by the
nonregistered stratum (1.2 parcels versus 0.4).
36 This variation partially reflects nonuniform
employment access and income strategies. Registered households tend to have larger irrigated
holdings (1.01 hectares versus .21 hectare), produce high-income crops for market, and
depend more heavily on earnings from self-employment (see table 4.9, p. 63). Conversely,
unregistered households have smaller irrigated holdings and tend (perhaps need) to
supplement their comparatively lower urban wages and farm income with earnings from rain-
fed plots.
37
Second, there is considerable variation in size of irrigated farming units. The total area
of irrigated machambas held by female-headed households (.21 hectare) is less than that of
male-headed households (.58 hectare). Registered households, with 1.01 hectare per farming
unit, in relative terms greatly exceed the unregistered group (.21 hectare per farming unit)
in the size of irrigated landholdings.
Third, despite a smaller number of holdings, registered households have larger irrigated
machambas (0.75 hectare per plot versus 0.16 hectare) than the unregistered group. While
female-headed households have slightly fewer dependents (18 percent) to feed based on family
size, their irrigated landholdings are only one-third the size of male-headed households'
holdings (.13 hectare versus .44 hectare).
35. Figures for rain-fed and irrigated hectares are based on different sampling frames. All plots in irrigated
zones were measured and all families had at least one irrigated machamba. Rain-fed machambas, which tend
to be located farther out in less "secure" areas, were generally not measured by researchers. While some
farmers were able to estimate the size of their rain-fed holdings, others were not. The area reported is thus based
on a small sample of rain-fed machambas for which respondents were able to estimate plot sizes, albeit with
larger errors (relative to the more precise measurements taken for irrigated plots).
36. Whereas irrigated land is very scarce and difficult to acquire, "idle" land in rain-fed areas is still
available, though with higher risk of violence.
37. It could be argued that the difference in holdings in rain-fed plots reflects a difference in residency
status, that is, earlier settlers in the demarcated areas were able to claim sufficient land for a livelihood while
later migrants were forced to live in outlying areas for subsistence. The data for residency in the present bairro
(2i.i versus 20.4 years) would not support this hypothesis.52
Fourth, rain-fed holdings tend to be more important in District 6 than in District 4 (1.1
versus 0.7 holdings and .36 versus .15 hectare per farm, on average), which is consistent
with the view that the best irrigated land is concentrated in the latter area.
4.4 LANGUAGE SKILLS
Portuguese is the official language for government administration and services in Maputo.
Government forms, schoolbooks, pamphlets, and registration records are prepared in this
language; all billings, invoices, and receipts are written in Portuguese as well. The ability to
read and write Portuguese is therefore necessary for engaging in commercial and legal
activities, particularly those involving official obligations.
However, language capabilities are not uniform. Both household heads and spouses in
the survey were asked to provide information on their mother language and their Portuguese-
speaking and -reading ability. Their responses are tabulated in table 4.3. Xichangana and
Xironga are the most common languages spoken, representing collectively 70.2 percent and
63.0 percent of household heads responding in districts 4 and 6, respectively. Less than 3.0
percent of the household heads in each district spoke Portuguese as a mother tongue.
However, 83.6 percent of the household heads in District 4 and 85.2 percent in District 6 said
they were fluent in speaking Portuguese, and 77.6 percent and 79.6 percent, respectively, said
they were able to write the language.
The stratum comprising female household heads is the notable exception. Only 38.5
percent reported being able to speak Portuguese fluently, 23.1 percent expressed a fair ability,
and 38.5 percent confessed a poor competence. Further, only 30.8 percent indicated being
able to write in Portuguese. When the principal spouse, normally a woman, was asked about
Portuguese-reading and -writing ability, the responses mirrored those of female household
heads (except for female-headed households, the principal spouse was normally a brother or
son, who in all cases was fluent in both speaking and writing Portuguese). Only 59.3 percent
(44.1 percent) of spouses indicated an ability to speak (write) Portuguese fluently in District
4, and 56.0 percent (38.0 percent) in District 6. Spouses in registered households tended to
be more fluent in Portuguese than those in nonregistered households (75.5 percent versus 43.3
percent with speaking, and 53.1 percent versus 31.7 percent with writing).
4.5 POLITICAL STATUS AND CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP
As reported in section 2, people ostensibly join cooperatives and producer associations to
increase access to farm inputs and secure land rights. Having a family member with an
official position in government would theoretically improve access to government services
(for example, titling) through better knowledge of the bureaucracy and the ability to use one's
position as leverage. Information on political status and cooperative membership was elicited
from each household head through three sets of questions: whether any family member
belongs to a cooperative, whether any family member belongs to a producer association, and54
whether any family member holds a position within the bairro organization, GD, Dcu,
Executive Council, and/or provincial or national government. Responses are summarized in
table 4.4.
On average, only 6.6 percent of household heads (and households) had one or more
members belonging to a cooperative. The lower percentage reported for family membership
(0.7 percent responding as members) indicates that membership is held by only one or two
persons in the household, not the entire family workforce. Membership in cooperatives by
household head tends to be more prevalent in District 6 compared with District 4 (13.0
percent versus 1.5 percent). Nonregistered households tend to have higher rates of
membership than registered households (8.6 percent versus 3.9 percent) while rates of
membership between male-headed and female-headed households are nearly equal (6.4 percent
and 7.7 percent, respectively). On average, for the entire sample, 37.5 percent of the families
belonging to a cooperative joined to gain access to farm inputs, 37.5 percent to obtain
produce to sell in the market, 12.5 percent to gain access to land, and 12.5 percent to acquire
assistance with marketing. However, these motives varied among household strata. Increasing
access to farm inputs was most important in District 4 (100 percent) and by registered
households (100 percent). Obtaining produce to sell was more important in District 6 (42.9
percent), by adult male-headed households (42.9 percent), and for nonregistered households
(50.0 percent). Female-headed households indicated general assistance with marketing as their
principal motive for joining (100 percent), which includes both gaining access to farm inputs
and selling products.
Membership in a producer association was more prevalent, partially due to the fact that
producer-association listings were used as the basis for selecting the nonregistered household
sample in the research area, especially District 6.
38 About 64.5 percent of households in the
overall sample had one or more members involved in a producer association. However, the
fact that only 7.5 percent of household members mentioned themselves as being members
indicates that affiliation is effectively limited to one or two persons per associated family.
Membership is higher in District 6 than District 4 (75.9 percent versus 55.2 percent), among
female-headed than male-headed households (76.9 percent versus 63.3 percent), and among
nonregistered than registered households (90.0 percent versus 29.4 percent). Various motives
were mentioned for joining a producer association, including, in descending order of
importance, increasing security of land rights (44.8 percent) and acquiring farm inputs (41.4
percent). The fact that 10.3 percent of association members said that they joined because their
land was located within the association's domain implies that, in addition to associations being
perceived as member-motivated, they are also seen by some as autonomous, land-controlling
entities. Increasing security of land rights was a more important factor for nonregistered than
registered households (49.3 percent versus 25.0 percent).
39 Increasing access to farm inputs
38. Lists of green-zone producers maintained by the casas op-árias in District 4 were also used.
39. The figure 25 percent implies that title alone is not sufficient for increasing security of land rights,
though it is possible that registered households acquired registration after becoming members of the producer
association.56
was the most important factor for female-headed and registered households (50.0 percent and
56.3 percent, respectively).
Official status in table 4.4 concerns two levels of authority in land allocation: local-level
authorities, including neighborhood (bairro) organizations and the GD, and central authorities,
including the Dcu, Executive Council, and provincial and national government. Surprisingly,
14.0 percent of households in the overall sample reported having a family member with a
position in the GD, the principal decision-making body for land allocations at the local level.
Whether this reflects the political power and status of landholding groups in the sample,
extended positions within the GD, or a broad interpretation of "position" by respondents
cannot be ascertained from the data. Conversely, few households (less than 2 percent in all
categories) have family members who hold positions within the offices of the central
authority. Rates of official status for all positions are relatively uniform across categories with
the exception of registered households, which tend not to participate in neighborhood
organizations, and female-headed households, which have low official representation in both
local and central offices.
4.6 DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
The conventional usage of "household head," implying a single decision maker, has come
under severe criticism in the development literature for failing to recognize the involvement
of other household members. In this study, the principal male and female adults in the
household were asked to respond jointly to six separate activities requiring management
decisions, specifically: who is primarily responsible for overall labor allocation within the
household, who is primarily responsible for making farm-labor allocation decisions, who
makes the primary decisions on farm investments, who makes the principal decisions on
marketing of farm produce, who decides how to spend farm income, and who decides how
to spend nonfarm income?
40 Possible responses include: household head (normally male with
the exception of the female-headed household categories) solely makes the decision; the
principal spouse (normally female) solely makes the decision; both household head and
principal spouse jointly make the decision; and someone other than the household head and
his or her principal spouse solely makes the decision. Responses are ranked in table 4.5 (from
top to bottom) according to decreasing authority of the household head and increasing
authority of the principal spouse.
Decisions about farm investments and destination of farm produce tend to be taken
solely by household heads, and to a lesser extent solely by the principal spouse (59.5 percent
40. Addressing questions to both adults simultaneously forced a consensus response. Asking each separately
would have permitted respondents more flexibility in offering dissenting views but would have required a
separate round of questioning. It is still possible that the presence of a domineering household head might have
prevented the principal spouse from revealing his or her "true" decision-making role within the household.
However, the fact that women reported at least a joint involvement in 38.0—53.7 percent of all decisions,
depending on the activity, suggests that this problem was not widespread or debilitating.TABLE 4.5 Decision-making authority of sample households, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
MALE FEMALE NON-










Making farm investments (%)
Household head makes decision 58.2 61.1 56.9 84.6 74.5 48.6 59.5
Principal spouse makes decision 25.4 33.3 30.3 15.4 17.6 37.1 28.9
Both 11.9 5.6 1 0.1 7.8 1 0.0 9.1
Other
Destination of farm produce (%)
4.5 2.8 4.3 2.5
Household head makes decision 58.2 59.3 56.9 76.9 78.4 44.3 58.7
Principal spouse makes decision 29.9 24.1 28.4 15.4 13.7 37.1 27.3
Both 9.0 14.8 11.9 7.7 5.9 15.7 11.6
Other
Farm labor allocation (%)
3.0 1.9 2.8 2.0 2.9 2.5
Household head makes decision 52.2 48.1 46.8 84.6 49.0 51.4 50.4
Principal spouse makes decision 23.9 35.2 31.2 7.7 33.3 25.7 28.9
Both 22.4 13.0 19.3 7.7 15.7 20.0 18.2
Other
Spending of farm income (%)
1.5 3.7 2.8 2.0 2.9 2.5
Household head makes decision 47.8 45.3 42.6 84.6 64.7 33.3 46.7
Principal spouse makes decision 32.8 30.2 33.3 15.4 13.7 44.9 31.7
Both
Other
Overall labor allocation (%)
19.4 24.5 24.1 21.6 21.7 21.7
Household head makes decision 46.3 42.6 40.4 84.6 54.9 37.1 44.6
Principal spouse makes decision 35.8 40.7 40.4 15.4 27.5 45.7 38.0
Both 14.9 16.7 17.4 17.6 14.3 15.7
Other
Spending of nonfarm income (%)
3.0 1.8 2.9 1.7
Household head makes decision 44.4 39.6 41.5 54.5 55.2 34.8 42.2
Principal spouse makes decision 22.2 26.4 25.5 9.1 10.6 33.3 24.1
Both 23.8 28.3 26.4 18.2 27.7 24.6 25.9
Other 9.5 5.7 6.6 18.2 8.5 7.2 7.858
versus 28.9 percent and 58.7 percent versus 27.3 percent, respectively). This tendency is
particularly strong for household heads in the registered (74.5 percent versus 17.6 percent and
78.4 percent versus 13.7 percent) and female-headed (84.6 versus 15.4 percent and 76.9
percent versus 15.4 percent) categories, respectively. Despite the fact that many machamba
managers are women (table 5.1, p. 68), the decisions concerning which family members work
on the plot tend to be made by the head of household (normally male, 50.4 percent, versus
spouse, 28.9 percent) (the notable exception is female-headed households, in which 84.6
percent of the decisions are made by women).
The gender gap, however, begins to shrink with regard to decisions involving overall
labor allocation and income expenditure. The principal spouse (compared with the household
head) either individually or jointly with the husband or wife determines 53.7 percent (60.3
percent) of the decisions concerning overall labor allocation, 53.4 percent (68.4 percent) of
farm-income expenditures, and 50.0 percent (68.1 percent) of nonfarm-income expenditures.
In the case of female-headed households, decisions regarding overall labor allocation (84.6
percent), farm-income expenditures (84.6 percent), and nonfarm-income expenditures (54.5
percent) tend to be made solely by the female head. Finally, household heads in the registered
category who are usually male tend to take greater responsibility for household decisions
(excluding the female-headed responses) than those in other categories.
4.7 ASSETS AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Information on access to physical services, quality of housing materials, and ownership of
physical assets (reported in table 4.6) serves as evidence of household wealth. Data on
financial assets are noticeably lacking; attempts were made in early rounds of questionnaire
development to elicit this information, but respondents were generally reluctant to disclose
details.
Compared with most rural economies in Africa, households in the green zones appear
relatively wealthy. About 9.0 percent of households in District 4 (25.9 percent in District 6)
own an automobile or truck; 22.4 (11.1) percent, a color television; 20.9 (9.3) percent, a
VCR; 40.3 (31.5) percent, a refrigerator; and 49.3 (53.7) percent, a gas or electric stove.
Registered households appear the wealthiest in terms of asset accumulation. Compared with
the nonregistered group, the registered category has the highest percentage of households with
a color television (27.5 percent versus 10.0 percent), VCR (23.5 percent versus 10.0
percent), refrigerator (52.9 percent versus 24.3 percent), and an automobile or truck (29.4
percent versus 7.1 percent). Conversely, compared with male-headed households, the
female-headed category is relatively disadvantaged in asset holdings: color television (0
percent versus 19.3 percent), VCR (0 percent versus 17.4 percent), refrigerator (15.4 percent
versus 38.5 percent), gas or electric stove (30.8 percent versus 53.2 percent), and automobile
or truck (0 percent versus 18.3 percent).
The advantaged position of registered households and the disadvantaged position of
female-headed households hold as well with respect to physical services and quality ofTABLE 4.6 Assets and physical infrastructure of sample households, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
Assets (% households with)
Color television 22.4 11.1 19.3 27.5 10.0 17.4
VCR 20.9 9.3 17.4 23.5 1 0.0 15.7
Refrigerator 40.3 31.5 38.5 15.4 52.9 24.3 36.4
Gas/electric stove 49.3 53.7 53.2 30.8 58.8 45.7 51.2
Bicycle 13.4 13.0 13.8 7.7 17.6 1 0.0 13.2
Motorcycle 9.0 7.4 9.2 9.8 7.1 8.3
Automobile/truck 9.0 25.9 18.3 29.4 7.1 16.5
Access to physical services (% yes)
Electricity 38.8 37.0 40.4 15.4 49.0 30.0 38.0
Piped water or private well 38.8 85.2 60.6 46.2 68.6 52.9 59.5
Construction material of house (%)
Reeds 14.9 9.3 11.9 15.4 7.8 15.7 12.4
Reinforced reeds 7.5 1.9 2.8 23.1 8.6 5.0
Wood 4.5 5.6 5.5 - 3.9 5.7 5.0
Cement blocks 68.7 81.5 77.1 53.8 86.3 65.7 74.4
Wood/cement mix 4.5 - 1.8 7.7 - 4.3 2.5
Zinc sheets 1.9 0.9 2.0 0.8
MALE FEMALE NON-
DISTRICT 4 DISTRICT 6 HOUSEHOLD HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED REGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
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housing. On average, 38.0 percent of households in the overall sample have access to
electricity, and 59.5 percent to piped water or a private well. Households in districts 4 and
6 have similar access to electricity, but only 38.8 percent of households in District 4 (versus
85.2 percent in District 6) have access to piped water or a private well. While 40.4 percent
(60.6 percent) of male-headed households and 49.0 percent (68.6 percent) of registered
households have access to electricity (piped water), only 15.4 percent (46.2 percent) of
female-headed households have the same luxury. While 74.4 percent of homes in the overall
sample are constructed of cement blocks, registered households (86.3 percent) and households
in District 6 (81.5 percent) are above this mean; nonregistered households (65.7 percent) and
female-headed households (53.8 percent) are below. Female-headed households in turn have
the highest percentage of homes constructed of reeds (15.4 percent) and reinforced reeds
(23.1 percent).
4.8 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Heads of household, spouses, and other adults with at least one wage activity or self-employ-
ment activity were asked to provide information on type of work and wage level as well as
nonwage benefits for all nonfarm employment enterprises in which they were involved. Wage
employment was defined as those activities for which remuneration was paid on a periodic
basis by an employer. Self-employment activities were defined as those operations from which
monetary income was earned or lost from the activity's profit or loss. Almost 20 percent of
income earners had multiple income-earning activities. Earnings are standardized in order to
compute average monthly salaries and annual earnings for the period January through
December 1991.
41 In the case of self-employment, monthly and annual earnings were
computed from data collected on monthly gross revenues and costs (labor, materials,
transportation, taxes, and goods and services) and the number of months worked in the past
year.
4.8.1 FORMAL-SECTOR WAGE ACTIVITIES
Average monthly wages for all household-resident males and females who reported having
wage employment in the past year are recorded in table 4.7 by job category. Many of the
activities are part-time positions, some consuming several weeks per month, others several
months per year. Multiple activities are sometimes undertaken by one wage earner. Several
points in the data stand out. First, the construction/industry and service/administration sectors
were the most significant sources of wage employment for both males and females. Second,
41. The respondent was asked for his or her average salary earnings during the past year per standard pay
period (day, week, month, or year). Earnings were converted to monthly totals using the conversion factors of
thirty days or four weeks per month. To calculate total annual earnings, data were also collected on the number
of periods worked in the past year. However, the amount of time worked (hours) per month per activity was
not collected uniformly, making it difficult to compare salaries among individuals (for example, a female and
a male adult could earn the same monthly salary of 30,000 meticais, but the male may work fewer hours during
the month and thus have higher real earnings).6i
males participate in formal wage employment to a much higher degree than females. While
the number of male and female adults in the sample is approximately equal (table 4.2, p. 49),
female labor represented 20.3 percent (27=133) of formal-sector activity (months worked)
while men accounted for 79.7 percent of time worked. Third, women earn less than men in
formal-sector activities. Only within the restaurant/hotel and health sectors did women earn
higher average monthly wages than men. In all other categories, monthly wages for males
were 9.0-77.8 percent higher than those for women. Further, the average monthly wage
across activities is 38,500 meticais for women, and 54,000 meticais for men. However,
without standardizing wage rates (monthly wages divided by hours or days worked per
month), for which information is not uniformly reported, and without adjusting wages for
differences in age, education, or training, it is difficult to calculate rates of wage discrimina-
tion.




OCCUPATION CATEGORY income Range income Range income
(000 mt) (000 mtl n (000 mtl (000 mt) n (000 mt) n
Construction/industry 36.1 28-50 8 49.8 23-80 46 47.8 54
Service/administration 49.3 10-108 6 73.6 15-326 23 68.6 29
Cleaning/guard 27.5 15-40 2 48.9 20-100 23 47.2 25
Restaurant/hotel 46.7 30-75 3 36.0 36-36 1 44.0 4
Commerce 27.0 20-34 2 47.5 45-50 2 37.3 4
Transportation 25.0 0-50 2 40.0 30-50 2 32.5 4
Education 41.0 32-50 2 44.7 35-54 2 42.9 4
Other - - 0 47.6 10-105 4 47.6 4
Health 50.0 50-50 1 45.0 40-50 2 46.7 3
Agricultural wage labor 25.0 25-25 1 32.0 32-32 1 28.5 2
All activities 38.5 27 54.0 106 50.8 133
a. One individual may have multiple activities.
4.8.2 SELF-EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
With the liberalization of Maputo's economy, self-employment, particularly petty trade, has
become an important part of household income strategies (Little and Baptista 1992). In
addition to conventional activities in the artisan, service, and commercial sectors,
self-employment activities listed in table 4.8 also include agricultural industry, that is, raising
animals for sale, fishing, and milling. These enterprises were not included in farm income
because the activity takes place away from the machamba-either on the coast (fishing) or at
the place of residence (livestock, milling). Although fewer adults reported self-employment
relative to wage employment (80 versus 133), net monthly incomes from self-employment
activities are considerably higher. The overall average monthly wage for self-employment is62
166,200 meticais per worker compared with 50,800 meticais per worker for wage
employment.
42 Average net monthly income was the highest for poultry, fishing, grocery
stores, and transportation, all of which earned over 300,000 meticais per month.
TABLE 4.8 Average monthly income, principal self-employment activity° of
sample households, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
MALES FEMALES OVERALL
EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES (000 mt) n (000 mt) n (000 mt) n
Services
Gardener 300.0 1 - - 300.0 1
Tailor 35.0 1 - - 35.0 1
Carpenter 350.0 1 - - 350.0 1
Seamstress - - 22.5 2 22.5 2
Electrician - - 50.0
 
1 50.0 1
Mechanic 60.0 2 - - 60.0 2
Mason 150.0 2 - - 150.0 2
Painter 250.0 1 - - 250.0 1
Shoemaker 18.0 1 - - 18.0 1
Other 30.0 1 - - 30.0 1
Agricultural industry
Pigs 38.4 13 50.0
 
1 39.2 14
Chickens 428.3 11 - - 428.3 11
Beekeeping 42.5 1 - - 42.5 1
Miller - - 72.0
 
1 72.0 1
Fisherperson 612.5 2 - - 612.5 2
Commerce
Grocery store owner 302.0 3 - - 302.0 3
Vendor of manufactured goods 70.0
 
1 66.9 10 67.3 11
Vendor of agricultural goods - - 46.2 14 46.2 14
Vendor of food 37.8 2 26.0 4 29.9 6
Chapa 100 owner
b 482.5 4 - - 482.5 4
All activities 232.9 47 48.1 33 1 66.2 80
a. Individual may have multiple activities.
b. Urban transport service, usually a minivan.
Clear market segmentation is apparent in self-employment activities. Men tend to work
in all sectors; women are principally engaged as petty traders in the central and peripheral
markets of the city. Of the 33 women reporting self-employment activities, 28 worked in
sales of manufactured items, agricultural goods, and food, compared with 3 of 47 male adults
in the same activities. Further, the earnings of women are much lower than those of men.
The average monthly earnings of men is 232,900 meticais versus 48,100 meticais for women.
As with formal wage employment, earnings from self-employment were not standardized for
time worked; thus potential causes for the wage gap-for example, discrimination, unequal
42. Monthly salaries are difficult to compare because figures are unadjusted for hours or days worked per
month (see previous footnote).63
access to employment opportunities, lack of resources or time constraints—are difficult to
determine from the data.
Why would household members work in wage employment given the higher earnings
potential of self-employment? Part of the answer lies with the other benefits obtained by
working in the formal sector (table 4.9). On average, 52.1 percent of households qualified
for retirement benefits, 49.6 percent obtained medical benefits, 33.9 percent got credit
assistance, 28.1 percent received transportation services, and 25.6 percent acquired food
subsidies. These benefits vary widely among strata, but the category of female-headed
households is most notable for lack of access. Only 7.7 percent of female-headed households




Data on mean household earnings for nonfarm jobs and total wage and self-employment
activities in 1991 are reported in table 4.9. Adults within the household on average held 1.1
salaried positions and worked at 0.4 self-employment enterprises. The number of self-employ-
ment activities was fairly constant across categories. However, the number of formal salaried
jobs ranged from 1.3 jobs per household for nonregistered households to 0.8 job per
household and 0.5 job per household for registered and female-headed households,
respectively. Mean annual nonfarm earnings for the entire sample of 121 households was
801,000 meticais. Self-employment represented 69.5 percent of this total, and wage earnings
30.5 percent. Female-headed households earned 292,000 meticais in 1991, or approximately
$132 ($US1.00=2,200 meticais) compared with an average of 854,000 meticais ($388) for
male-headed households. Registered households had the highest absolute level of nonfarm
income of any category. Compared with nonregistered households, the nonfarm income of
registered households in 1991 averaged 985,000 meticais (versus 667,000 meticais), of which
47.1 percent (93.7 percent) came from wage employment, and 52.9 percent (6.3 percent)
from self-employment. These data indicate both the vulnerable position of women in the
formal economy and the relatively stronger economic and social position of registered
households compared to nonregistered households.
4.9.2 FARM INCOME AND EXPENDITURES
Income and expenditures for irrigated plots in the sample are presented in table 4.9 for the
total area of irrigated holdings and per square meter.
43 The nonfarm income gap between
43. Rain-fed plots are used almost exclusively for home consumption and reciprocal in-kind trade among
extended family and neighbors. Since output could not be recalled with any reasonable degree of accuracy, both
output and inputs on rain-fed plots were excluded from income calculations.TABLE 4.9 Farm and nonfarm income and expenses of sample households, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo







HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Crop income and expenditures (0001 
Total revenue 2,494 4,694 3,803 506 6,964 934 3,476
Wages 525 327 477 65 892 105 436
211 290 269 38 462 89 246 Chemical inputs
Other costs 23 59 43 2 84 6 39
Total expenses 759 676 790 105 1,439 199 722
Net income 1,735 4,018 3,013 401 5,526 735 2,754
Crop income and expenditures per m
2 
Total revenue 804 788 836 437 1,012 640 797
Wages 128 69 108 46 164 57 1 02
Chemical inputs 68 76 76 32 89 60 72
Other costs 7 8 8 2 12 4 7
Total expenses 203 153 192 79 265 120 181
Net income 601 635 644 358 747 520 616
Number of nonfarm jobs
Nonfarm jobs/family 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.6
Formal jobs 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.1
Self-employed 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4
Farm and nonfarm income (000 mt)
Net farm income 2,519 4,223 3,591 447 6,488 943 3,280
Crops 1,735 4,018 3,013 401 5,526 735 2,754
Livestock 784 205 578 46 962 208 526
Nonfarm income 768 842 854 292 985 667 801
Formal sector income 552 564 597 176 464 625 557
Self-employed income 216 278 257 116 521 42 244
Total farm and non-farm income 3,289 5,065 4,445 739 7,473 1,610 4,081
Total income/capita (000 mt) 531 572 596 123 977 238 549
Per-capita income by sector (%)
Net crop income 44.6 74.8 58.7 60.0 63.3 44.9 58.7
Net livestock income 28.0 3.1 16.7 5.4 15.8 18.2 16.4
Total nonfarm income 27.4 22.1 24.6 34.6 20.9 36.9 24.9
Households with access to other social benefits (%)`
Medical benefits 50.7 48.1 54.1 7.7 33.3 61.4 49.6
Credit assistance 31.3 37.0 37.6 33.3 34.3 33.9
Retirement 47.8 57.4 56.9 7.7 41.2 60.0 52.1
Food subsidy 20.9 31.5 28.4 23.5 27.1 25.6
Transportation 19.4 38.9 31.2 27.5 28.6 28.1
a. Excludes family labor costs.
b. Taxes, farm implements, and machinery rental services.
c. Households with at least one member with nonwage benefits.65
male-headed and female-headed households in the previous section would theoretically be
reduced if women earned a disproportionately greater share of household income from
farming. The data, however, do not support this hypothesis. The annual net farm income
(crop and livestock activities) of female-headed households is 447,000 meticais, 89.7 percent
of which came from crop activities, and 10.3 percent from livestock farming on the
machamba. Comparable figures for male-headed households are 3,591,000 meticais, 83.9
percent from crop income, and 16.1 percent from livestock activities. Registered households
have the highest annual net farm income of any stratum (6,488,000 meticais), in part due to
larger farm size.
Registered households (compared with nonregistered households) also appear to make
more intensive use of the land resource, whether measured by total revenues (1,012 versus
640 meticais per square meter), wages paid (164 versus 57 meticais per square meter),
chemical inputs applied (89 versus 60 meticais per square meter), or net revenue (747 versus
520 meticais per square meter). Female-headed households have the lowest productivity of
any stratum and, compared with male-headed households, they exhibit very low revenues (437
versus 836 meticais per square meter), wages paid (46 versus 108 meticais per square meter),
chemical inputs (32 versus 76 meticais per square meter), and net revenue (358 versus 644
meticais per square meter).
4.9.3 TOTAL INCOME
Total household income, including farm and nonfarm activities, is reported in table 4.9. The
income gap between female-headed and male-headed households shows the severe
vulnerability of female-headed households to economic fluctuations. The average total income
of female-headed households in 1991 was 739,000 meticais ($336) versus 4,445,000 meticais
($2,020) for male-headed households. Even after adjusting for differences in household size
between the two strata, the per-capita total income of female-headed households (123,000
meticais, or $56) was still only 21 percent of the level reported for the male-headed category
(596,000 meticais, or $271). Households in District 6 have incomes 53.9 percent higher than
in District 4 (5,065,000 versus 3,287,000 meticais), but per-capita incomes are similar
(572,000 versus 531,000 meticais) due to a greater number of residents per household in
District 6 (table 4.2, p. 49). Registered households have substantially higher total and per-
capita income levels than nonregistered households (7,473,000 versus 1,610,000 meticais per
household and 977,000 versus 238,000 meticais per capita), further demonstrating the
economic Power of private (titled) farms in the economy.
On average, crop income contributes 58.7 percent to total household incomes across
categories. The contribution of crop income is highest in District 6 (74.8 percent), and for
registered households (63.3 percent) and female-headed households (61.7 percent), and lowest
in District 4 (44.7 percent) and for nonregistered households (44.9 percent). Nonregistered
households (36.9 percent) and female-headed households (34.6 percent) place the greatest
dependence on nonfarm employment, lending weak evidence to the hypothesis that these
disadvantaged populations, because of limited land access and weak property rights, are
turning to the nonfarm sources of income. Conversely, registered households place the least66
emphasis on nonfarm income sources of income (20.9 percent), indicating the combined effect
of both greater farm sizes and greater security of property rights.
4.10 CONCLUSIONS
Selected data were presented and analyzed in this section on political and socioeconomic
characteristics of green-zone producers including household demography, landholdings,
language skills, political status, household decision-making, physical assets, nonfarm
employment, and farm and nonfarm income. Data are disaggregated according to seven
categories of households reflecting different degrees of Political and institutional status:
quality of state administrative structures (District 4 versus District 6), gender (male- versus
female-headed households), tenure status (registered versus nonregistered), and the overall
sample.
The analysis shows that, of the 121 households in the survey, a sizable number have
at least one family member living outside Mozambique, though very few households reported
receiving remittances. Also, compared with the general population, which is in a high state
of flux from refugee resettlement, the household sample has a history of long residency in
the study area. Households tend to own multiple plots of land in rain-fed and irrigated areas,
though registered households have fewer, but larger, plots than unregistered households due
to fewer holdings of rain-fed land. Female-headed households are particularly disadvantaged;
while they have fewer dependents (18 percent fewer residents), their irrigated landholdings
are roughly one-third the size of those of male-headed households.
Only 7 percent of households on average have one or more members who belong to a
cooperative, and 65 percent, to a producer association. Nonregistered households have higher
rates of membership in producer associations than registered households while rates of
membership between male-headed and female-headed households are nearly equal. Those
families belonging to a cooperative tended to join for reasons of gaining access to farm
inputs, obtaining produce to sell in the market, increasing access to land, or securing
marketing assistance. Those families with membership in a producer association tended to join
to increase security of land rights and to acquire farm inputs. Increasing security of land
rights was a more important factor in joining for nonregistered than registered households.
Registered households also make more intensive use of the land, whether measured by
total revenue, chemical inputs applied, or net revenue. Productivity of female-headed
households is the lowest of any stratum, and compared with male-headed households exhibit
very low revenue and net income. Males have higher rates of participation and earnings than
females in formal wage employment. The average total income of female-headed households
in 1991 was 739,000 meticais versus 4,445,000 meticais for male-headed households. Even
after adjusting for differences in household size, the per-capita total income of female-headed
households was still only 21 percent of that reported for the male-headed category. Registered
households have substantially higher total income than nonregistered households, demonstrat-
ing the economic Power of private (titled) farms in the economy.67
Overall, the analysis reveals that agricultural producers in District 6, with the least
effective state administration, rely to a greater degree on cooperatives and producer
associations to gain access to land, security of land rights, and access to production inputs.
Female-headed households—usually divorced, widowed, or with husbands work abroad—are
severely disadvantaged, whether measured by resource access, employment opportunities, or
income levels. Registered farms possess larger farm sizes, wealth, and income than
nonregistered households due to differences in human capital, property rights, market access,
and nonfarm employment among households. The next section compares land-market
transactions, land rights, land disputes, and settlement histories among the various household
strata, before turning to land-price determination in section 6.69
5. LAND SETTLEMENT AND LAND MARKETS
The land market in the peri-urban zone of Maputo is characterized by intense competition,
land conflicts, high transactions costs, and complex interactions between administrative modes
of land allocation and informal transactions. Land is the principal means of economic
livelihood for the majority of green-zone producers. For female-headed households, land
serves as the safety net that separates subsistence from starvation. For registered households,
land as an asset has produced farm incomes far above the combined farm and nonfarm
earnings of nonregistered households. For urban residents, peri-urban land provides a home
away from the city and the opportunity to engage in part-time gardening. For refugees, the
green zones have furnished a home and a new life—or a home away from home until political
and economic stability in the countryside is restored. Regardless of the group, land has
important social and economic value. The land market, based on administrative allocations
or otherwise, determines the process by which land is transferred among alternative uses and
users. Using survey data and case-study methods, this section examines the structure and
operation of the land market in the peri-urban green zones. It investigates the nature of land
transactions in the peri-urban zones, intermediaries involved, transactions costs, and
performance in terms of certainty of land rights, credit access through collateral enhancement,
and land distribution. The combined impact of physical and economic factors on estimated
land prices via regression methods is reserved for the final section.
5.1 SETTLEMENT AND LAND ACQUISITION
As indicated in section 4, the 121 households surveyed controlled 161 plots of land. These
plots were managed by 124 managers (responsáveis). On average, a household had access to
1.3 machambas of irrigated land and 0.9 machamba of rain-fed land. Irrigated plots averaged
0.41 hectare in size while rain-fed plots averaged .52 hectare. However, plot sizes of
female-headed households were considerably smaller (0.13 hectare and 0.10 hectare for
irrigated and rain-fed, respectively) while those of registered households were substantially
larger (0.75 hectare and 0.89 hectare, respectively).
5.1.1 SETTLEMENT
The vast majority of plot managers in the survey migrated to Maputo from the rural areas
outside districts 1-8, then, over time, moved outward from the city to their current bairros
of residence in the peri-urban area. When migrants arrived prior to 1975, however, Maputo
was a much smaller city (mainly consisting of the cement city) than it is today. Many
residents settled at the outskirts of then-Maputo city before relocating later with the expansion
of the peri-urban fringe.TABLE 5.1 Migration history of sample households and plot-level mode of land acquisition, 1991 peri-urban
survey, Maputou
MALE FEMALE NON-










Number of plot managers 67 57 1 12 12 53 71 124
Total number of plots 92 70 104 58 57 105 162
Sex of plot manager (% female)
Year plot manager first immigrated to Maputo
40.3 49.1 38.4 100.0 24.5 59.2 44.4
<1950 13.4 12.3 10.7 33.3 15.1 11.3 12.9
1950-1973 74.6 73.7 75.9 58.8 77.4 71.8 74.2
1974-1980 10.4 14.0 12.5 8.3 7.5 15.5 12.1
1981-1985
Year plot manager arrived in current bairro
1.5 0.9 1.4 0.8
<1950 3.0 3.5 2.7 8.3 5.8 1.4 3.3
1950-1973 53.0 49.1 51.4 50.0 51.9 50.7 51.2
1974-1980 31.8 40.4 37.8 16.7 34.6 36.6 35.8
1981-1985 6.1 1.8 3.6 8.3 3.8 4.2 4.1
1986-1992
Years  experience growing vegetables 
6.1 5.3 4.5 16.7 3.8 7.0 5.7
0-5 11.9 14.0 11.6 25.0 13.2 12.7 12.9
6-10 26.9 28.1 27.7 25.0 30.2 25.4 27.4
11-15 22.4 24.6 23.2 25.0 28.3 19.7 23.4
16-20 25.4 19.3 22.3 25.0 15.1 28.2 22.6
>20
Mode of plot acquisition
13.4 14.0 15.2 13.2 14.1 13.7
Concession from bairro (GD) 37.4 18.3 29.7 23.5 28.8 29.2 29.0
Spontaneous occupation 18.7 11.3 13.8 29.4 6.1 21.9 15.4
Lent-in or borrowed 13.2 11.3 12.4 11.8 10.6 13.5 12.3
Concession from Dcu/executive council 8.8 14.1 11.7 5.9 27.3 - 11.1
Concession from producer association 2.2 21.1 9.0 23.5 1.5 16.7 10.5
Purchased 12.1 4.2 9.0 5.9 10.6 7.3 8.6
Inherited 4.4 8.5 6.9 9.1 4.2 6.2
Concession from regulo
b 2.2 4.2 3.4 - 5.2 3.1
Concession from Green Zones Office - 4.2 2.1 3.0 1.0 1.9
Rented-in 1.1 - 0 7 - 1.0 0.6
Concession from Ministry of Agriculture 1.4 0.7 1.5 0.6
Concession obtained after having evicted tenant 1.4 0.7 1.5 0.6
a. Another question-years of experience farming in peri-urban irrigated green zones-produced a similar set of responses.
b. The regulo was the village chief installed by the colonial Portuguese government.71
For the 124 plot managers in the survey, table 5.1 contains key data on date of
immigration to Maputo and last date of change of residency to the current bairro (though
other moves may have taken place in the interim). On average, 12.9 percent of the
respondents indicated that they had immigrated to the greater Maputo area (mainly the cement
city) prior to 1950. The vast majority (74.2 percent) arrived in the 1950-1973 period, just
before independence. Roughly 12.1 percent immigrated to greater Maputo in the years
immediately after independence (1974-1980), 0.8 percent between 1981 and 1985, and none
thereafter. The high cost of living creates a formidable barrier to settlement, which partially
explains the decline in recent years. However, the rapid expansion of the pen -urban zone
beyond districts 1-3 (and thus beyond Maputo city) also means that, for reasons of cost,
present immigrants are now establishing their roots first in the outer districts (4-8).
After the initial period of settlement, all respondents, by definition (that is, place of
residence in the green zones) moved outward from Maputo, through one or more stops, to
their current bairro. As indicated in table 5.1, an initial surge (51.2 percent) took place from
1950 to 1973, but 35.8 percent of the overall sample moved between 1974 and 1980, corre-
sponding to the period of economic decline following the departure of the Portuguese. Since
1980, the population has been exceptionally stable. Only 9.8 percent of respondents reported
moving to their current bairro sometime during the 1981-1992 period. This settlement pattern
appears remarkably similar for households in districts 4 and 6 as well as between registered
and unregistered groups, though plot managers for female-headed households appear to have
arrived later than their male counterparts. Compared with the general population, which is
in a high state of flux from refugee resettlement, this sample of green-zone producers has a
history of long residence and access to land in the study area.
The green zones also have a long history of vegetable production. Years of experience
with growing vegetables is a good indicator of background in farming and length of
cultivation.' Of the 124 plot managers in the survey, 36.3 percent have been growing
vegetables for at least 16 years; 23.4 percent, between 11 and 15 years; 27.4 percent,
between 6 and 10 years; and 12.9 percent, between 0 and 5 years. The widespread belief that
a surge of vegetable producers broke into agriculture following the price liberalization of
1985 appears inconsistent with these data. At least 59.7 percent of machamba managers were
producing vegetables prior to 1982.
45 The price reforms no doubt encouraged some entry
of producers into the vegetable sector, but most of the increase in production that has taken
place since 1985 has come from the expansion of area in vegetables or more intensive
production by then existing producers.
44. Many elders recall that, prior to 1975, much of the area now known as the green zones was low-lying
territory covered in grass and brush. Another question—years of experience in farming in peri-urban irrigated
green zones—yielded a similar set of responses.
45. For those respondents reporting having grown vegetables for 6-i0 years (27.4 percent), some would
have been engaged in vegetable production prior to price liberalization.72
5.1.2 MODE OF ACQUISITION
Land acquisition in the peri-urban green zones has historically involved two principal sources:
spontaneous settlement, and formal allocation by the district and national government. As
indicated in table 5.1, 29.0 percent of the currently held machambas were acquired through
bairro authorities, 15.4 percent through spontaneous occupation, 11.1 percent from the Dcu
or Executive Council, 10.5 percent from producer associations, 3.1 percent from the village
chief installed by the colonial Portuguese government (regulo), 1.9 percent from the Green
Zones Office, and 0.6 percent from the Ministry of Agriculture. A lower percentage of
landholdings was acquired through nonadministrative mechanisms-6.2 percent through
inheritance, 8.6 percent through purchase, 12.3 percent through borrowing, 1.1 percent
through eviction of former tenant, and 0.6 percent through renting-in. No households claimed
to have rented-out land, which is not surprising given the risk that lessors face of having land
expropriated by state or local authorities.
Concessions by the bairro administration and producer associations are the lowest level
of administrative mechanism for acquiring land and, for most intents and purposes, can be
combined since the two institutions work closely together. However, producers do perceive
a difference. The bairro authorities in District 4 tended to allocate concessions to producers
directly (37.4 percent versus 18.3 percent in District 6). In 1984/85, the producer associations
in District 6 sought the assistance of families in cleaning the irrigation canals; a concession
was offered in exchange for labor, thus producing the higher allocation by producer
associations (21.1 percent versus 2.2 percent in District 4). Spontaneous settlement tends to
be more common among nonregistered households (21.9 percent versus 6.1 percent of
registered households). As expected, registered households tend to rely more heavily on
concessions from the Dcu (27.3 percent versus 0 percent for nonregistered). Purchases and
borrowings tend to be fairly evenly distributed among strata. However, of 58 plots managed
by female-headed households in the sample, none was inherited (versus 6.9 percent for
male-headed households), suggesting de facto constraints on women's access to land under
customary inheritance law in Mozambique.
The importance of the various processes used to acquire land has changed over time.
Spontaneous occupation, which represented 34.8 percent of land acquisitions over the
1950-1974 period, when land was abundant, had become one of the least important modes
of acquisition (7.9 percent) by the 1986-1992 interval (table 5.2). This collaborates the
prevalent view that land in most areas of the pen-urban green zones had become fully settled
or occupied by 1987. Administrative allocations by bairro authorities were particularly
important during the postindependence era (1975-1985), when local authorities had the
official responsibility of settling vacated lands, but also since 1980, when they were
confronted with the moral responsibility of aiding refugees through land allocations.
Conversely, land allocations by the Dcu or Executive Council have been increasing in
importance over time, rising from 0 percent in the 1950-1974 period to 20.8 percent in
1981-1985, though declining in recent years. Granting of concessions by producer
associations has also increased over time, from 0 percent before independence to the
predominant source since 1986 (23.7 percent). Land purchases, common before73
independence, virtually ceased over the 1975-1985 period due to legal provisions banning
sales. Purchases since 1986 have rebounded (18.4 percent of acquisitions over this period)
despite periodic decrees notifying the public that private transfers are not permissible (see
below). Borrowings have remained an important means of land acquisition over time, ranging
from 10.4 percent to 15.1 percent of acquisitions, depending on the time span. Rentals have
become more important since 1986, but still represent less than 3 percent of acquisitions.'
TABLE 5.2 Mode by which sample households acquired land plots by year of
acquisition, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
(ACQUISITION 1950-1974 1975-1980 1981-1985 1985-1992
Total acquisitions
Mode of acquisition
23 53 48 38
Spontaneous occupation 34.8 17.0 10.4 7.9
Inherited 13.0 1.9 4.2 10.5
Concession from bairro (Go) 17.4 35.8 37.5 15.8
Concession from Dcu/executive council - 7.5 20.8 10.5
Purchased 17.4 5.7 - 18.4
Lent-in or borrowed 13.0 15.1 10.4 10.5
Rented-in 2.6
Concession from regu/o 4.3 7.5 -
Concession from producer association 1.9 14.6 23.7
Concession from Green Zones Office 5.7
Concession from Ministry of Agriculture - 2.1
Eviction of tenant 1.9 -
The incidence of inheritance will increase with the aging of the current population.
However, whether private market transactions-purchase, borrowing, and rental-will
continue to multiply, in the absence of legal reforms aimed at liberalizing land transfers, is
far from clear. As indicated by a recent circular (8 July 1992), issued by the Executive
Council of the City of Maputo and published in the daily newspaper Noticias, the government
has firmly emphasized its authority and control over landownership and allocation:
1.The general public is advised that, according to constitutional principles, the state
controls all land. It is also the state which is responsible for determining the conditions
of land use and exploitation. This is made explicit in Law 6/79 of July 3. This is the
Land Law (Lei de Terras), whose details were passed by Decree no. 16/79 on July 15.
2. In particular, within the City of Maputo, the Executive Council is the authority
responsible for granting concessions for the use and exploitation of land. This is stated
in ARTICLE 29 of Law 6/79 on line (c) of ARTICLE 9 of this regulation. This also
conforms with ARTICLE 16 and the articles following 16 of Law 7/78 of the 22nd of
April.
46. From independence to the present, land rental markets have been suppressed by the same legal
restrictions that affected sales. Recent growth in rental markets, as with purchases, illustrates a growing
willingness of households to contravene these restrictions.74
3. The Dcu is the body responsible for carrying out the above-mentioned responsibil-
ities, and therefore makes it known that it does not recognize the practice of selling
properties (terrenos). Any such sale implies consequences for the property's legal
registration status.
We alert the citizens so that they do not involve themselves in illegal acts of this
nature. [Portuguese translation by the authors.]
5.1.3 ALIENATED LAND
Over the 1967-1991 period, households in the sample reported having disposed of, or having
lost, 34 plots of land (table 5.3). These forsaken machambas were widely dispersed among
12 different bairros, though a particularly large number (cumulatively, 67.7 percent) appears
to have been located in Costa do Sol, Laulane, Zona Verde, Albazine, and Khongolote. Most
of the plots have been alienated since 1982: 26.5 percent over the 1982-1986 period, 23.5
percent between 1987 and 1989, and 32.4 percent in the 1990-1991 interval. Both registered
households (17.5 percent, 10 plots alienated out of 57 currently held) and nonregistered
households (22.9 percent, 24 plots alienated out of 105 currently held) had similar rates of
dispossession (compare tables 5.1 and 5.3).
Unlike machambas currently held (which were acquired primarily through administra-
tive transactions), most of the alienated plots were obtained through spontaneous occupation
(32.4 percent), gift by family (17.6 percent), inheritance (14.7 percent), or purchase (11.8
percent). Most striking, however, is the mode of alienation: landholders were evicted in 64.7
percent of the cases. Eviction rates were highest in District 6 (75.0 percent versus 55.6
percent in District 4) and among female-headed households (80.0 percent versus 62.1 percent
for male-headed households). Land had been given to the family in 20.6 percent of the cases,
and was abandoned, most probably due to war-related violence, in 8.8 percent of the cases.
Family members (20.6 percent) obviously gained control of the land when it was given to the
family. However, in the remaining instances, where land was alienated (primarily by
eviction), private farmers gained in 38.2 percent of the cases; government, 20.6 percent;
producer associations, 5.9 percent; and others, 14.6 percent. Evicted registered farmers
tended to lose their land primarily to the government (30.0 percent); evicted nonregistered
landholders tended to lose their land to private farmers (50.0 percent), who had been issued
concessions by government. In only 11.8 percent of the cases of alienated land was any form
of compensation received by the landholder, a percentage that is reasonably constant across
strata. Female-headed households stand out in two regards: the majority (80 percent) lost their
land through eviction, and none received compensation.
In table 5.3, data on authorizations provide some indication of the agencies responsible
for evictions. No authority was involved in 50 percent of the cases of land being alienated.
However, 26.5 percent were authorized by the bairro structure; 11.8 percent by the casas
agrárias; and 2.9 percent each by producer associations, Dcu/Executive Council, district
administration, and APE (the housing parastatal). These data clearly indicate that refugees
entering the city since 1982 induced many local authorities (casas agrárias and bairro
structures) to expropriate land for their resettlement.TABLE 5.3 Plot histories of land alienated from sample households, 1991 pert-urban survey, Maputo











Number of plots alienated 18 16 29 5 10 24 34
Bairro location of alienated land
Costa do Sol 27.8 13.8 20.0 10.0 16.7 1 4.7
Laulane 27.8 - 13.8 20.0 10.0 16.7 14.7
Zona Verde - 31.3 17.2 40.0 4.2 14.7
Albazine 22.2 - 13.8 10.0 12.5 11.8
Khongolote 25.0 10.3 20.0 16.7 11.8
Vale do Infulene - 18.8 6.9 20.0 10.0 8.3 8.8
Mahotas 11.1 - 6.9 10.0 4.2 5.9
T-3 - 12.5 6.9 8.3 5.9
Maxaquene A 5.6 - 3.4 4.2 2.9
Ndhavela 6.3 - 20.0 4.2 2.9
P. Lumumba - 6.3 3.4 - 4.2 2.9
Catembe 5.6 3.4 10.0 2.9
Time period plot alienated
1967-1970 5.6 6.3 6.9 - 8.3 5.8
1977-1980 11.1 12.5 13.8 20.0 8.3 11.7
1982-1986 22.2 31.3 27.6 20.0 30.0 25.0 26.5
1987-1989 22.2 25.0 27.6 - 50.0 12.5 23.5
1990-1991 38.9 25.0 24.1 80.0 45.9 32.4
Mode of acquisition
Spontaneous occupation 27.8 37.5 37.9 - 30.0 33.3 32.4
Given by family 22.2 12.5 17.2 20.0 10.0 20.8 17.6
Inherited 11.1 18.8 13.8 20.0 20.0 12.5 14.7
Concession from bairro structure 16.7 6.3 6.9 40.0 10.0 12.5 11.8
Purchased 16.7 6.3 10.3 20.0 20.0 8.3 11.8
Concession from Dcu 12.5 6.9 10.0 4.2 5.9
Lent by family - 6.3 3.4 4.2 2.9
Concession by regulo 5.6 3.4 4.2 2.9
Mode of alienation
Evicted 55.6 75.0 62.1 80.0 60.0 66.7 64.7
Given to family 16.7 25.0 20.7 20.0 20.0 20.8 20.6
Abandoned 16.7 10.3 10.0 8.3 8.8
Sold 5.6 3.4 - 4.2 2.9
Plot was nationalized 5.6 - 3.4 - 1 0.0 - 2.9
Compensation paid (% no) 88.9 87.5 86.2 100.0 90.0 87.5 88.2
Who gained control of plot
Private farmer 38.9 37.5 41.4 20.0 10.0 50.0 38.2
Family 11.1 31.3 20.7 20.0 20.0 20.8 20.6
Government 16.7 25.0 13.8 60.0 30.0 16.7 20.6
No one 16.7 - 10.3 20.0 4.2 8.8
Producer association 5.6 6.3 6.9 10.0 4.2 5.9
Church 5.6 3.4 1 0.0 - 2.9
Army 5.6 3.4 4.2 2.9
Transfer authorized by
No one 66.7 31.3 55.2 20.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Bairro structure 22.2 31.3 24.1 40.0 40.0 20.8 26.5
Casa agr ria 5.6 18.8 13.8 - 16.7 11.8
Dcu/Executive Council 6.3 - 20.0 - 4.2 2.9
APIE - 6.3 3.4 - 10.0 - 2.9
Producer association 5.6 - - 20.0 4.2 2.9
District administration 6.3 3.4 4.2 2.976
5.1.4 LAND CLAIMS BEYOND THE PERI-URBAN ZONE
Besides having irrigated and rain-fed land in the peri-urban area, 53 households, or 43.8
percent of the sample, believe they still retain rights to land beyond districts 1-8 of Maputo
Province. As indicated in table 5.4, the largest number of these machambas are in Inhambane
(22.6 percent), followed by Chibuto (9.4 percent), Chokwe (9.4 percent), Manhica (9.4
percent), Manjacaze (7.5 percent), and thirteen other districts or regions. In the majority of
cases, war or security problems were the primary reason for leaving the plot behind (43.4
percent), followed by need to seek employment (30.2 percent) and desire to join one's family
in Maputo (15.1 percent). War and security problems proved more disruptive to families in
District 6 (50.0 percent) than in District 4 (36.0 percent). Members of female-headed
households were more inclined to leave land behind to join family in Maputo (50.0 percent)
or to flee natural disaster (33.3 percent).
In the majority of cases, the abandoned land consisted of 5 hectares or less (76.1
percent), though 7.2 percent reported leaving tracts larger than 50 hectares. These holdings
outside the peri-urban area (and security zone) are currently being guarded or farmed by close
family (39.6 percent), distant family (1.9 percent), or neighbors (3.8 percent), or are not
being used at all (49.1 percent). Given the war situation, the very fact that respondents
indicate no knowledge of land use in only 5.7 percent of the cases is rather surprising. The
majority of households (66.0 percent) expect one day to occupy or reoccupy the land; male--
headed households are more inclined to return than female-headed households. However, in
only 22.6 percent of the cases, on average, did respondents say that the entire household
would return; in the remainder of cases (43.4 percent), one or more members of the family
would return while others stayed in Maputo. Combined with the other 68 households, which
did not hold land in rural areas, these data suggest that agricultural households have formed
strong roots in the peri-urban area and that prospects for their returning to rural areas are
remote.
5.2 LAND MARKET PROCESSES
5.2.1 LAND BUYERS AND SELLERS
The survey design, including the Osu baseline and the LTC peri-urban land-markets survey,
identified a number of households that reported buying and selling (mainly buying)
agricultural land. Using case-study methods, special follow-up interviews were arranged with
willing participants to inquire about land-market processes, amounts transacted, land-price
determination, and land use. The case studies reveal a considerable array of land-market
arrangements and contracts, both formal and informal.
5.2.1.1 Case study 1
The buyer respondent, a farmer, is a descendant of a Portuguese family that settled in a
neighboring quinta in 1949. He oversees the management of farm labor and sells the produceTABLE 5.4 Landholdings of sample households outside urban and peri-urban areas of Maputo, 1991 peri-urban survey
MALE FEMALE
INFORMATION ON LANDHOLDINGS DISTRICT 4 DISTRICT 6 HOUSEHOLD HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED NONREGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
25 28 48 6 24 29 53
Number of households
District of plot or farm
Inhambane 20.0 25.0 22.9 33.3 20.8 24.1 22.6
Chibuto 12.0 7.1 10.4 12.5 6.9 9.4
Chokwe 16.0 3.6 10.4 16.7 3.4 9.4
Manhica 16.0 3.6 8.3 16.7 8.3 10.3 9.4
Manjacaze 12.0 3.6 8.3 8.3 6.9 7.5
Gaza 4.0 7.1 6.3 - 10.3 5.7
Chadenguele 4.0 7.1 2.1 33.3 4.2 6.9 5.7
Bilene 8.0 3.6 6.3 - 10.3 5.7
Homoine 7.1 2.1 16.7 - 6.9 3.8
Zavala 7.1 4.2 4.2 3.4 3.8
Maxixe 7.1 4.2 8.3 3.8
Moamba 3.6 2.1 4.2 1.9
Chongoene 3.6 2.1 - 3.4 1.9
Boane 3.6 2.1 4.2 1.9
Namaacha 3.6 2.1 4.2 1.9
Palmeira 3.6 2.1 4.2 1.9
Marracuene 4.0 2.1 - 3.4 1.9
Xai-xai
Motive for leaving plot
4.0 2.1 3.4 1.9
War/security 36.0 50.0 45.8 16.7 41.7 44.8 43.4
Seek employment 32.0 28.6 33.3 33.3 27.6 30.2
Join famiy in Maputo 20.0 10.7 12.5 50.0 12.5 17.2 15.1
Transferred by employer 8.0 3.6 6.3 8.3 3.4 5.7
Natural disaster (drought) 4.0 3.6 - 33.3 - 6.9 3.8
Lacked resources in countryside 3.6 2.1 4.2 1.9(Table 5.4, Landholdings outside urban and peri-urban areas of Maputo, cont.)




HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED NONREGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Area of land left behind 21.7 15.8 15.8 50.0 36.4 19.0
0-1 ha 60.9 52.6 57.9 50.0 55.0 59.1 57.1
1-5 ha 8.7 10.5 10.5 15.0 4.5 9.5
5-10 ha 4.3 10.5 7.9 15.0 7.1
1 0-50 ha 4.3 2.6 5.0 2.4
50-100 ha 10.5 5.3 10.0 4.8
>100 ha
Plot currently utilized by
Close famiy
Do not know 44.0 35.7 37.5 50.0 41.7 37.9 39.6
Neighbor 8.0 3.6 4.2 16.7 4.2 6.9 5.7
Distant family 4.0 3.6 4.2 8.3 3.8
Plot currently unused 3.6 2.1 4.2 1.9
44.0 53.6 52.1 33.3 41.7 55.2 49.1
Household member expects to return (% yes) 64.0 67.9 70.8 33.3 70.8 62.1 66.0
Who would return 
Entire household 28.0 17.9 25.0 - 25.0 20.7 22.6
Only head of household 12.0 17.9 16.7 16.7 20.8 1 0.3 15.1
Only the parents 8.0 7.1 8.3 - 12.5 3.4 7.5
Alternate members 4.0 10.7 6.3 16.7 12.5 3.4 7.5
Only the children 8.0 3.6 6.3 1 0.3 5.7
Ony spouse of household 4.0 3.6 4.2 6.9 3.8
Only head of household and spouse - 7.1 4.2 6.9 3.8
No one 36.0 32.1 29.2 66.7 29.2 37.9 34.0
Reasons for wanting to return
Agricultural production 81.3 63.2 70.6 100.0 68.8 73.7 71.4
Not accustomed to urban life 12.5 10.5 11.8 12.5 10.5 11.4
Recover house - 15.8 8.8 12.5 5.3 8.6
Return to ancestral lands 6.3 10.5 8.8 6.3 1 0.5 8.6
a. Following the war or once security in the countryside improves.79
to restaurants and in the central market. His father is responsible for raising livestock (cattle,
hens, and pigs) while his mother supervises the farmworkers and sells produce at the
machamba level and to intermediaries. In 1991, his family earned a net income of more than
10 million meticais, mainly from selling kale, lettuce, and chickens. In addition to working
with his parents, he employs sixteen workers, whom he pays 35-40 contos, and two
milicianos and two guards, to each of whom he pays 50 contos.
In 1983, the buyer agreed to purchase a plot (about 1 hectare) from a Portuguese owner
who had decided to return to his native country. The buyer wanted the land to expand his
own quinta and to build corrals for raising livestock. A formal contract was approved,
whereby the Portuguese owner would be paid about 23,500,000 meticais—half in meticais,
and half in escudos payable in Portugal with a check. The secretary of the GD witnessed the
transaction, including filing and completing all documents.
In 1989, the buyer ran into financial difficulties; his attempts to obtain credit through
the Green Zones Office failed. He then learned about a military officer who was going to
receive money from the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD) and was seeking land to
buy. The respondent sold one of his plots to the officer to raise cash to invest in his other
plots. The value of the quinta was set at 45,000,000 meticais, including the land, a cement-
block house, a truck, an electric pump, pig stalls, 60 pigs, 168 piglets, 16 goats, and mango
trees. Due to the officer's lack of agricultural experience, the contract also stipulated that the
respondent would provide technical assistance for three months after the transaction. This
arrangement has terminated. According to the respondent, the military officer has not shown
any interest in farming. He now wishes he had not sold the plot but, nonetheless, at the time
had to raise the capital. The GD, the casa agrária, and a district administrator all oversaw
the transaction, the district administrator being the last person to confirm the cancellation of
the previous owner.
5.2.1.2 Case study 2
The buyer respondent refers to himself as a war refugee. He recently left his homeland,
Manjacaze, due to its worsening security situation. He was settled (by district authorities) in
a zone reserved specifically for war refugees and, to profit from his living near the
agricultural zone, decided to acquire the plot. In 1991, he learned that another man wanted
to sell his machamba in order to return to his homeland. He contacted a neighbor, a miner
and a relative who works in the Republic of South Africa, to determine his interest in buying
the machamba with him. The neighbor responded positively.
They bought the machamba for 150,000 meticais, including sugarcane plants,
vegetables, and wells. The former owner advised the chief of the quarteirao of the purchase
price; the secretary of the GD witnessed the transaction and signed a declaration verifying its
transferal to new ownership. The machamba is not registered because it is located in a zone
that was never demarcated. The zone "belongs" to a producer association named "Tomás
Sankara" (in honor of the late president of Burkina Faso). Initially, when the sale transaction
became known, the association's president objected, but the conflict was later resolved when80
the buyer clearly explained the purpose of the transaction. He and his partner hope to invest
in the land and obtain secure land rights through title ownership.
5.2.1.3 Case study 3
In August 1991, a relative of a priest—who owned a quinta adjacent to the house of the seller
respondent—proposed buying four lots, each about 30 x 50 meters, then hiring the seller to
work there. The buyer, a Portuguese man, wanted to live in Maputo. The seller agreed to sell
only one of the lots for 1,500,000 meticais. He received half this amount, together with an
Iou for the remainder once the buyer returned to the country. Why sell? According to the
seller, he already had had one plot taken from him by the GD to establish the Association of
Small Animal Raisers (Associação de Pequenos Criadores de Animals); he had sold the land
lest people steal it, leaving him with neither land nor money. He is now considering selling
his remaining lots as well. This would provide him with a monthly salary and prevent his
"being kicked off the land like a stray dog." The contract with the Portuguese man was oral;
no one was involved in witnessing the transaction, though the buyer intends to register his
occupancy with the GD, the district administration, and the Dcu upon his return to the
country.
5.2.1.4 Case study 4
The buyer respondent is a major in the Mozambican army. In 1989, he received a loan for
15,000,000 meticais from a fund designated for army veterans and distributed by the BPD.
In the same year, he bought a quinta (approximately 1 hectare), which had pig stalls, corrals
for rabbits and birds, wells, an electric pump, a storehouse, and banana and papaya trees.
The purchase was arranged with formal contract. The seller at the time lacked financial
resources to run the farm. The buyer, too, is now facing a financial crisis. He has applied
to the BPD for another loan to renovate the decaying infrastructure and to begin production,
but, at the time of interview, the loan had not yet been granted. His second concern is
inability to find a trustworthy and qualified person to manage the quinta. He must continue
to work in the army, which requires a lot of travel. When he bought the quinta, he hired two
technicians; but when he last went abroad on a service mission, both technicians damaged the
installations and sold the animals. He is also worried about not yet having definitive title to
the property. Although he has been granted a permit of temporary occupation, he anxiously
awaits the formal title from the Dcu, where the documents are pending.
5.2.1.5 Case study 5
Until 1983, the buyer respondent was a worker in a Mozambican firm. He currently is the
owner of a photocopying business. His wife has regularly worked on the machambas that they
own. They produce vegetables and raise chickens and pigs. In 1982, when the food crisis was
worsening throughout the country, he and his wife asked the GD for a plot of land in
Albazine. Seven years later, in 1989, the couple got a second plot (5,000 square meters) after
hearing of someone who wanted to sell because of financial difficulties. This plot is located
on the border between Albazine and the district of Marracuene, a violent zone where frequent82
In the case of the latter two acquisitions, the buyer indicates that he did not spend any
money to facilitate the transactions. His only expenses (which were minimal at the time of
purchase) were the stamps needed to register the documents. However, based on hearsay
evidence, the Dcu is now charging from 103,000 meticais to 108,000 meticais per title for
these services. The buyer currently wants to open irrigation wells, build water tanks,
construct breeding stalls for animals, and install an electric pump for the plot in Boane. He




Extensive areas of land in districts 4-8 were left idle following the departure of the
Portuguese. By 1979, however, problems arose as a result of spontaneous occupation: drought
and political violence uprooted the population in the countryside; miners with capital were
forced to return from South Africa; the economy had fallen into severe recession; and a
general policy of "occupying the land" was widespread—in part to meet the needs of a
growing urban population and in part to provide employment for an expanding pool of
jobless.
Initially the unplanned settlement involved families from inner Maputo and former
farmworkers. Later, with the insurgency of the 1980s, refugee families began moving directly
into the pen-urban zone. Residents felt obliged to accept in-coming migrants, particularly
family members. By 1987, the agricultural areas had been almost totally occupied, densely
settled, and heavily subdivided.
In 1985, the government officially stopped its occupation policy; prices of vegetables
were liberalized, effectively resulting in a sharp increase in real produce prices. Since 1986,
according to certain district administrators, land renting has become more common—but
nearly always to family members or "close" friends to avoid having the plot "claimed" by
the renter. These transfers are undertaken between families with little or no involvement of
district authorities.
Bairro officials are still intimately involved in land purchases, despite the apparent legal
restrictions against such transfers. As indicated by the above case studies, there are a number
of ways that a land purchase may be arranged:
1. Someone, perhaps a miner returning from South Africa, approaches the local (bairro)
authorities and inquires about idle land; idle land happens to be available (this process would
have been more common prior to 1987). If the applicant has no money, s/he is probably told
that no land is available. If the applicant does have money, on the other hand, the local
authorities will negotiate "a fee,"
48 the land is allocated, money is transacted, maps are
47. Based on discussions with officials in the Dcu and casas agrarias.
48. Effectively a price, though a price is legally not possible since land is administratively reallocated by
the state free of charge.84
and the prices include not only land but also infrastructure, which can vary widely from
purchase to purchase.
Nevertheless, the data in the preceding section and in table 5.5 provide two important
insights into the land market of peri-urban Maputo. First, the nominal (and probably real)
land price has been rapidly rising over time. Second, although the rising price of land has
sharply increased the wealth of most smallholders occupying irrigated land, it is also creating
a formidable barrier to potential farm entrants. Using the 1991 exchange rate (2,200
meticais=US$1.00) and prices of 5,000,000-32,000,000 meticais per hectare of irrigated
land, the value could fall in the range of $2,273 per hectare to $14,545 per hectare.50 In
1991, smallholders (in personal interviews) were quoting prices of around $2,500 per plot
being paid in actual transactions of irrigated land, an amount roughly equivalent to $6,250
per hectare (based on the mean of 0.4 hectare per plot in table 4.2, p. 50). These prices are
very high, especially when considering that the average annual income of nonregistered
households is around $732 ($336 for female-headed households).
TABLE 5.5 Land prices, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo (meticais/hectare)
50. One respondent reported that, in i989, a group of Koreans offered him i0 million meticais for his
60x 30 meter plot. A women holding an adjacent plot did sell in 1990, receiving 16,000,000 meticais for about
0.5 hectare. Both plots are considered prime irrigated land because of their superior access to water and because
they are located next to a gravel road (the road substantially adds value since it permits hauling vegetables by
truck).
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drawn, testimonials are written, and the district authorities send the necessary documents to
the Dcu. No information could be obtained on the amount of the fees negotiated, mainly
because these types of transactions have become rare with the tightening supply of land in the
pen-urban zone.
2. Someone with money, perhaps a miner returning from South Africa, approaches the
local (bairro) authorities inquiring about land. Local authorities have a good knowledge of
unutilized land that is available (now rare), of households with land beyond their current
needs, or of individuals wishing to sell land. These persons are the potential sellers. As
intermediaries, the district authorities contact a seller and bring the buyer and seller together;
a price is negotiated and money changes hands. Legally, the land cannot be sold, but
investments in land can be transacted. The district authorities thus appear to be reallocating
land on the basis of improvements being traded and sign documents stating so accordingly.
The current holder must then submit the documents to the Dcu, along with a statement
indicating that the seller or seller's family does not need the land. The purchase thus takes
the form of an administrative transaction. Presumably, both district and Dcu authorities
receive "gratuities" to facilitate the transfer, but no information could be obtained on the
amounts involved.
3. Finally, someone interested in buying a plot locates a seller and negotiates a price for
the land and for fixed improvements. The district authorities are then contacted, and the plot
is officially transferred through the process described in #2 above.
In principle, land sales are not legal, though a seller and buyer may buy and sell
investments on the land, including buildings, corrals, animals, and so forth. The prices being
transacted, however, far exceed the value of investments and, thus, can only be considered
as including an economic value for the land. The district authorities and the Dcu, now
recognizing that land has value, are seeking to capture a portion of these economic rents. The
district authorities presumably secure part of the land price through "gratuities" at the time
of transaction. The Dcu obtains its "rents" through surveying fees (for services which may
or may not actually be done) or through title fees,
49 which appear to vary widely from case
to case.
5.2.3 LAND PRICES
Those respondents reporting buying plots were asked for information on the prices they paid.
However, three circumstances resulted in widely varying estimates: only fifteen households
reported ever having purchased land; amounts were paid over the 1950-1992 period, and
unreliable price data exacerbate any attempts to standardize prices to a uniform Point in time;
49. These fees are levied sometimes on a per-hectare basis and, at other times, per title. In one case study,
the respondent's nephew was charged 4,500,000 meticais for registering 8.5 hectares. Two other persons, whom
he knew personally, were charged 300,000 and 600,000 meticais, respectively, for two lots of the same size
(1,500 square meters).8i
armed attacks take place; the owner was thus willing to lower the selling price to 1,000,000
meticais. Following the purchase, the couple began the process of acquiring title. All
necessary documents have been compiled and delivered to the Dcu, where they are pending.
The plot is currently being worked by four laborers, who receive wages of 12,500, 15,000,
18,000, and 20,000 meticais, respectively, per month. They grow mainly kale, lettuce and
onions, bananas, oranges, mangoes, papayas, and sugarcane. However, they are currently
having problems selling the produce; they lack a truck to transport the goods to market, and
market women are hesitant to visit the plot for fear of being caught in the violence.
5.2.1.6 Case study 6
The buyer respondent heard about the possible sale of a machamba through a third person,
whereupon he contacted the seller. The seller was forced to relinquish the plot because of a
dispute he was having with neighbors (according to the buyer, the seller's son had become
sick due to a spell placed on him by a woman living nearby). The transaction took place in
1990. A price of 1,500,000 meticais was negotiated for 5,000 square meters, including pig
stalls and banana and avocado trees.
5.2.1.7 Case study 7
Until 1984, the buyer respondent was a driver for the Mozambique National Airline. He later
became the owner of two warehouses in Hulene, where he sells construction materials. In
1986, he acquired his first machamba, a big quinta formed of plots which had formerly
belonged to four small producers. The owner of the biggest of the four plots contacted him
one day to test his interest in buying the plot. The seller had tired of agriculture and wanted
money to start a new business and renovate his house. A price was negotiated for 2,500,000
meticais and an informal agreement signed. After beginning his farming, the buyer decided
to enlarge the quinta to 2 hectares. Over the next six months, he arranged to buy out the
three remaining smallholders, one for 200,000 meticais, the second for 800,000 meticais, and
the third for 400,000 meticais. All told, the buyer paid 3,900,000 meticais for the 2 hectares
of land. He purchased a second machamba (1 hectare) in 1987 for 3,000,000 meticais with
no written contract.
The buyer acquired his third machamba, in Boane District, without purchase. In this
case, he applied to the GD, requesting a machamba; he got their approval through their
declaration to the Direção Distrital de Agricultura da Namaacha, asking for support of the
application. Although a rain-fed plot, this third machamba is considered very productive for
manioc, maize, and garlic.
The buyer's most recent acquisition, which measures 4 hectares, is located in Costa do
Sol. He got it through the GD. The parcel was located in a zone not previously settled. To
secure it, the buyer personally contacted the GD and then formally submitted an application.
The GD sent its consent to the administrator of the district, who granted final approval.85
5.3 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND LAND RIGHTS
The earlier investigation of household decision-making asked the head of household and
principal spouse about their involvement in decisions on investment, labor allocation,
marketing, and spending (table 4.5, p. 57). Questions concerning land rights in table 5.6were
directed to the person or persons primarily responsible for managing the machamba.
s'
Rarely was there any ambiguity over who controlled the land. Within the overall sample, 64.5
percent of the managers are the household head (mainly male adult), and 33.1 percent, the
principal spouse (normally female adult). In the case of female-headed households, all (100
percent) management decisions are made by the household head. Principal and secondary
spouses are more directly involved in machamba management decisions in nonregistered (45.1
percent) than in registered households (20.8 percent).
Each machamba manager was asked if s/he possessed any of five specific land-use
rights and three land-transfer rights. The former included (1) the right to grow vegetable
crops, (2) the right to plant fruit trees, (3) the right to build a storehouse, (4) the right to
build a cement wall, and (5) the right to build a house; the latter, (6) the right to bequeath
the machamba to an heir, (7) the right to rent-out the plot, and (8) the right to sell the plot.
Respondents were also asked if they had the right to refuse to vacate land if ordered to do
so by the government. The responses, tabulated in table 5.6, indicate a number of important
points.
First, with few exceptions, the machamba managers feel that they have the right to plant
vegetables and fruit trees, that is, engage in activities that involve putting the land to
productive use in agriculture.
Second, compared to cultivation rights, relatively few household decision makers feel
that they have the right to invest in long-term permanent infrastructure (building a storehouse,
cement wall, or house). On average, depending on the investment, only 68.9-79.5 percent
of households in the entire sample felt that they had this authority. The percentages were
highest for registered households (between 83.1 percent and 93.8 percent) and lowest for
female-headed households (between 58.8 percent and 76.5 percent). These data suggest either
or both of two conclusions: respondents are concerned that irrigated land is neither suited for
such investments nor a good use on cultivable land; or local authorities, feeling that
permanent investments increase the security of claims to land, are reluctant to let people
establish permanent structures.
Third, there is considerable ambiguity in people's minds about rights of transfer. The
majority of households, regardless of stratum, feel they can bequeath land to heirs (83.2
percent in the overall sample). Yet fewer households perceive they have the right to rent-out
(45.3 percent) or sell a plot (43.5 percent), at least partially reflecting the legal restrictions
on private transfer. While registration seems to increase people's perception of their right to
invest in permanent structures, it does not seem to change their attitude toward right to
5i. The i21 households in the study had 124 machamba managers.TABLE 5.6 Family relationship of machamba managers and land-rights perceptions, 1991 pert-urban survey, Maputo




HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED NONREGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Number of machamba managers 68 56 71 53 52 72 124
Number of plots 90 71 144 17 65 96 161
Relationship of machamba manager to house-
hold head
Household head 70.1 57.9 60.7 1 00.0 79.2 53.5 64.5
Principal spouse 28.4 38.6 36.6 18.9 43.7 33.1
Second spouse 3.5 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.6
Cousin 1.5 0.9 - 1.4 0.8
Machamba manager perceives right to (% yes) 
Plant vegetables 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Plant fruit trees 96.7 97.2 96.5 100.0 98.5 95.8 96.9
Build storehouse 82.2 76.1 79.9 76.5 92.3 70.8 79.5
Build cement wall 72.2 67.6 70.8 64.7 93.8 54.2 70.2
Build house 68.9 69.0 70.1 58.8 83.1 59.4 68.9
Bequeath to family 82.2 84.5 83.3 82.4 83.1 83.3 83.2
Rent-out plot 52.2 36.6 47.2 29.4 55.4 38.5 45.3
Sell plot 58.9 23.9 45.1 29.4 55.4 35.4 43.5
Refuse to vacate if required by government 28.9 45.1 34.7 47.1 49.2 27.1 36.0
Permission from authorities needed to exert
rights (% yes)
Plant vegetables - -
Plant fruit trees 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.2
Bequeath plot 9.9 8.5 10.3 10.6 8.3 9.3
Rent-out plot 12.1 9.9 11.7 5.9 13.6 9.4 11.1
Build storehouse 14.3 15.5 14.5 17.6 13.6 15.6 14.8
Sell plot 15.4 18.3 17.9 5.9 28.8 8.3 16.7
Build wall 18.7 16.9 17.2 23.5 12.1 21.9 17.9
Build house 19.8 16.9 19.3 11.8 18.2 18.8 18.5
a. Alternate responses were "no" or "I don t know."[Table 5.6, Family relationship, cont.]
RELATIONSHIP AND RIGHTS
MALE
DISTRICT 4 DISTRICT 6 HOUSEHOLD
HEAD
FEMALE
HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED NONREGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Number of machamba managers
Number of plots 68 56 71 53 52 72 124
90 71 144 17 65 96 161
Whose permission is needed to plant trees
Producer association 100.0 - 50.0 100.0 - 50.0
Other 100.0 50.0 100.0 50.0
Whose permission is needed to build a wall
Producer association 52.9 63.6 50.0 100.0 25.0 70.0 57.1
Dcu/Executive Council 29.4 18.2 29.2 62.5 10.0 25.0
Casa agr ria 5.9 - 4.2 - 5.0 3.6
Grupo Dinamizador 11.8 9.1 12.5 12.5 10.0 10.7
Other 9.1 4.2 5.0 3.6
Whose permission is needed to build a house
Producer association 44.4 50.0 42.9 100.0 8.3 72.2 46.7
Dcu/Executive Council 38.9 41.7 42.9 83.3 11.1 40.0
Casa agr ria 5.6 3.6 - 5.6 3.3
Grupo Dinamizador 11.1 7.1 8.3 5.6 6.7
Other - 8.3 3.6 5.6 3.3
Whose permission is needed to rent-out a plot
Producer association 45.5 57.1 47.1 100.0 100.0 50.0
Dcu/Executive Council 54.5 28.6 47.1 88.9 44.4
Casa agr ria 14.3 5.9 11.1 5.6
Whose permission is needed to sell a plot
Producer association 35.7 30.8 30.8 100.0 5.3 100.0 33.3
Dcu/Executive Council 50.0 61.5 57.7 78.9 55.6
Casa agr ria 7.1 7.7 7.7 10.5 7.4
Grupo Dinamizador 7.1 3.8 5.3 3.788
transfer land. Only 55.4 percent of households in the registered stratum felt they have the
right to rent-out or sell a machamba. Although the legal framework does not explicitly give
men greater transfer rights than women, the de facto perception, based on custom, is that
male-headed households have greater rights of rental and sale (47.2 percent and 45.1 percent)
than female-headed households (29.4 percent and 29.4 percent), respectively.
Finally, in the event that people are told to vacate the property by government, do they
think they can refuse?
52 The majority (64.0 percent) feel they do not have the right. The
perception of right of refusal was lowest in District 4 (28.9 percent), where the control of
local authorities is stronger, and among nonregistered landholders (27.1 percent). Conversely,
perceptions of right of refusal were highest in District 6 (45.1 percent) and among registered
landholders (49.2 percent).
Those machamba managers affirming the possession of a land right were asked in
addition if permission from authorities is needed to exert that right, and by whom. In general,
they respond that growing vegetables or fruit trees can be done freely without involving
authorities. However, permission is normally needed—or believed to be needed— on matters
pertaining to permanent constructions (building a wall, house, or storehouse) in 14.8-18.5
percent of cases, and on land transfers, 11.1-16.7 percent of cases, with very little difference
between districts, male- and female-headed groups, or tenure status. The authorities involved
(depending on the case) include, inter alia, the producer associations, Dcu, Executive
Council, casa agrária, and GD. Registered households normally seek approval from the Dcu
or Executive Council while nonregistered households approach producer associations.
5.4 LAND ACCESS
Despite considerable market (not land) reforms since the mid-1980s, the vast majority of
households would still first turn to administrative mechanisms to acquire more land (table
5.7). On average, 38.0 percent of households would like to acquire more land, a proportion
that is nearly equal across districts and gender categories but is higher for registered
households (47.1 percent versus 31.4 percent for nonregistered). A high percentage of all
households would turn to the GD (34.8 percent on average) for a land allocation, especially
in District 6 (47.4 percent versus 25.9 percent in District 4). Purchasing would be more
common in District 4 (25.9 percent versus 5.3 percent in District 6) and among male-headed
households (18.0 percent versus 0.0 percent of female-headed) while tenure status appears
to have no measurable impact. Female-headed households compared with male-headed
households tend to rely more heavily on the producer associations (50.0 percent versus 2.3
percent) and casas agrárias (25.0 percent versus 16.3 percent) for a land allocation.
Surprisingly 10.9 percent (overall average) would in the future attempt to rent-in land despite
legal restrictions.
52. The responses to this question might also be interpreted as whether landholders feel they have the power
to refuse.89
TABLE 5.7 Land access of sample households, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo









4 6 HEAD HEAD HOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Percent households inter-
ested in acquiring more 40.3 35.2 39.4 30.8 47.1 31.4 38.0
land (%)
Most likely source for ac-
quiring new land (%)
Wait for new distribution 5.3 2.3 4.5 2.2
Borrow from own famiy 5.3 2.3 4.5 2.2
Rent 11.1 10.5 11.6 8.3 13.6 10.9
Purchase 25.9 5.3 18.6 16.7 18.2 17.4
Casa agrária 14.8 15.8 16.3 25.0 20.8 9.1 15.2
Producer association 11.1 2.3 50.0 4.2 9.1 6.5
Grupo Dinamizador 25.9 47.4 34.9 25.0 29.2 40.9 34.8
Dcu 7.4 5.3 7.0 12.5 6.5
District administrator 3.7 5.3 4.7 8.3 4.3
5.5 LAND DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS
In general most landholders are very worried about losing their land. As indicated in table
5.8, 70.3 percent of households feel either very worried or a little worried about losing land.
The majority (57.0 percent) also felt that disputes had become more or much more serious
in recent years, though this perception was stronger in District 4 (67.1 percent) than District
6 (44.4 percent).53)."
The source of disputes also depends on the region. In District 4, the major origins of
dispute are individuals from outside the bairro (55.2 percent), who come with concession
papers issued by the DcU, and neighbors (14.9 percent); only 11.9 percent said that disputes
are not a problem. In District 6, the major sources of dispute are individuals from outside the
bairro (35.2 percent), neighbors (13.0 percent), bairro officials (13.0 percent), and
ex-landowners (9.3 percent); 22.2 percent indicated that disputes are no problem. A large
percentage of households have firsthand knowledge of "outsiders" claiming land with official
documents (41.3 percent) or producers being evicted for land underutilization (24.8 percent).
Landholders frequently feel that there is considerable risk if land is rented-out. Based
on the overall sample, 33.1 percent believe that renting-out land is very risky while an
additional 19.8 percent think that some risk is involved. However, registering land seems to
reduce the assessment of risk; over 70 percent of households across strata (slightly lower for
female-headed households) feel that it would be impossible to lose the plot from renting-out
if it were registered.
53. The recent intrusion of housing northward along the coast is a principal source of disputes in District 4.TABLE 5.8 Perceptions held by sample households about land disputes, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
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HOUSEHOLD REGISTERED NONREGISTERED OVERALL
HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Degree landholder is worried about losing land
Very worried 49.3 68.5 59.6 38.5 49.0 64.3 57.9
A little worried 14.9 9.3 11.9 15.4 17.6 8.6 12.4
Not at all worried 34.3 20.4 26.6 46.2 31.4 25.7 28.1
No opinion 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.7
Frequency of land disputes in last 3 years
( % hh)
Much more serious than before 50.7 29.6 40.4 46.2 37.3 44.3 41.3
More serious 16.4 14.8 16.5 7.7 15.7 15.7 15.7
Less serious 26.9 40.7 32.1 46.2 39.2 28.6 33.1
Land disputes never a problem 4.5 11.1 8.3 7.8 7.1 7.4
No opinion 1.5 3.7 2.8 4.3 2.5
Principal source of land disputes
Neighbors 14.9 13.0 11.9 38.5 9.8 17.1 14.0
Bairro officials 4.5 13.0 7.3 15.4 3.9 11.4 8.3
Individuals from outside bairro 55.2 35.2 47.7 30.8 51.0 42.9 46.3
Ex-landowners 9.3 4.6 - 5.9 2.9 4.1
Land disputes not a problem 11.9 22.2 16.5 15.4 15.7 17.1 16.5
Private producers 1.5 1.9 1.8 - 2.9 1.7
Members of government 3.0 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.7
Dcu 3.0 1.8 3.9 - 1.7
Producer association 4.5 - 2.8 2.0 2.9 2.5
No opinion 1.5 5.6 3.7 5.9 1.4 3.3
Respondent has firsthand knowledge of (% yes):
Outsiders claiming land with official documents 38.8 44.4 40.4 46.2 35.3 45.7 41.3
Producers evicted for land underutilization 19.4 31.5 25.7 23.1 31.4 20.0 24.8
Risking of losing land (% yes)
If rented-out and unregistered
Lot of risk 32.8 33.3 31.2 46.2 31.4 34.3 33.1
Some risk 20.9 18.5 20.2 15.4 23.5 17.1 19.8
No risk 25.4 24.1 25.7 15.4 23.5 25.7 24.8
No opinion 20.9 24.1 22.9 23.1 21.6 22.9 22.3
If rented-out and registered
Impossible 70.1 85.2 78.9 61.5 78.4 75.7 76.9
Possible 17.9 7.4 13.8 7.7 13.7 12.9 13.2
Very possible 6.0 5.6 3.7 23.1 7.8 4.3 5.8
No opinion 6.0 1.9 3.7 7.7 7.1 4.191
The 121 households in the survey reported encountering 25 occasions of dispute
sometime over the 1973-1991 period (multiple disputes per household were possible) (table
5.9). Over 44.0 percent of the conflicts have occurred since 1989, and 64.0 percent since
1986. The disputes were caused by a variety of factors, including, in declining order of
importance: conflicting title claims (multiple titles issued for the same plot or overlapping
registrations) (30.4 percent), private farmer trying to expand holding onto owner's land (26.1
percent), project expanding onto the owner's land (17.4 percent), border dispute with
neighbors (13.0 percent), and ex-landholder claiming land (8.7 percent).
The parties involved in creating conflicts varied among categories. Private farmers
encroaching upon or reclaiming land were purportedly the major culprits in District 6 (63.6
percent); in District 4, however, private farmers caused only 28.6 percent of disputes, fol-
lowed, in descending order of importance, by other small farmers (14.3 percent), producer
associations (14.3 percent), members of government (14.3 percent), and various local
authorities (agricultural cooperative, bairro structure, construction company, and church) (7.1
percent each). Private farmers (30.0 percent) were less important in the case of registered
households; local-level institutions—small farmers (20.0 percent) and various local authorities
(cooperatives, churches, producer associations, and government officials) (10.0 percent
each)—were the dominant instigators of dispute. Not surprisingly, disputes reported by
nonregistered farmers tended to be generated by more influential groups—private farmers
(53.3 percent) and local bairro authorities (20.0 percent).
5.6 LAND REGISTRATION
Previous data suggest positive benefits to land registration in terms of improved incentives
for making permanent improvements in the land and enhanced tenure security. Respondents
in the survey were asked to rank the importance of land registration in improving the
possibility of five theoretical benefits: increased tenure security, increased willingness to
rent-out land, increased willingness to sell land, increased access to credit through increased
collateral value of land, and increased incentive to invest. The categorical ranking for
likelihood included the following Possible answers: much more likely, more likely,
indifferent, less likely, and much less likely. The responses are tabulated in table 5.10.
In general, land registration is expected to increase tenure security (74.6 percent much
more, 14.9 percent more), incentive to invest in the land resource (72.7 percent much more,
18.2 percent more), and access to credit (62.8 percent much more, 21.5 percent more).
However, these data disguise two underlying trends. First, households in District 4 perceive
higher benefits across the board than households in District 6, partly reflecting the poorer
organization of government services in District 6. Second, female-headed households perceive
fewer benefits to registration than male-headed households, particularly for credit benefits.
Compared with female-headed households, registration for male-headed households is much
more likely to increase security (77.1 percent versus 53.8 percent), investment in land (75.2
percent versus 53.8 percent), acquisition of credit (67.0 percent versus 30.8 percent), renting-
out land (33.9 percent versus 7.7 percent), and selling land (32.1 percent versus 7.7 percent).TABLE 5.9 Land conflicts experienced by sample households, 1991 pert-urban survey, Maputo







HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Number of disputes 14 11 22 3 10 15 25
Period conflict began
1973-1979 7.1 18.2 13.6 20.0 6.7 12.0
1980-1985 21.4 27.3 27.3 30.0 20.0 24.0
1986-1988 7.1 36.4 18.2 33.3 20.0 20.0 20.0
1989-1991 64.3 18.2 40.9 66.7 30.0 53.3 44.0
Sources of conflict
Conflicting title claims 23.1 40.0 30.0 33.3 60.0 7.7 30.4
Nationalization during transition to FRELIMO 10.0 5.0 - 7.7 4.3
Private farmer expanded onto land 15.4 40.0 25.0 33.3 46.2 26.1
Ex-landholder claimed land 7.7 10.0 10.0 - 15.4 8.7
Project expanded onto land 30.8 15.0 33.3 20.0 15.4 17.4
Border dispute with neighbor 23.1 15.0 20.0 7.7 13.0
Conflict with whom
Private farmer 28.6 63.6 40.9 66.7 30.0 53.3 44.0
Agricultural cooperative 7.1 - 4.5 10.0 - 4.0
Bairro structure 7.1 18.2 13.6 - 20.0 12.0
Family member - 9.1 4.5 10.0 - 4.0
Small famiy-farm sector 14.3 9.1 13.6 20.0 6.7 12.0
Construction company 7.1 4.5 - 6.7 4.0
Church 7.1 4.5 10.0 - 4.0
Producer association 14.3 4.5 33.3 10.0 6.7 8.0
Member of government 14.3 9.1 10.0 6.7 8.0
a. Based on 25 actual conflicts in the survey.TABLE 5.10 Perception of registration benefits by sample households  1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo







HEAD HEAD HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS SAMPLE
Increase security of using land
Much more likely 85.1 61.1 77.1 53.8 78.4 71.4 74.4
More likely 6.0 25.9 1 4.7 15.4 17.6 12.9 1 4.9
Indifferent 9.0 13.0 8.3 30.8 3.9 15.7 10.7
Willingness to invest in land
Much more likely 83.6 59.3 75.2 53.8 78.4 68.6 72.7
More likely 7.5 31.5 17.4 23.1 15.7 20.0 18.2
Indifferent 9.0 9.3 7.3 23.1 5.9 11.4 9.1
Ability to receive credit
Much more likely 73.1 50.0 67.0 30.8 70.6 57.1 62.8
More likely 13.4 31.5 18.3 46.2 11.8 28.6 21.5
Indifferent 11.9 18.5 13.8 23.1 17.6 12.9 1 4.9
Less likey 1.5 0.9 1.4 0.8
Willingness to rent-out land
Much more likely 35.8 25.9 33.9 7.7 49.0 18.6 31.4
More likey 16.4 22.2 17.4 30.8 15.7 21.4 19.0
Indifferent 20.9 24.1 19.3 53.8 11.8 30.0 22.3
Less likely 1.5 5.6 3.7 - 7.8 3.3
Much less likely 25.4 22.2 25.7 7.7 15.7 30.0 24.0
Willingness to sell land
Much more likely 37.3 20.4 32.1 7.7 45.1 18.6 29.8
More likely 10.4 13.0 10.1 23.1 9.8 12.9 11.6
Indifferent 19.4 27.8 20.2 46.2 17.6 27.1 23.1
Less likely 3.0 5.6 4.6 - 3.9 4.3 4.1
Much less likely 29.9 33.3 33.0 23.1 23.5 37.1 31.4
a. Percent households in strata responding much more, more, indifferent, less, and much less.94
Part of the lower response for women can be attributed to their disadvantaged access to
information about land registration and institutional forms of credit.
As anticipated, legal restrictions acted to suppress fanners willingness to rent-out or sell
land compared with their overall perceived benefits of tenure security, investment motivation,
and credit enhancement. Only 31.4 percent of households on average were much more willing
to rent-out (29.8 percent to sell) land compared with 74.4 percent feeling increased tenure
security. A surprisingly large number of households on average were much less likely to
rent-out or sell land (24.0 percent and 31.4 percent, respectively). Both sets of data suggest
that, by increasing exposure to government scrutiny, land registration increases the risk of
engaging in illicit sale or rental activity. It further complicates the benefit-cost equation;
households seeking greater security of land rights for investment and credit purposes must
weigh the benefits of compliance with the law against the costs of increased risk of losing
land via state expropriation.
If households, at least male-headed households, perceive important benefits from land
titling, why do they not register land? The data presented in table 5.11 show the following
reasons, in declining order of importance: unaware of registration process (28.4 percent),
belief that the producer association will take care of it (23.5 percent), does not understand
registration procedures (13.6 percent), and plot has not yet been demarcated by the Dcu
(12.3 percent). Surprisingly, the cost of having to wait too long for the Dcu to issue
documentation was the major reason cited by only 7.4 percent of households. Only 3.7
percent of households expressed no interest whatsoever in having their land registered,
suggesting a strong latent demand for benefits of titling. However, important differences are
evident among strata. In District 4, households tended to say that the producer associations
should take care of it (27.7 percent versus 17.6 percent in District 6) while households in
District 6 were generally unaware of registration (52.9 percent versus 10.6 percent in District
4). Registered households (when referring to lack of registration by unregistered households)
tended to place more weight on land not being demarcated (25.0 percent versus 9.2 percent
for nonregistered), small farmers not being interested (18.8 percent versus 1.5 percent), and
process too long and expensive (12.5 percent versus 6.2 percent); smallholders actually felt
more constrained by lack of knowledge (33.8 percent versus 6.3 percent for registered),
inability to understand procedures (15.4 percent versus 6.3 percent), and general perception
that the producer association should take care of it (24.6 percent versus 18.8 percent).
Clearly, certain producers either lack a general awareness of or do not understand the
registration process, but this situation may arise from specified procedures that are not well
advertised, ambiguous rules, or arbitrary implementation. As mentioned in section 2, respon-
dents often did not know, or were mistaken about, whether title was actually held. To
determine the uniformity and scope of implementation, respondents were asked precisely
which steps they had completed in the registration process (see table 5.11). Compared with
the nonregistered group (2.1 percent), 57.6 percent of the registered group had submitted a
statement of bank account, an employer salary statement (22.7 percent versus 2.1 percent),
54. No doubt, the fact that registered households had the lowest formal-sector employment of any category
(table 4.9, p. 64) severely limited their compliance with this provision.TABLE 5.11 Registration procedures and constraints, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
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Reasons for not registering land
Unaware of registration 10.6 52.9 30.0 16.7 6.3 33.8 28.4
Producer association taking care of it 27.7 17.6 21.4 33.3 18.8 24.6 23.5
Does not understand registration 14.9 11.8 12.9 25.0 6.3 15.4 13.6
Plot in area not yet demarcated by Dcu 14.9 8.8 12.9 8.3 25.0 9.2 12.3
Process too long and expensive 12.8 8.6 - 12.5 6.2 7.4
Not interested 8.5 4.3 8.3 18.8 1.5 4.9
Told by Dcu could not receive individual title 4.3 2.9 4.3 - 4.6 3.7
Producer farming only temporarily - 5.9 2.9 12.5 - 2.5
Other 4.3 2.9 3.1 2.5
Afraid ex-landholders will return and evict them
Steps completed in registration process (% fulfilled)
2.1 8.3 1.5 1.2
Statement of bank account 25.3 23.9 26.9 5.9 57.6 2.1 24.7
Employer salary statement 14.3 5.6 11.7 22.7 2.1 1 0.5
Plot map provided 44.0 36.6 44.1 11.8 69.7 20.8 40.7
Written authorization from casa agr ria 41.8 45.1 44.8 29.4 71.2 24.0 43.2
Written authorization from Grupo Dinamizador 57.1 52.1 57.9 29.4 89.4 31.3 54.9
Written authorization from Dcu/executive council 37.4 36.6 40.0 11.8 87.9 2.1 37.0
Precarious title granted 1.1 8.5 4.8 - 1 0.6  - 4.3
Provisional title granted 15.4 25.4 20.7 11.8 47.0  1.0 19.8
Definitive title granted 19.8 4.2 1 4.5 31.8  13.0
Registered in property registry 2.2 4.2 3.4 7.6 3.1
a. Figures do not sum to 100 percent due to some applications still in process and title status not yet having been defined by the Dcu.96
a plot map (69.7 percent versus 20.8 percent), written authorization from the casa agrária
(71.2 percent versus 24.0 percent), written authorization from the GD (89.4 percent versus
31.3 percent), and written authorization from the Dcu (87.9 percent versus 2.1 percent).
Most of the registered households were issued provisional leases (47.0 percent), followed by
definitive leases (31.8 percent), precarious leases (10.6 percent), and unsure (10.6 percent).
Finally, only 7.6 percent of all registrations made their way through the entire process to
documentation in the property registry (only after entry can a title certificate be issued). In
summary, many registered households did not complete all the necessary steps; many
nonregistered households started the process but stopped for reasons of imperfect knowledge,
time, cost, or thinking that all steps had been completed.
ss
Smallholders are caught in a trap. Titles cannot be granted because the land in most
areas has not been demarcated. Yet surveying fees for extralegal demarcations greatly exceed
the means of most small farmers. DINAGECA has been stepping in to help; the Green Zones
Office, which lacks surveying capacity to implement its jurisdictional authority over land
registration in districts 3-8, has in at least one instance paid DINAGECA topographers to
undertake a two-stage demarcation process in District 4 and the Infulene Valley.' The Dcu,
which is responsible for registration in the peri-urban area, has an urban focus and is
understandably less concerned with strengthening land rights on irrigated lands. Such
requirements as submitting a bank account, employer salary statement, or development plan
are perhaps applicable to the commercially oriented, capitalized private farms but are
ill-suited to family-sector landholdings. With its urban interests, tight staffing, and limited
budgets, the Dcu has every incentive to allocate its scarce resources to registering urban
properties. In addition to lacking the knowledge, resources, or influence needed to acquire
title, smallholders must also suffer the consequences of tenure insecurity created by
"outsiders" claiming unregistered land.
5.7 CREDIT ACCESS
Increasing the security of lenders through collateral enhancement and expanding the demand
for credit by investors are important theoretical benefits of strengthening property rights.
These benefits also depend on the unrestricted transferability of land, which permits formal
lenders to foreclose and liquidate property. To assess credit use, respondents in the survey
55. Having made only the initial visit and provided a plot map, a number of households thought that they
now held title to their property.
56. The first step is an overall demarcation of permanent green-zone areas, with the immediate goal of
impeding residential encroachment. At the time of the study, this stage had been completed in the Infulene
Valley but was stalled in District 4 due to lack of resources. The fee for the first stage was around 5,000,000
meticais. Projected for the future, the second stage is to be detailed demarcation of individual plots both to
indicate the areas currently unmarked and to adjust colonial demarcations to present-day land occupations. No
fee has yet been agreed upon for the stage-two surveys, and the Gzv was still trying to raise funds from the gov-
ernment and donor communities (personal communications with the director of the Gzv and topographers at
DINAGECA).97
were asked the number, amount, terms, and conditions of all loans received in the past five
years. Of 121 households in the sample, 25.5 percent of the registered and 17.1 percent of
the unregistered stratum made use of credit facilities (table 5.12). Despite similar frequencies
among strata, registered households on average borrowed 9,511,100 meticais per loan versus
139,200 meticais for unregistered households. Registered households tended to borrow from
both family and formal sources—Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (46.7 percent), family
(26.7 percent), Banco de Mozambique (6.7 percent), and the Caixa Central de Cooperação
Econômica (6.7 percent). Nonregistered farms tended to rely more heavily on family (23.1
percent), employers (30.8 percent), and friends (38.5 percent) as sources for capital.
Credit uses also varied between the two tenure groups. Registered households in relation
to unregistered households tended to use credit for financing nonfarm business (26.7 percent
versus 15.4 percent), building or repairing a house (13.3 percent versus 7.7 percent), and
purchasing a truck or windmill (13.3 percent versus 0 percent). Conversely, nonregistered
households tended to use credit more for purchasing consumer goods and services (consumer
durables, clothes, food, medical bills, and funeral expenses) (38.5 percent versus 26.8
percent), farm inputs (23.1 percent versus 6.7 percent), and additional land (15.4 percent
versus 0 percent). No collateral was offered in the case of nonregistered farms. However, in
the case of registered farms, only 26.7 percent of loans involved collateral on the machamba
and fixed-place investments, houses (20.0 percent), and vehicles (13.4 percent).
5.8 CONCLUSIONS
Eighteen years of socialism in Mozambique has a legacy of legal uncertainty, high
transactions costs, and excessive institutional involvement by local authorities and the state
in land allocation. Although land rentals and purchases are becoming more frequent, the
government continues in its attempt to control land allocation and use, periodically issuing
decrees that prohibit transfers without state authorization. The economic costs of land market
restrictions are difficult to enumerate but are, nonetheless, widely apparent in the frequent
occurrence of land disputes, land expropriation by the Dcu and local authorities, invasion of
irrigated land by refugees and private farmers, encroachment of urbanites seeking residential
land, absence of fair compensation, tenure insecurity, deteriorating incentives for long-term
investment, high transfer costs under indigenous tenure systems, and onerous procedures for
acquiring title under the statutory system.
The administrative system of land allocation served societal interests well in the years
between 1980 and 1987, when the enormous influx of refugees poured into the city. Local
bairro authorities and GDS assisted in locating and reallocating land to refugee families and
other disadvantaged people, albeit at the sacrifice of existing landholders. With the insurgency
at an end, it is now more difficult to overlook the inefficiencies of the system, the Political
influence that it has favored, and the corruption that has sometimes resulted.
There is no doubt that enhanced property rights are needed and wanted by smallholders
and large holders alike, and that the combination of nationalization, intrusion of refugees, andTABLE 5.12 Credit access of sample households, 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
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Percent households having received credit
in past five years (%)
22.4 18.5 21.1 15.4 25.5 17.1 20.7
Number of loans (#) 16 12 26 2 15 13 28
Total amount of loans (000 mt)
Source of credit received (%)
8,462.3 756.6 5,552.7 52.5 9,511.1 139.2 5,159.9
Banco Popular de Desenvo/vimento 31.3 16.7 26.9 - 46.7 25.0
Family 18.8 33.3 19.2 100.0 26.7 23.1 25.0
Friends 31.3 8.3 23.1 6.7 38.5 21.4
Employer - 41.7 19.2 6.7 30.8 17.9
Banco de Mozambique 12.5 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.1
Caixa Central de Cooperação Econ mico
Principal reason for obtaining credit
6.3 3.8 6.7 - 3.6
Nonfarm business 31.3 8.3 19.2 50.0 26.7 15.4 21.4
Purchase farm inputs 12.5 16.7 15.4 6.7 23.1 14.3
Build or repair house 6.3 16.7 11.5 13.3 7.7 10.7
Purchase clothes/food 6.3 16.7 11.5 6.7 15.4 10.7
Pay funeral expenses 6.3 16.7 11.5 6.7 15.4 10.7
Pay medical bills - 16.7 7.7 6.7 7.7 7.1
Purchase truck 6.3 8.3 7.7 13.3 - 7.1
Purchase land 12.5 3.8 50.0 - 15.4 7.1
Build windmill 12.5 7.7 13.3 7.1
Purchase consumer durables
Collateral offered
6.3 3.8 6.7 3.6
None 56.3 83.3 65.4 1 00.0 40.0 100.0 67.9
Machamba and fixed-place investments 25.0 - 15.4 26.7 14.3
House 12.5 8.3 11.5 20.0 1 0.7
Vehicle - 8.3 3.8 6.7 3.6
Boat 6.3 3.8 6.7 3.699
housing demand has seriously undermined security of land rights in the green zones. Yet the
alternative tenure arrangement provided by government is a Poor substitute. Land registration,
for all but the initiated and influential, is shrouded in uncertainty and comprises onerous
requirements and procedures that both exceed the abilities of smallholders and are inappropri-
ate to the needs of agriculture. Smallholders, who feel largely abandoned by the registration
process, are unsuccessfully turning to producer associations for protection of land rights, a
solution not without its own problems. Registration programs are never easy to implement,
nor are they cheap, however simple. Yet the de facto situation of vesting Powers of land
policy among multiple bodies with inadequate staff and resources has created a predicament
of too many parties voicing land policy, none of which has sufficiently clear responsibilities
and resources to perform its tasks effectively.
The socialist principles that once governed land policy seem asynchronous with the
demands of the modern economy now surfacing in Mozambique. The administrative structure
that once served the colonial government well has now been turned on its head. The Dcu and
DINAGECA, which had adequate funding for a much smaller volume of land services, are in
effect privatizing operations to make up for low salaries and budgetary shortfalls. Rumors of
corruption abound. Smallholders lack the resources and knowledge needed to acquire title to
their land. Until property registration procedures are greatly simplified and made more
transparent or a suitable model of group registration is discovered, political influence and
economic wealth will prevail as the driving forces determining title status.
In the current transformation from a socialist state to a market-oriented economy, the
Mozambican government has not yet agreed upon the appropriate role of the land market—or
even the degree to which market principles should govern resource allocation. Clearly, there
are some who favor state control over landownership and land-market restrictions as a way
to protect the resource base and societal interests. An unfettered land market based on private
ownership is not without problems of its own. Yet it is difficult to see how Mozambique's
market reforms can take hold without a land policy more geared to serving private interests.101
6. LAND PRICE DETERMINATION
Land-price determination models are now developed and evaluated to link plot and household
characteristics with the land-price perceptions of plot managers. Plot size, plot quality, and
physical improvements (access road and buildings) are found to be significant determinants
of both the reservation and offer price of land. Asymmetries in information and unequal
bargaining positions among households, which one might expect to distort price signals in a
land market characterized by administrative allocations, show either inconsistent or weak
effects. Regression models linking price differences (transactions costs) with household-level
attributes are also estimated. Farm size tends to have a negative effect on the price difference
due to reluctance of small landholders to dispose of land for income-security reasons or their
difficulty in making a competitive offer price for lack of purchasing power. A negative
relationship between income and transactions costs and a positive relationship between income
and land prices indicate potential for small farmers to exit agriculture and wealthier farmers
to expand their holdings, with overall improvement in employment opportunities. Land
registration tends to increase transactions costs due to greater risk of detection—and
consequent loss of land—from engaging in "illegal" transfers. Gender has no direct influence
on transactions costs per se, but the effects of unequal gender access are apparent through
differences in tenure status and farm-size attributes.
6.1 THEORETICAL MODEL
Equations (6.1) to (6.3) represent a general model of land-price determination for the i-th
plot:
(6.1) LP; = LP, [PCi, Li, Hi { P(M), Y, Z(M) }, Ti, A(HC)]
(6.2) LP
 = Lk: [PCi, Li, Hi {P(M), Y, Z(M)}, Ti, A(HC)]
(6.3) ti = LP; - LP 
where LP; is the reservation price that the manager would be willing to accept in disposing
of his or her i-th plot, LP': is the offer price that the plot manager would be willing to pay
in purchasing the same plot, PC; is a vector of physical-quality characteristics of the i-th plot
including land improvements, L; is a vector of attributes of the i-th plot's location relative to
markets or infrastructure, II;(...) is the annual net profit of the i-th irrigated plot, and A(...)
is a vector of household characteristics representing unequal bargaining power and
information asymmetry among households. Equation (6.1) links theoretical determinants on
the right-hand side of the equality with the reservation price of land, and equation (6.2) links
the same theoretical determinants with the offer price. The difference between the reservation
price and offer price in equation 6.3 is the transactions cost (ti) or economic rent accruing to102
uncertainty, and to intermediaries other than the buyer and seller who are involved in
negotiating and monitoring the transfer contract.
The reservation price and offer price are theoretically influenced by five sets of factors,
including plot quality (PC), location (L), plot income or productivity (II), tenure status (T),
and information asymmetries or unequal bargaining position (A). Physical characteristics or
land improvements that either enhance the productivity of irrigated land or increase the
owner's utility in nonfarm uses should theoretically raise both the reservation and the offer
price. Unfavorable location would theoretically lower plot price to the extent that labor time
in production (time from household to plot) and transportation cost in marketing (time from
plot to road or market) are increased. Agricultural profit (returns to family labor and land),
derived from prices (P), yields (Y), commercial inputs (Z), and market access (M), should
theoretically be positively related to the land price as long as land is inelastic in supply (which
is surely the case in the green zones). Tenure status (T) would theoretically lead to current
landholders' commanding a higher sale price and to greater willingness of borrowers to pay
a higher purchase price as long as it confers, on balance, either greater number of land rights,
greater certainty of rights, and/or lower costs of transferring land.
Price under competitive market conditions is the rationing mechanism that allocates land
among alternative uses and users. Under such market conditions, attributes PC, L, II, and
T should prevail as principal determinants of land prices. However, in markets characterized
by administrative transactions, household characteristics might play a more important role in
land allocation decisions and may dominate quality and location effects. Rather than resource
allocation being based on highest and best value, it may instead be determined by who is best
able to exert political or economic power, regardless of price. Yet financial lending
institutions, in order to find land an attractive collateral substitute, must see its price as being
highly predictive (having high probability of being realized in the market) and obtainable at
"reasonable" costs. A land equation that has no predictive power, based on either physical,
spatial, or social factors, would entail unduly high risks to banks seeking to expand
mortgage-based lending.
The pervasiveness of administrative transactions in the peri-urban green zones, as well
as the role of economic and political power in acquiring land from local and central
authorities, suggests at least the possibility that differences in human capital, wealth, and
political status among households are creating asymmetries in information access and
bargaining power. These asymmetries in turn may be affecting the prices that buyers are
potentially able and willing to pay for land as well as the prices that sellers are willing to
accept. Asymmetry leading to higher reservation and offer prices by political and economic
elites would tend to lead to higher levels of land concentration; lower prices would tend to
result in the opposite. However, many of the present landholders, who acquired their land
through administrative channels, did so during the 1975-1985 period. The increase in land
purchases and rentals that has been occurring since the mid-1980s may in fact suggest a more
competitive land market than is commonly believed, in spite of land restrictions.i03
6.2 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
Plot managers participating in the study were asked to state the price they would be willing
to pay for a plot identical to their i-th plot held (hereafter referred to as the reservation price)
as well as the price they would be willing to accept in disposing of the same plot (offer
price). Plot managers in general had difficulty answering these questions, though declaring
a reservation price proved easier than a hypothetical purchase price. Those not able to
respond (either 20 percent or 24 percent of managers, depending on the question) tended to
make up the most disadvantaged or marginalized populations. When the remaining
respondents were asked to justify the seemingly "exorbitant" land prices being reported, they
stressed the high future demand for—and value of—land in the peri-urban green zones and
their intention to capitalize on this trend.57 '
Mean values, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values for land prices
and other variables included in subsequent regression models are presented in table 6.1. The
average reservation price for plots in the reduced sample (which excludes households unable
to report either a reservation or an offer price) is 18,156, 890 meticais, and the offer price,
12,331,180 meticais. Based on the average plot size of .395 hectare, the average reservation
price per hectare is 45,966,810 meticais ($20,894), and average offer price per hectare,
31,218,177 meticais ($14,190). While these prices are consistent with certain land prices
(based on actual transfers reported in section 5, there is almost certainly some degree of
upward bias caused by the exclusion of those households unable to state prices as well as
households tending to speculate, sometimes wildly, about future capital appreciation.
58 The
price difference (5,825,710 meticais) is 32.1 percent of the reservation price—a very high
figure compared with real estate costs of around 6-10 percent in Western markets.
Plot-quality characteristics contained in subsequent regression models include size of
machamba, topography (whether plot is inclined), presence of salinity (yes or no), and extent
of flooding (a weighted scale from 0, meaning no problems, to 6, meaning frequent and very
serious problems). Alternative measures were also tried, including type of soil (whether
primarily clay, mud, or sand), severity of drainage problems and lack of water, without
improvement in model results. The average plot size is .395 hectare, but ranges from .02
hectare to 4.0 hectares. Of plots measured, 33 percent are on an incline, 57 percent have
salinity concerns, and 76 percent have flooding problems.
Various proxies for location were attempted, including walking distance from home to
plot as an alternative for higher monitoring, enforcement, and production costs; walking
distance to nearest road and to market as proxies for transportation and marketing costs;
location of plot by district; and proximity of plot relative to an access road. On average, 39
minutes are required from site of plot to nearest market by walking, and 7 minutes to the
57. In fact, rampant price speculation has taken place in the peri-urban area since this survey was
undertaken.
58. To the extent that prices are speculative, estimators in the subsequent regressions are biased, but may
still be consistent.104
nearest road. Only 8 percent of plots are situated adjacent to an access road suitable for
traffic by vehicles. The remaining variables-district and proximity to home (53 min-
utes)-were dropped from the subsequent regression models because of either high
multi-collinearity with other location variables or inferior model results.





Hypothetical sell price (000 mt) 18,156.9 32,534.7 30.0 200,000.0
Hypothetical offer price (000 mt) 12,331.2 26,151.6 15.0 150,000.0
Price difference (000 mt) 5,825.7 12,813.4 0.0 90,000.0
Plot-level attributes
Size of machamba (m
2) 3,954.0 7,012.2 170.0 40,000.0
Topography (inclined = 1) .33 .47 0 1.0
Plot has salt problems (yes = 1) .57 .50 0 1.0
Plot has flood problems (scale) . .76 1.58 0 6.0
Tenure status
Plot registered (yes = 1 ) b .42 .50 0 1.0
Right to sell plot (yes = 1) .41 .49 0 1.0
Locational attributes
Distance to nearest market (min)
c 39.3 33.0 3 210.0
Distance to nearest road (min)
d 7.1 8.2 0 45.0
Access road for vehicles (yes =1) .08 .27 0 1.0
Land improvements
Cement well (yes = 1) .19 .39 0 1.0
House or shed (yes =1) .24 .43 0 1.0
Livestock buildings (yes = 1) .14 .35 0 1.0
Number of fruit trees (#) 78.1 153.8 0 1,008.0
Plot productivity
Net plot income excluding family labor
(000 mt/plot) 2,504.6 8,642.0 -1,296.5 81,321.0
Household characteristics
Sex of plot manager (male = 1) .57 .50 0 1.0
Political status (yes =1)  .25 .43 0 1.0
Farm size (m
2) 5,379.8 9,893.9 240.0 76,000.0
Farm size/resident (m
2/person) 440.3 776.9 17.0 5,714.3
Farm and nonfarm income (000 mt) 3,792.7 9,017.2 -1,228.5 81,321.0
Nonfarm income (000 mt/resident) 136.6 394.1 .0 3,416.0
a. Multiplicative variable computed from frequency of problem (0=none, 1 =problem occurs
once per year, 2 = problem occurs multiple times) times severity of problem (1 = not very
serious, 2=somewhat series, 3=very serious).
b. Precarious, provisional, or definitive registration.
c. Minutes to walk the distance.
d. Means are calculated only for those observations for which complete information is available
in computing the variance, co-variance matrix in subsequent regressions.
e. A binary variable, 1 if the household has a member in the Grupo Dinamizador and bairro
organization, 0 otherwise.i05
A number of land improvements are commonly found in the study area, including dirt
wells, cement wells, walls or fences, irrigation ditches, sheds, houses, livestock buildings,
and traditional straw houses (palhotas). Managers were queried about the presence or absence
of all such improvements, and data were coded as binary variables (1 if improvement exists
on plot, 0 otherwise). In addition, data were collected on the number of banana and other
fruit trees on the plot. On average, 19 percent of plots in the reduced sample had a cement
well, 24 percent had a shed or a house, and 14 percent had livestock barns or stalls.
Furthermore, plots on average had 78 fruit trees. The remaining improvements were excluded
from subsequent regression models because of either too few improvements (palhotas, 6
percent), too many improvements (irrigation ditches, 72 percent), or high multi-collinearity
with other improvements on the plot (dirt wells with cement wells; walls or fences with
buildings).
Plot income or productivity represents the cumulative effect of plot quality characteris-
tics, improvements, inputs, prices, transport costs, and tenure status. It represents the use
value of land in agriculture, but excludes any household utility derived from quality of
location or place of home or business. Net plot income for the reduced sample is 2,504,593
meticais per plot or 6,340,742 meticais per hectare.
59
Asymmetry in market information or unequal bargaining Power among households may
act to distort price signals in a variety of ways. Farm size or access to nonfarm income
opportunities may help to increase access to capital markets and provide greater household
liquidity for land purchases. Conversely, to the extent that larger farms are less efficient than
small farms, a lower reservation and offer price would be expected. Political status (a binary
variable, 1 if the household has a member in the Grupo Dinamizador and bairro organization,
0 otherwise) could have either a positive or a negative effect on prices depending on whether
membership acts to facilitate or constrain access to land-market information or increases or
decreases access to administrative transactions through exertion of political power. Education
would tend to increase one's ability to assimilate price information, but the effect could be
either positive or negative. Status as a female manager would tend to have a dampening effect
on the offer price due to lower purchasing power and disadvantaged access to input and credit
markets. As indicated in table 6.1, the mean farm size is .54 hectare, but ranges from .02
hectare to 7.6 hectares; the mean farm size per resident ratio is .04 hectare per person, but
ranges from .0 hectare to .57 hectare per person. Approximately 57 percent of plot managers
are male, and 25 percent have household members who hold positions in the Grupo
Dinamizador or bairro organization. The mean of nonfarm income per resident is 136,561
meticais per person, but ranges from 0 to 3,416,000 meticais per person. Other household-
level factors—age of plot manager (46 years), years of education (3 years), or time managing
the plot (12 years)—were included at various stages of model development, but were later
dropped in favor of existing model specifications.
59. Despite concerns of bias in the reduced sample that stem from having to exclude those households unable
to state a reservation or offer price, net plot income is comparable to that of 6,160,000 meticais/hectare
computed for the overall sample in table 4.9 (p. 63), and the average size of irrigated holdings (.395 hectare
per plot) is nearly equal to that of .41 hectare per plot in the same table.i06
An increase in the number and certainty of land rights should theoretically raise both
the reservation and offer price of land, since sellers would demand a higher premium and
borrowers should be willing to pay more for the additional rights provided. Whether this
relationship holds in practice would depend on the breadth and certainty of rights provided
by the tenure system(s) and the transactions costs incurred in transferring rights. Registration
would theoretically increase the certainty of rights, but would not necessarily improve the
likelihood or costs of transferring land due to legal restrictions on private (unauthorized) sales
or rentals, increased exposure of registered plots to government scrutiny, and high
administration costs in processing leases. On average, 42 percent of plots in the reduced
sample have either precarious, provisional, or definitive title.
60
An alternative measure of tenure security-right to sell-is based on the codification and
ranking of individual use and transfer rights perceived by the plot manager. Each manager
was asked if s/he had the right to grow vegetables, plant fruit trees, build a wall or fence,
build a house, bequeath the plot to heirs, rent-out the plot, or sell the plot. Responses are
binary. Defining and ranking distinct combinations or bundles of rights is difficult because
of the large number of potential permutations. However, certain lexicographic relationships
can be exploited in the data to arrive at an alternative proxy. Theoretically, transfer rights
imply greater tenure security than use rights. Among transfer rights, rights of permanent
transfer are theoretically superior to rights of temporary transfer (rental), and the right to sell
is theoretically superior to the right to bequeath.
TABLE 6.2 Percentage of various rights held by a priori selection of designated







BUILD RIGHT TO RIGHT TO RIGHT
VEGETABLES TREES HOUSE BEQUEATH RENT TO SELL
# with primary right 161 156 111 134 73 70
Complementary rights (%
primary plots with right to)
100.0 100.0 100.0 1 00.0 1 00.0 100.0 Grow vegetables
Grow fruit trees 96.9 100.0 1 00.0 97.8 100.0 100.0
Build house 68.9 71.2 1 00.0 76.1 89.0 87.1
Bequeath to heirs 83.2 84.0 91.9 100.0 97.3 94.3
Rent-out plot 45.3 46.8 58.6 53.0 100.0 85.7
Sell plot 43.5 44.9 55.0 49.3 82.2 100.0
60. An index variable from low to high tenure security was attempted to capture the effects of precarious
registration having fewer rights of less duration than provisional registration, and both precarious and provisional
having fewer rights and less duration than definitive title: 0=no registration, 1=precarious registration,
2=provisional registration, and 3 =definitive registration. However, this variable did not materially improve
results, partially because respondents themselves rarely knew which type of title they held.i07
The data in table 6.2 confirm these hypotheses. Nearly all plot managers (161 of 162)
felt they could plant vegetables or fruit trees, but fewer perceived having the right to rent (73)
or sell (70). For those plots on which plot managers indicated a right to grow vegetables,
only 45.3 percent and 43.5 percent perceived the right to rent-out or sell, respectively.
Conversely, only 70 of 162 plot managers indicated an ability to sell the plot, but of these,
the vast majority also perceived the right to grow vegetables or fruit trees (100 percent), build
on the plot (87.1 percent), bequeath the land to heirs (94.3 percent), and rent-out the plot
(85.7 percent). Perception of right to sell is thus a good proxy for breadth of use rights and
inferior transfer rights as long as perceptions and actual rights are highly correlated (this
relationship is empirically untestable). On average, 41 percent of plots in the reduced sample
had plot managers who perceived having the right to sell, despite government restrictions
prohibiting private transfers.
6.3 DETERMINANTS OF TENURE STATUS
A review of table 6.3 reveals very little correlation between registration status and possession
of specific land rights. Registration status is not significantly correlated with right to
bequeath, right to rent, or right to sell. However, right to sell is positively correlated with
the right to rent (p=.658) and the right to bequeath (p= .335). Having the right to bequeath,
rent, or sell a plot does not appear strongly correlated with any of the measures of plot, plot-
manager, or household characteristics tested [the positive correlation between right to sell and
farm size per resident (p= .248) and size ofmachamba (p = .230) are exceptions]. Registration
status, on the other hand, is significantly correlated with presence of a cement well (p = .517),
house or shed (p=.516), wall (p=.452), livestock buildings (p=.427), size of machamba
(p=.423), number of fruit trees (p = .377), sex of plot manager (male =1) (p = .462), farm
size per resident (p =.390), and years of education (p =.227). Farm size in turn is highly
correlated with commercial outlays on farm operations (p=.668) and hours of hired wage
labor (p=.655). Thus, while it is difficult to generalize about the characteristics of plots and
managers associated with the right to sell, those plots being registered tend to be larger and
have substantial physical improvements; also, those households registering land tend to have
larger farms that are more commercially oriented. Moreover, registration status does not
necessarily confer the right to sell, rent, or bequeath, indicating that registered households
are claiming greater awareness—and perhaps observance—of legal restrictions on private land
transfers. In general, the data suggest a great deal of uncertainty and confusion among
households over whether or not private transfers are permissible.
6.4 LAND PRICE REGRESSIONS
Six alternative regression models are estimated in table 6.4 for the reservation price of land,
and in table 6.5 for the offer price. Model (A,G) examines the effect of plot quality
characteristics and registration status on price. Model (B,H) examines, in addition to plot
quality and registration status, the effect of location on plot value. In model (C,I), various108
indicators of land improvements are incorporated along with plot quality and registration
status, and location variables are replaced by presence or absence of an access road. Model
(D,J) is the same as model (C,I) except for the addition of various proxies for unequal
bargaining position or asymmetries in information. In model (E,K), net income per plot is
substituted for plot quality characteristics and capital improvements. Model (F,L) is the same
as model (D,J), except that right-to-sell is substituted for registration status. With regard to
the reservation price regressions in table 6.4, the various models explain between 55 percent
and 69 percent of total variation in the reduced sample, and errors appear normally
distributed. The various regressions for offer price do not provide comparable degrees of fit,
whether measured by R
2 values or standard errors of coefficients.
TABLE 6.3 Correlation between plot- and household-level characteristics and











Right to bequeath 1.000 .421
b .335
b -.068
Right to rent .421
b 1.000 .658
b .166
Right to sell .335
b .658
b 1 .000 .135
Plot registered (yes = 1) -.068 .166 .135 1.000
Plot characteristics
Topography (plot inclined = 1) -.113 -.007 -.177 .458"
Plot clay (yes =1) .080 .166 .356
b -.033
Size of machamba (m
2) .013 .137 .230  .423
b
Number of fruit trees (#) .041 .047 .049 .377"
Cement well (Yes =1) -.100 .137 .136 .517
b
Wall (yes =1) -.112 .068 .017 .452
b
Livestock buildings (yes =1) .041 .173 .160 .427
b
House or shed (yes =1) .013 .153 .033 .516
b
Access road for vehicles (yes =1) .053 .203 .106 .176
Income per plot (000 mt/ha) .077 .012 .038 .275 
Plot manager characteristics
Sex of plot manager (male =1) -.122 .072 .144 .462
b
Years plot held (years) .140 .125 .048 .013
Education of plot manager (years) -.212 -.177 -.005 .227 
Household characteristics
Farm size/resident (m 2/person) -.038 .134 .248  .390
b
Hired labor (hours/plot) -.001 .031 .158 .375
b
Political status (yes = 1) -.045 .025 -.010 -.173
Nonfarm income per resident (000 mt/person) -.206 -.001 .190 .219
a. One-tailed significance.
b. Two-tailed significance.109
TABLE 6.4 Land-price regressions, hypothetical reservation price,  1991 peri-urban
survey, Maputo
REGRESSIONS MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D MODEL E MODEL F
Constant 1,100.3 -2,380.6 -1,608.9 -1,365.1 2,427.3 258.7
(4,238.5) (6,407.7) (3,907.8) (4,907.4) (3,931.4) (5,427.9)
Size of machamba (ha) 30,856.0   31,130.3   25,745.3   21,3678.7   20,068.3
` 23,382.5  
(3,704.1) (3,730.1) (3,809.0) (7,321.9) (8,802.5) (7,598.7)
Topography (1 =inclined) 3,390.2 4,936.0 4,734.3 6,520.3 11,352.1
 
(5,231.9) (5,468.1) (5,111.3) (5,312.5) (5,434.9)
Salinity problems y = 1) -7,270.0 -7,159.9 -4,832.0 -4,785.6 -5,904.1
(4,588.4) (4,670.7) (4,183.3) (4,340.5) (4,514.0)
Flooding problems (scale) 2,555.2 " 2,369.8 3,071.3
  3,078.7
  2,645.5 -
(1,467.6) (1,503.6) (1,354.6) (1,379.2) (1,429.4)
Plot registered y = 1) 18,455.6
  18,614.6
  17,401.1
  16,379.0  
(5,561.1) (5,884.1) (5,297.6) (5,646.6)
Right to sell plot y =1) 723.4
(4,588.7)
Minutes to market (min) 74.0
(72.2)
Minutes to road (min) -11.6
(293.0)
Access road adjacent to 29,500.4  28,017.2
  30,049.3  
plot y = 1) (7,730.8) (7,879.7) (8,182.7)
Presence of cement well -15,117.3
  -19,101.4  -16,802.5
 
(y
=1 ) (7,263.8) (7,694.7) (7,990.7)
Presence of house or -3,926.3 -2,528.1 -962.1
shed y =1) 18,341.3) (8,483.7) (8,822.9)
Presence of livestock 32,191.2   31,800.8
  30,212.0  
buildings y =1) (9,354.4) (9,851.5)






Net income per plot 919.0
(000,000 mt) (332.1)
Farm size/resident 41,642.5 91,197.6 42,906.1
(ha/person) (64,684.9) (75,158.1) (67,428.8)
Sex of plot manager -738.4 6,487.5 3,400.8
(male =1) (4,773.1) (4,801.4) (4,743.3)
Nonfarm income/resident 7.7 7.1 9.6
(000 mt/person) (6.1) (6.6) (6.4)




.59 .59 .68 .69 .55 .66
Adj R
2 .57 .56 .65 .65 .53 .62
n 114 114 114 114 114 114
a. The dependent variable is in units of 000 meticais.
  = .05 significance;     = .10 significance. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.ii0
TABLE 6.5 Land-price regressions, hypothetical offer price,  1991 peri-urban survey,
Maputo
 REGRESSIONS MODEL G MODEL H MODEL I MODEL J MODEL K MODEL L
Constant 1,850.9 4,235.9 1,198.0 863.1 -457.3 1,385.7
(3,465.1) (5,190.1) (3,329.4) (3,860.5) (2,799.2) (4,145.2)
Size of machamba (ha) 22,759.4
  22,568.5   19,456.8 2,568.0 -541.7   3,039.2
(2,875.5) (2,917.0) (3,046.2) (5,412.6) (6,162.6) (5,491.8)
Topography (1 =inclined) -3,653.5 -4,513.3 -4,116.9 -2,040.7 692.9
(4,290.5) (4,542.0) (4,401.3) (4,197.3) (4,129.6)
Salinity problems y= 1 ) -4,155.9 -4,309.4 -3,756.3 -3,206.2 -3,761.6
(3,689.2) (3,745.3) (3,476.8) (3,342.5) (3,391.2)
Flooding problems (scale) 268.5 322.0 771.7 402.9 154.3
(1,168.3) (1,204.2) (1,110.7) (1,046.5) (1,053.5)
Plot registered y = 1) 12,199.7
  11,754.7
  9,290.9   7,621.4 -
(4,530.7) (4,740.0) (4,469.8) (4,397.9)
Right to sell plot y =1) 1,046.0
(3,437.7)
Minutes to market (min) -33.7
(60.5)
Minutes to road (min) -69.0
(241.2)
Access road adjacent to 21,073.1   19,664.7   20,948.0
 
plot y=1) (6,671.2) (6,257.5) (6,312.4)
Presence of cement well -5,584.9 -10,131.4
" -8,824.4
y=1) (6,225.5) (6,047.8) (6,098.7)
Presence of house or -3,536.5 5,541.6 5,256.3
shed y =1) (6,279.8) (5,953.9) (6,043.7)
Presence of livestock 19,464.3   17,934.3   18,334.6
 
buildings y = 1) (7,628.2) (7,129.0) (7,251.6)
Number of fruit trees (#) -17.2 -14.9 -13.1
(12.6) (11.8) (12.0)








Sex of plot manager -160.7 4,298.4 1,680.5
(male =1) (3,720.0) (3,448.6) (3,616.4)
Nonfarm income/resident 5.7 7.1 6.5
(000 mt/person) (4.6) (4.6) (4.7)
Political status (y =1) -3,265.3 -3,954.7 -3,947.3
(3,700.2) (3,856.1) (3,752.7)
R2 .52 .52 .61 .68 .59 .67
Adj R
2 .50 .49 .57 .63 .56 .62
n 109 109 109 109 109 109
a. The dependent variable is in units of 000 meticais.
= .05 significance;   = .10 significance. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.1i1
6.4.1 RESERVATION PRICE REGRESSIONS
Regarding the reservation price of land, each hectare in the green zones has a marginal value
of between 20,068,260 meticais and 31,130,250 meticais, or $9,122-$14,150 per hectare,
depending on the model, significant at the 5 percent confidence level. An incline in slope
tends to increase and the presence of salinity problems tends to decrease land price, but
neither variable is highly significant. Each step of the scale in the flooding index increases
land price between 2,369,787 and 3,078,733 meticais, depending on the model, indicating
the effect of improved water availability for vegetable cultivation. Possession of registration
significantly improves the price of land in all models, from 16,379,037 to 18,614,562
meticais, or from $7,445 to $8,461 per plot. As registration does not legally confer additional
transfer rights, the premium can be attributed to either credit benefits (which, as table 5.12,
p. 96, indicates, are present but weak) or greater security of land use rights. Location factors
in model B show mixed effects with wide standard errors. Possession of the right to sell tends
to have a positive effect on the reservation (and offer) price, but results are not significant.
Presence of a road significantly increases the reservation price of a plot by 28,017,169
to 30,049,319 meticais, and presence of livestock buildings augments it by 30,211,988 to
32,191,159 meticais). While dirt wells tend to be only 1-2 meters in depth, cement wells tend
to be deeper and are located on slopes or in areas of deep water tables." The significantly
negative coefficient for presence of a cement well (-15,117,260 to -19,101,424 meticais per
plot) would thus appear to be capturing the latent effect of lack of water and higher cost of
water lifting for irrigated vegetable production. Net income per plot (918,957 meticais) is
shown to significantly increase the reservation price through the combined effect of plot-
quality characteristics, prices, use of animal stalls, and transport costs, but the R
2 declines
as the model excludes the utility derived from nonincome-earning improvements, including
residential uses.
None of the variables included as proxies for unequal bargaining position or information
asymmetries—farm size per resident, sex of plot manager, nonfarm income per resident, or
political status—appears to significantly affect the formation and transmission of land-price
signals in the peri-urban zone.
6.4.2 OFFER J ER PRICE REGRESSIONS
Regarding the offer price for land, each hectare in the green zones has a marginal value of
between 19,456,790 and 22,759,440 meticais, or $8,844 to $10,345 per hectare, depending
on the model, significant to the 5 percent probability level. Unlike the reservation price
regressions, an incline in slope tends to decrease land price. Like the reservation price
regressions, presence of salinity problems tends to decrease land price while the flooding
index increases it, but neither variable is statistically significant. Possession of registration
6i. Presence of a cement well is significantly correlated with sandy soil (p = .25i) and inclined topography
(p= .402). Dirt wells are significantly correlated with clay soils (p= .292) but are not significantly correlated with
slope (p=.042).112
significantly improves the price of land in all models, by 7,621,437 to 12,199,735 meticais,
or $3,464 to $5,545 per plot. Location factors in model B are negative and consistent with
expectations but, nonetheless, exhibit wide standard errors.
Presence of an access road suitable for vehicle traffic significantly increases the offer
price of a plot by 19,664,707 to 21,073,127 meticais, and presence of livestock buildings
increases the offer price by 17,934,305 to 19,464,330 meticais. Net income per plot (526,497
meticais) is again shown to significantly increase the offer price, but, like the reservation
price regressions, the R
2 declines as a result.
Also unlike the reservation price regressions, the household-level indicators for
asymmetries in bargaining position and information exhibit higher levels of significance,
though only farm size per resident is statistically significant. For every unit (hectare) increase
in farm size per resident, the offer price of land increases by 17,297,765 to 21,409,486
meticais per hectare. Land acquisition through the GD and bairro organizations is the lowest
tier of administrative transactions and tends to be used by the poorest farms. Political
membership in local organizations tends to decrease the offer price, consistent with
expectations, though results are not highly significant. Reliance on nonfarm income may
improve cash liquidity and ability to pay, which would have a positive effect on the offer
price. Alternatively, nonfarm employment could theoretically drive up the opportunity cost
of family labor and reduce the offer price for land. Model results show that access to nonfarm
income tends to increase the offer price, though results are not highly significant.
6.4.3 PRICE DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS
The regressions in table 6.6 evaluate the relationship between the price difference (reservation
price less offer price) and farm size, income, land rights, and gender status. Model M
examines the relationship between price difference and farm size while controlling for size
of plot.
62 The relationship between income and price difference is estimated in model N.
Model 0 examines the impact of registration status, and model P, possession of right to sell
on the price difference. Model Q estimates the impact of gender on transactions costs while
controlling for the effects of farm size, income, and tenure status.
Theoretically, small households with limited access to land would be more reluctant to
sell their holdings at any price for reasons of social security, income security, and felt need
to bequeath land to children. A lower offer price would also be expected because of lack of
purchasing power. Both relationships should result in an unambiguous negative effect on the
price difference. The results in table 6.6 lend support to this hypothesis. For each marginal
(hectare) increase in land size, the price difference tends to fall by between -4,218,420 and
-4,978,560 meticais per hectare, significant at the 5 percent level.
Limited land access need not be a constraint on willingness to sell land assets if
households have access to other, nonfarm income or if income is derived from other farm
62. Alternatively, price differences could have been expressed in per-hectare terms.1i3
TABLE 6.6 Land price regressions, hypothetical transactions costs or price
difference,' 1991 peri-urban survey, Maputo
 REGRESSION MODEL M MODEL N MODEL O MODEL P MODEL Q
Constant 2,384.4
  1,788.5 587.4 3,299.8
  999,8
(1,208.5) (1,219.7) (1,344.3) (1,425.3) (1,710.2)






(2,621.4) (1,806.3) (2,591.8) (2,623.2) (2,667.8)





size (ha) (1,857.9) (1,811.4) (1,855.2) (1,799.6)
Total household income 251.6
" 231.8  
(000 mt) (140.5) (135.2)




Right to sell plot (y = 1) -2,601.4 -2.750.1
(2,159.0) (2,084.3)
Sex of plot manager 1,204.7
(male =1) (2,290.1)
R
2 .31 .30 .36 .32 .39
Adj R
2 .30 .28 .34 .30 .35
n 106 106 106 106 106
a. Dependent variable is the price difference between reservation and offer price in units of 000
meticais.
" = .05 significance; = .10 significance.
plots. Wealthier households may have a higher reservation price because of either superior
productivity or less need for distress sales. Higher household income would theoretically tend
to lower the reservation price of small farms and also tend to increase their offer price due
to improvements in purchasing power. The results in table 6.6 are consistent with these
conclusions. For each marginal increase (000 meticais) in total household income, the price
difference increases by 231,811 to 251,608 meticais per plot.
In situations where land markets are unrestricted and information is perfect, possession
of registration ought to reduce transactions costs by increasing the certainty of property rights
and reducing the time and money spent by buyers and sellers on negotiating and monitoring
land contracts. However, to the extent that risk to buyers and sellers is increased from
privately transferring land or that the administrative process of acquiring and renewing
registrations is costly relative to transfers in the informal market, a positive effect between
title and transactions costs would be expected.
63 The effect of registration status in table 6.6
(that is, registration status increasing the price difference by 5,366,721 to 6,276,289 meticais
63. Sellers engaging in unauthorized transfers of registered land risk being fined, whereas buyers risk having
the land expropriated.1i4
per plot) would tend to support the conclusion that transactions costs increase with possession
of title.
Regardless of registration status, perception of right to sell ought to result in a lower
reservation price by the seller and a higher offer price by the Potential buyer due to lower
transactions costs. Overall, a negative relationship between right to sell and the price
difference would be expected. As indicated in table 6.6, presence of right to sell decreases
the price difference by -2,601,357 to -2,750,078 meticais per plot, but results are not highly
significant.
Finally, to the extent that women have constrained access to land, employment, or input
and capital markets, a positive relationship between gender and the reservation price would
be expected. However, the net effect on the price difference is uncertain, since the offer price
may increase as well if, due to constrained access, women must pay more for land in the
market. The gender variable for plot management in table 6.6 suggests that being a male
increases the price difference by 1,204,713 meticais per plot compared with female managers;
thus being a female would tend to lower the price difference, but results are not statistically
significant. Being a male manager is not significantly correlated with net plot income,
nonfarm income, or right to sell, but is significantly and positively correlated with title
(p=.462) and farm size (p=.252). Gender thus does not have a direct influence on
transactions costs per se, but the effects of unequal gender access are apparent through
differences in tenure status and farm-size attributes.
6.5 SUMMARY
Land-price determination models are developed and evaluated in this section to link plot
attributes and household characteristics with land-price perceptions by plot managers. Plot
size, flooding problems, and presence of an access road or buildings are found to be
significant and positive determinants of both the reservation and the offer price of land. These
model results show that a substantial amount of the variation in land prices can be explained
by economic factors based on plot quality or improvements. Asymmetries in information and
unequal bargaining position among households, which one might expect to distort price
signals in a land market characterized by administrative allocations, show either inconsistent
or weak effects. To the extent that land-resource allocation is determined by political or
economic power rather than market mechanisms, these administrative allocations do not
appear to be distorting land prices as perceived by plot managers.
Regression models linking price differences (transactions costs) with household-level
attributes are also estimated. Farm size tends to have a negative effect on the price difference
due to reluctance of small landholders to dispose of land for income-security reasons or their
difficulty in making a competitive offer price due to lack of purchasing power. A negative
relationship between income and transactions costs and a positive relationship between income
and land prices indicate potential for small farmers to exit agriculture and wealthier farmers
to expand their holdings, with overall improvement in employment opportunities. Landi15
registration tends to increase transactions costs due to the greater risk of detection and loss
of land from engaging in "illegal" transfers, while perception of right-to-sell tends to reduce
transactions costs. Gender has no direct influence on transactions costs per se; the
disadvantages that women experience in the land market appear to be fully captured by
differences in tenure status and farm-size attributes.
Despite problems in collecting data for the reservation and offer price variables, signs
on coefficients are mostly consistent with economic theory, and the various models explain
the majority of variation in land prices. The predictive power of the regression models
suggests the emergence of a land market with potential for distributing land among the best
and most efficient uses. While the predictive power strengthens the possibility of mortgage-
based lending by financial institutions, transactions costs remain very high—to such an extent
that land-collateral value will experience steep discounting in financial transactions until such
time as transactions costs are reduced. The data are not sufficiently disaggregated or robust
to explain the high difference between reservation and offer prices. One can only surmise that
not only are search and negotiation costs high, but also buyers and sellers incur considerable
risk in transfers due to legal restrictions. The land market appears to exhibit particular
sluggishness among those households with both small-farm size and low income, since they
lack the financial means to acquire more land and demand a steep reservation price to part
with land. As employment opportunities expand in the postwar era, growth in income will
help lubricate the land market, particularly among smaller holdings. Rather than being
demand constrained, land transactions (administrative and market) are being overly curtailed
by legal impediments and enforcement, both of which seem terribly asynchronous with the
Powerful market forces that are presently emerging in Mozambique.ii7
ANNEX A
SAMPLING FRAME FOR PERI-URBAN BASELINE SURVEY
Phase 1 of the peri-urban project was implemented by The Ohio State University from
January to April 1991. The survey includes a sample of 330 households in the urban to
peri-urban area of Maputo. In the course of designing the research, the investigators faced
two pressing concerns (Graham and Roth 1990a,b). First, census data or population lists that
might be used to select sample households were either unavailable or out of date. Second,
official population records or lists that might exist would likely be outdated by the rapid
influx of migrants or would miss significant numbers of the refugee and indigent population.
Two fortuitous circumstances helped the team to overcome these problems. First, aerial
photographs were available in DINAGECA based on flight lines piloted in August 1989. When
enlarged to a scale of 1:10,000 (1:40,000 original), these provided a reasonably accurate
overview of residential establishment and expansion. Second, the municipality of Maputo had
constructed good maps of physical infrastructure and population density as of 1982. Paul
Jenkins, an architect/planner with the UNDP Urban Development and Housing Program in the
Ministry of Construction and Water, was hired to relate aerial photographs to city landmarks
and to update the city map for changes in layout since 1982. The aerial photographs combined
with Jenkins's detailed understanding of city infrastructure and residential density on the
ground enabled the team to develop the following research design.
A grid map containing 500 blocks, each block measuring 1 kilometer to a side, was to
be overlaid on a physical map of Maputo. Population density gradients were then to be
assigned to each grid—for example, 0 being no population resident, 1 the lowest level of
residency, and "x" the highest (where x is the population density factor of the most highly
populated block relative to the least populated block). Blocks without resident population as
well as those with 100 percent habitation and full services were to be excluded, the former
because of no population, the latter because it was considered urban. Blocks were then to be
randomly selected. A second set of procedures identified and selected individual households
within each designated block. This scheme was intended to cover all residential areas
(excluding urban tracts) out to the end of the security zone, with households sampled in each
block in proportion to the population density.
In practice, the actual survey design was implemented as follows:
1. The peri-urban area was defined as Greater Maputo City, including the satellite urban
districts of Matola and Machava. This area covers 675 square kilometers.
2. This area was subdivided into 544 blocks, each 1 square kilometer, by overlaying the
grid onto a city map (table A2).i18
3. An aerial photograph mosaic was then prepared from the 1:10,000 enlargements. Lines
of the grid were drawn onto the aerial photographs and a grid map transparency copied.
4. The base map overlaid with the grid was then used to pinpoint the administrative
location of each block. The aerial block overlaid with the grid permitted analysis by
block of land use (residential, industrial, agricultural) and, in the case of residential
land use, the proportion of coverage, residential characteristics, and number of housing
units).
5. Residential characteristics were identified as follows:
a. dispersed spontaneous, occupation of a predominantly rural character;
b. planned, no services;
c. planned, basic services;
d. planned, medium services; and
e. planned, full services.
The final grid showing the number of blocks associated with 13 different categories of
residency and scope of settlement (percentage of blocks with either more or less than
50 percent of the area classified as residential) is provided in table Al.
6. Only those blocks meeting the following criteria were retained for sampling purposes.
First, all blocks with less than 50 percent residential use were excluded on grounds that
it would distort the study by including too many grid units with dispersed, spontaneous
residential occupation. Second, all extensive areas of planned residential use with full
services, and thus considered to be urban, were eliminated. Third, areas with other
forms of residential land use were excluded if more than 50 percent of the area was
planned with full services. After deleting these blocks, only 87 blocks remained for
sampling purposes (table A2).
7. Each of the blocks remaining was assigned a population gradient coefficient, ranging
from 1 to >45. Blocks with 1-5 residential units would have two households sampled.
Blocks with >45 residential units would have a maximum of 11 households sampled.
Based on these criteria, the final research design called for a survey of 524 households.
An indicative outcome of this sampling design is illustrated by figure Al. Blocks with
less than 50 percent residency (1, 2, 3, 7, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 102, 443,
444, 445, 446, 476, 477, 478, 480, 511, 512, 514, 515) were excluded, as were blocks with
50 percent or more full services (5, 6, 40, 74, 483, 510, 517, 544). The remaining blocks
were sampled.
These procedures have two important implications for the characteristics of households
included in the survey design:
First, urban is defined as any area with full services. Areas with high residential density
that would normally be considered urban by nature of building infrastructure are consideredii9
peri-urban. By excluding dispersed settlements and the possibility that perhaps as high as 25
percent of the people on the urban fringe are excluded," there is some risk that the sample
is biased toward the urban population. To the extent that in-coming migrants settle in more
outlying areas or in more dispersed settlement, there is risk that the sample is underweighted
in migrant population.
Second, due to resource constraints and security risks in District 7, the survey was
scaled back to 330 households. It is not clear how this affects the randomness of the sample
population.
TABLE A1 Residential characteristics of grid survey design
NUMBER OF BLOCKS
RESIDENCY CHARACTERISTICS
< 50% > 50% Total
Dispersed spontaneous 88 10 98
Spontaneous 44 19 63
Spontaneous/planned (no services) 3 1 4
Spontaneous/planned (basic services) 5 29 34
Spontaneous/planned (basic/medium) 1 7 8
Spontaneous/planned (medium) 1 3 4
Spontaneous/planned (full) 7 6 1 3
Planned (no services) 2 0 2
Planned (basic services) 5 10 1 5
Planned (medium services) 2 3 5
Planned (full services) 12 1 1 23
Planned (basic/medium services) 0 1 1
Planned (basic/full services) 0 2 2
Total 170 1 02 272
Source: Work performed by Paul Jenkins, 1990.
64. Assuming that the median point between 50 percent and 100 percent residency is 75 percent and that
the median point between 0 percent and 50 percent is 25 percent, and given that the households are evenly
distributed over these ranges, one can conclude that the baseline survey was offered to about 75 percent of the
pen-urban population, and not to about 25 percent.i20
TABLE A2 Target population and sampling frame, Phase 1 of the
household baseline survey
RESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLDS TO
DENSITY NUMBER OF BE SELECTED PER TOTAL SAMPLE
(units/ha) BLOCKS BLOCK SIZE
1-5 14 2 28
6-10 4 3 1 2
11-15 2 4 8
16-20 15 5 75
21-25 23 6 138
26-30 6 7 42
31-35 4 8 32
36-40 5 9 45
41-45 1 0 10 100
>45 4 11 44
Total 87 524
Figure Al Schematic diagram of peri-urban sampling frame
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